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ABSTRACT 
The domestic non-state sector is a potential core component of the economy of 
Vietnam. Many institutional changes have been made by the Vietnamese government 
during the transition to a market economy to support the development of the non-state 
sector. The thesis provides an in-depth investigation into the effects of privatisation on 
the new domestic non-state manufacturing sector's performance in Vietnam in a series 
of three core essays. 
The first essay (Chapter 3) examines the technical efficiency level of non-state small 
and medium manufacturing firms by using the stochastic frontier approach and data for 
small and medium enterprises in 1991, 1996, and 2001, from the Ministry of Labour, 
Invalids and Social Affairs of Vietnam. Both cross-section and panel models are 
estimated, showing a high level of technical efficiency of non-state small and medium 
manufacturing firms and an improvement in their technical efficiency level over the 
period studied. The results indicate that a greater use of family labour and a 
metropolitan location are associated with an improvement in technical efficiency, while 
direct government financial and non-financial assistance to businesses has few benefits. 
The performance of the non-state small and medium manufacturing firms is further 
investigated in the second essay (Chapter 4). In this essay, a new method called 'the 
error index decomposition method' is developed to analyse the contribution of 
productivity, firm size, and the prices of outputs and intermediate inputs to a firm's 
value-added. The method introduces an error term into the decomposition equation to 
capture measurement biases and white noise that are generated by using the industry 
deflater instead of the observed price to resolve the dimensionality problem. Empirical 
application of the method using the data set of non-state small and medium 
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manufacturing firms in 1996 and 2001 indicates that total factor productivity is the most 
important factor contributing to a firm's value-added. The findings, again, reveal the 
ineffectiveness of the government assistance program. 
The third essay (Chapter 5) examines the impacts of institutional reforms with a 
particular focus on the second phase of the economic reforms in Vietnam since 2000 on 
non-state firms' economic performance. The results indicate that the improvement of 
government practices and institutional performance including information provision, 
land tenure security and labour training assistance is positively associated with non-state 
firm performance. By contrast, the presence of a weak judiciary system and 
administrative reforms impede growth of the non-state sector. 
The findings from the thesis imply that if the lack of a skilled labour force and capital 
shortages are addressed, administrative obstacles are overcome, and market information 
provision and the judiciary system are strengthened to promote cooperation among 
firms, the non-state sector in Vietnam will continue to improve overall economic 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1 
The transition from a centrally planned to a market economy is often identified by the 
increasing share of the private sector in GDP and rapid institutional changes. Literature 
on transitional economies has often focused on the causal-effects between privatisation 
and firm performance changes. For instance, Frydman et al. (1999), Megginson and 
Netter (2001), Djankov and Murrell (2002), and Bennett et al. (2004) investigate the 
effectiveness of the privatisation programs in Central and Eastern Europe and the 
former Soviet Union. Walder (1995), Bai et al. (1997), Lin et al. (1998), and Fung et al. 
(1999) examine the impacts of privatisation on firm performance in China. 
In an attempt to shed light into the efficiency of privatisation in Vietnam, Che et al. 
(2001) investigate the impacts of market reform on the productivity of agriculture, 
Pham (2001) examines the effectiveness of market policies on the export performance 
of foreign invested enterprises (FIEs), and Vu (2003) analyses the effects of the 
privatisation programs on the performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, 
questions still remain regarding the effects of privatisation on the performance of the 
new domestic manufacturing non-state sector in Vietnam. This thesis gives a 
comprehensive insight into the new domestic manufacturing non-state sector in 
Vietnam, including its performance and the impacts of institutional reforms since the 
start of the economic reform 'Doi moi' process. 
Doi moi began in 1986 with gradual reforms. Their first objective was to rescue the 
economy from the economic crisis that resulted from the ineffective central planning. 
To achieve this aim, the reforms were targeted: (i) to improve the efficiency of SOEs, 
and (ii) to promote the development of the non-state sector. 
The SOE reform in Vietnam which began in 1981 and preceded the economic reforms 
can be divided into three phases. The first round of the reform was carried out from 
2 
1981 to 1985 under the centrally planned framework. A few changes, such as allowing 
SOEs to produce and sell partially their products in free markets, were taken and the 
impacts were moderate (Vu 2002). The second round of reform took place in the period 
1986-96 when the country moved towards a market economy. Reform measures during 
this period were strengthened with the issuance of Decree No. 338/HDBT on the 
20/11/1991 on establishing and liquidating SOEs and the Law on SOEs in 1995. These 
bold measures of economic reform and the favourable economic conditions in the 
middle of the 1990s had a positive impact on SOEs' economic performance. However, 
difficulties facing SOEs after the Asian financial crisis in 1997 led to a considerable 
number of loss-making SO Es. This triggered the third round of reform from 1997 which 
has continued to the present. This reform focused on the privatisation of SOEs under the 
guidelines of Decrees No.28/CP, 07/05/1996, No.44/1998/ND-CP and No.64/2002/ND-
CP. 
The SOE reform process has resulted in a significant fall in the number of SOEs, from 
12,000 in 1991 to 6,000 in 1994 (CIEM 2002) and to 4,086 in 2005 (GSO 2007). The 
share of industrial output of SOEs has also diminished from 49.63% in 1996 to 25.10% 
in 2005 (GSO 2007). Although the reforms have eliminated some priorities previously 
given to SOEs, they have granted more autonomy to SOEs. Consequently, the 
performance of SOEs has improved (Mekong Economics 2002; Vu 2002). 
Nevertheless, a recent study on efficiency of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) by 
Nguyen et al. (2007) shows no differences in efficiency performance among SOEs and 
private ownership firms. 
The economic reforms in Vietnam also promote the development of the non-state 
sector. This sector includes FIEs and the domestic non-state sector. FIEs were the result 
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of the foreign direct investment program, which began in 1988. Although FIEs account 
for only 3.27% of all enterprises and generates 19.56% of the total employment, they 
produce 43.70% of the value of industrial outputs in 2005 (GSO 2007). This remarkable 
performance, compared to that of the state and domestic non-state sectors has attracted a 
large body of literature such as, Pham (2001), Le (2002), Freeman (2002), and Tran 
(2007). These studies investigate the performance of FIEs and recommend policy 
options that assist Vietnam in attracting foreign direct investment. 
On the other hand, despite its legal recognition since the beginning of the 1990s and the 
increasingly crucial role in the economic development process, little attention has been 
given to exploring the development of the domestic non-state sector in Vietnam. This is 
partly due to the unavailability of relevant data. Most of the studies on the domestic 
non-state sector focus on the policy environment (MPI-UNIDO 1999; Sakai and Takada 
2000; Steer and CIE 2001; Schaumburg-Muller 2005; CIEM 2006). Analyses also 
emphasise obstacles impeding the development of domestic non-state enterprises 
through small-scale surveys (Ronnas et al. 1998; Webster and Taussig 1999; CSEG and 
CIEM 2002; earlier and Tran 2004a; IFC/MPDF 2005). Attention has been recently 
extended to quantitative analyses. For instance, Vijverberg and Haughton (2002) 
investigate the survival and growth rate of non-farm household enterprises in Vietnam 
during the period 1993-98. Hansen et al. (2004), Kokko and Sjoholm (2004), and 
Kokko and Tingvall (2005) analyse the survival and growth rate of non-state SMEs 
from 1991-2001 and the impact of government support and internationalisation on their 
survival and growth. 
Despite the above efforts, questions still remain: (i) how efficient and productive are 
domestic non-state enterprises? (ii) which factors influence their efficiency and 
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productivity? what is the determinant of the success of a domestic non-state firm? and 
(iii) how have institutional changes during the transition affected firm economic 
performance? 
Under the current legal framework, the domestic non-state sector (to this end the non-
state sector) in Vietnam includes informal household enterprises, cooperatives, and the 
private sector's four types of ownership: sole-proprietorships, limited companies, 
shareholding or joint-venture companies and partnership enterprises. The common 
characteristic of non-state enterprises is that they are at small and medium scale with 
nearly 99% of firms employing up to 300 workers and 90% of enterprises having fewer 
than 50 employees (GSO 2003). Generally, non-state enterprises experience working 
capital shortages and possess obsolete technology (GSO 1998, 2003), but the situation 
has improved in limited and shareholding companies. 
In terms of economic performance, the non-state sector performs well in generating 
employment and job growth. By 2004, the proportion of employment generated by the 
non-state sector had increased to 52.39% (GSO 2005). Despite this contribution and the 
upsurge in the number of non-state firms, the non-state sector's share in the industrial 
outputs has increased slightly, from 24.5% in 2000 to 29.0% in 2004 (GSO 2005). This 
relatively slow increase in economic importance and the growth and survival rate of 
non-state enterprises (Carlier and Tran 2004a; Hansen et al. 2004) raise concerns about 
the economic performance of this sector. 
A key contribution of the thesis is the exploration of the technical efficiency of non-
state manufacturing enterprises and factors influencing this efficiency level. More 
importantly, the thesis gives insights into the performance of non-state enterprises by 
extending previous work (Fox et al. 2002) and introducing a new method, called 'the 
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error index decomposition method', to decompose the contribution of productivity to a 
firm's economic performance. The thesis also surveys institutional changes in Vietnam 
during the transition period and models impacts of these changes on firm performance. 
Understanding the actual performance and factors that constrain the performance of 
non-state enterprises effectively directs government and policy makers towards better 
policies to promote the sustainable development of the non-state sector. 
The thesis is composed of three core essays which are presented in Chapters 3 to 5. The 
first two core chapters (3 and 4) examine non-state SME enterprise performance in 
terms of technical efficiency and productivity. The last core chapter (chapter 5) analyses 
the impacts of institutional changes on firm economic performance during the transition 
period with a particular focus on the second phase of the economic reform in Vietnam 
since 2000. 
In the first core essay, presented in Chapter 3, the stochastic frontier approach is applied 
to the data of non-state manufacturing SMEs collected by the Institute of Labour 
Science and Social Affairs (ILSSA) of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social 
Affairs (MOLISA) of Vietnam in collaboration with the Stockholm School of 
Economics (SSE) of Sweden in 1991, 1996 and 2001. The results show that average 
levels of efficiency of the non-state small and medium manufacturing industries are 
high. The results also indicate an improvement in technical efficiency over the period 
studied and a considerable variation in efficiency levels among firms. The determinants 
of such differentials are identified, showing that a greater use of family labour and a 
metropolitan location are associated with improvement in technical efficiency. The 
results indicate few benefits from direct government financial and non-financial 
assistance to businesses. 
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The second core essay (Chapter 4) develops a new method called 'the error index 
decomposition method' to decompose the contributions of productivity, prices and firm 
size to a firm's value-added. The method introduces an error term into the 
decomposition equation to capture measurement biases which are caused by using the 
deflater instead of the observed price. An application of the method is given using the 
same data set as in Chapter 3, but excluding the data in 1991. The error index 
decomposition method provides a comparison of performance of all firms to the 
hypothetical representative firm. The analysis allows firms and policy makers to realise 
the key factors contributing to the success or failure of a firm, and suggest strategies to 
improve firm economic performance. 
In the third core essay (Chapter 5) we investigate institutional reforms in Vietnam, 
focusing on three aspects of institutional performance: (i) provision of information; (ii) 
security of private property rights; and (iii) lower transaction costs that arise from 
reduced administrative procedures and less discretion by state officials. The impacts of 
institutional changes on firm economic performance are investigated using countrywide 
firm-level data collected by the General Statistics Office (GSO) of Vietnam in 2005 and 
the provincial competitiveness index 2006 (PCI06). The PCI06 reflects the 
improvement of institutions since the second phase of economic reforms in Vietnam in 
2000 and differences in the implementation of the central government's regulations and 
policies at provincial level in creating a fair business and policy environment to all 
economic sectors. 
The results of Chapter 5 are compelling. They show that provincial competitiveness is 
economically and statistically significant in explaining cross-province differences in 
firm performance. We find that a one percentage improvement in government practice 
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could increase the daily value-added of an average firm by an amount equivalent to 
nearly three times daily per capita GDP. The results indicate that an improvement in 
providing market information, more secure land tenure and labour training assistance 
has a positive effect on firm performance. By contrast, weaknesses in the judiciary 
system and administrative reforms impede the growth of non-state firms. Overall, 
findings imply that governance is an important obstacle to the development of the non-
state sector in Vietnam. 
The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 provides the background of the non-
state sector in Vietnam. This chapter is an overview of the legal framework for the 
formation and development of the non-state sector. It also discusses the general 
characteristics, performance and constraints facing non-state enterprises during the 
transition period. This is followed by two core chapters (Chapters 3 and 4) investigating 
the economic performance of non-state enterprises in terms of efficiency and 
productivity. Several factors that affect firm performance are also investigated in these 
two chapters. Chapter 5 focuses on the effectiveness of the privatising program in 
Vietnam. Concluding remarks are offered in Chapter 6. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE NON-STATE SECTOR IN VIETNAM 
9 
2.1 Introduction 
The economic crisis in Vietnam early in the 1980s led to economic reforms in 1986, 
which transformed the economy from a centrally planned system to a market economy, 
with a socialist orientation. The reforms targeted: (i) improving the efficiency of SOEs 
and (ii) stimulating the development of the non-state sector. This sector was expected to 
overcome drawbacks of SO Es including inefficiency, weak competitiveness and failure 
in generating sufficient jobs. More importantly, the non-state sector was supposed to 
sustain economic growth and become a core component of the economy. 
In an attempt to promote the development of non-state enterprises, the Vietnamese 
government has carried out a number of policy changes to create a better business 
environment and a 'level playing field' for all economic sectors. However, weaknesses 
in institutions supporting markets, lack of experience in managing the market economy 
on the government's side, and attitudes favouring the state sector have resulted in many 
constraints towards the operation and development of non-state enterprises. Although 
market-entry barriers have been lessened, obstacles such as limited access to factors of 
the production, markets and information have been challenging non-state enterprises. 
Consequently, the non-state sector has stayed small with the dominance of household 
enterprises. According to the enterprise countrywide surveys conducted during 2000-02 
by GSO, 99% of non-state enterprises employ up to 300 workers and 90% of enterprises 
have less than 50 employees. Policy and institutional changes have promoted the 
increase of more evolved ownership types such as limited and shareholding companies. 
Nevertheless, the inverse transformation from sole-proprietorships to household 
enterprises is a warning for an over-regulated environment. The difficult business 
environment constrains the performance of non-state enterprises. Although they 
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perform well in generating job and despite the dramatically increase in the number of 
non-state firms, the share of the non-state sector in industrial output has increased 
slowly and its contribution to GDP has decreased during the period 1995-2004 (GSO 
2005). 
This chapter reviews economic reforms and provides background of the non-state 
sector, focusing on the characteristics, performance and constraints facing non-state 
enterprises in Vietnam. Following discussion of the features of the economy before 
1986 in Section 2.2, attention is turned to economic reforms with a particular focus on 
institution building for non-state sector development in Section 2.3. The general 
characteristics, performance and constraints facing noff-state enterprises are provided in 
Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Economy of Vietnam before Doi moi reforms 
In 1954, after the Geneva Agreement, Vietnam was divided into two parts, characterised 
by two contradictory economic systems. North Vietnam adopted a centrally planned, 
socialist economy while South Vietnam followed a capitalist model. 
In the early years of the socialist economy (1954-1957), North Vietnam accepted multi-
economic sectors based on different ownership types: the state, collectives 1, and private 
ownership types, including individual businesses and private-state joint-venture [Cong 
ty h<Jp danh]. In 1957, the state sector provided only 26.9% of GDP (Nguyen and 
Hoang 1990: 35). 
1 In collectives, people contributed all their assets, worked together, and received the same returns. This 
sector concentrated on agricultural and handicraft areas. 
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To mobilise all resources for the "war against the Americans", the following period 
(1958-1960) witnessed the determination of North Vietnam to transfer private and 
individual ownership types into state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and collectives. 
However, individual businesses still played an important role in the economy during 
this period. Their contribution to GDP was 33.4% in 1960 (Nguyen and Hoang 1990: 
41). 
Following the Third Communist Party Congress2 (1960), the period 1961-7 5 
experienced the mass restructure of all private ownership types into the state and 
collectives. North Vietnam also applied a large-scale heavy industry scheme. Until 
1975, not only were private ownership types considered illegal, but they also faced 
discrimination. No materials and credits were allocated to private enterprises if they 
existed (Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences 2006). Individual ownership forms were 
limited to small-scale enterprises. Small-scale traders were not allowed and were 
transferred into collectives. The contribution to GDP was mainly from the state sector, 
accounting for 88.4% of GDP. The formal and informal private sector contributed only 
10% of GDP in 1975 (Nguyen and Hoang 1990: 46). 
After reunification in 1976, the northern economic system was applied to the south. 
Private companies were either transferred into SOEs or re-structured as private-state 
joint-ventures where the state held controlling interest. The economy was dominated by 
two state economic sectors: SOEs and collectives. Private and individual ownership 
firms were considered 'the enemy of socialism' and existed illegally in the 'grey zone' 
as informal household businesses. 
2 The political system in Vietnam has a unique ruling Communist Party, which holds a National Congress 
every five years to adopt a five-year strategy for socio-economic development. 
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Under the centrally planned economy, the government made all decisions about the 
production process, from the allocation of inputs to the distribution of outputs. SOEs 
and collectives acted in the economy as main production units for the government. 
There were no market transactions and prices, credit and interest rates mal-functioned 
(Le 1999). The mechanism of this model was based on the average distribution. That 
meant everyone received the same return, regardless of the individual's productivity. 
This could not create the incentives needed for economic development and squandered 
the country's scarce resources. In addition, the development strategy, of boosting large-
scale heavy industry right after reunification ( 197 6) while lacking capital, advanced 
technology as well as talented managers with technical and managerial skills, was 
inappropriate. It was also clearly ill-suited to the predominantly agricultural economy 
and small-scale industry of Vietnam and the need for alleviating prevalent starvation 
after the "American war" (Dao 1990). Consequently, GDP growth rate was less than 
that of population growth as shown in Table 2.1 (page 33). The economy fell into a 
severe economic crisis at the beginning of the 1980s with hyperinflation and widespread 
famine that needed comprehensive reforms. 
2.3 Economic reforms and legal framework for the non-state sector 
The economic crisis revealed the inefficiency of SOEs and collectives. They did not 
provide enough outputs and services for the economy. Furthermore, widespread 
starvation and the failure of the state sector in absorbing the expansion of the labour 
force showed that the prohibition of the non-state sector was unwise (Dao 1990: 19). In 
fact, its existence was necessary to overcome drawbacks of the state sector. This 
triggered the so-called 'Renovation Process' 'Doi moi' that focused on economic reform 
and began in 1986. This paved the way for the issuance of a series of legal documents 
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for the formation and development of the non-state sector. 
The development of the non-state sector in Vietnam can be divided into three periods. 
The first, from 1986 to 1992, was considered as the launching period of economic 
reform. This brought the non-state sector from the 'grey zone' for the first time and 
transformed the economy from a centrally planned model to a market economy with 
socialist orientations. Nevertheless, institutions supporting markets had not been created 
yet. The non-state sector faced many obstacles to registering and operating businesses. 
The second period, from 1993 to 1998, witnessed little improvement in the policy 
environment though a number of legal decrees had been issued. However, favourable 
economic conditions during this period following trade liberalisation in 1993 improved 
firm economic performance. In addition, there were numbers of firms which 
transformed from simple ownership forms to more complex ones. Though many 
constraints still remained, this period can be named the transformation period to 
indicate efforts from both government and firms to improve economic performance. 
The last period, from 1999 until present, is one of rapid changes in institutions and 
policies to streamline costly administrative procedures and stimulate the development of 
the non-state sector. This period has witnessed a huge increase in the number of non-
state enterprises. However, the performance of this sector is less than satisfactory. Yet, 
with the growth in firm numbers and achievements that firms obtain, this period can be 
known as the development period. 
2.3.1 First period (1986 - 1992): Launch of economic reforms 
The Sixth Party Congress of Vietnam in 1986 marked a milestone for the legal 
existence of the non-state sector. It acknowledged officially the multi-sectoral 
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economy, including the state sector, the collective sector, the private sector, individuals 
and households (Vietnamese Communist Party 1986) for the first time since 1975. 
Following the Party Congress, a number of legal decrees were issued to set up the legal 
framework for non-state sector operations. The first was the Decision No.27-HDBT3, 9 
March 1988 on policies towards the non-state economic sector. This Decision 
transformed the strategy of the Sixth Party Congress into specific policies towards the 
non-state sector. Following this was Resolution No.16/NQTW4, 15 July 1988 on small-
scale non-state-sector activities, which stated that the non-state sector would be allowed 
to operate outside the state planning process and should not be discriminated against. 
The recognition of the non-state sector was re-iterated at the Seventh Party Congress in 
mid-1991, where the property rights of individuals and private ownership types were to 
be protected legally for the first time (Vietnamese Communist Party 1991). To 
encourage the development of the non-state sector, a series of legal documents was 
issued including the Land Law (1988), the Company Law (1991a), the Law on Private 
Enterprises (1991b) and Decree No.66/HDBT, 2 March 1992. 5 More importantly, the 
property rights of different economic sectors were re-confirmed in the Constitution 
(1992). This also stated that all economic sectors had rights to be treated equally while 
preserving the leading role in the economy of the state sector (MPI-UNIDO 1999: 7). 
3 Decision no.27-HDBT, 9 March 1988, by the Council of Ministers on Policies Towards Private 
Manufacturing Sector, Services and Transportation [Nghi Dinh s6 27-HDBT ngay 9-3-1988 ban hanh quy 
djnh vB chinh sach d6i v6i kinh t~ ca th@, kinh t~ tu doanh san xu~t cong nghi~p, djch vi.i, cong nghi~p xay 
di.mg, v~ tai] 
4 Resolution No.16/NQTW, 15 July 1988, by the Politic Bureau on the Renovation of Management 
Policies and Mechanisms Towards the Non-state Economic Sectors [Nghi quy~t s6 16/NQTW ngay 15-7-
1998 cua Bi) Chinh tri vB d6i m6i chinh sach va ccr ch~ quan ly d6i v6i cac ccr sa san xu~t thui)c cac thanh 
phAn kinh t~ ngoai qu6c doanh] 
5 Decree No.66, 2 March 1992 on household enterprises and small traders [Nghi djnh s6 66-HDBT ngay 
2-3-1992 vB ca nhan va nh6m kinh doanh c6 v6n th~p hO'll v6n phap djnh quy dinh trong nghj djnh s6 
211-HDBT ngay 23-7-1991] 
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The issuance of the law on private enterprises and the company law in 1991 led to the 
registration of a number of informal household businesses as private enterprises of 
which the majority is sole-proprietorships.6 Collectives were transformed into either 
household businesses or private associations under the name 'cooperative'. Those 
cooperatives were, however, basically synonymous to socialist collectives. Under the 
contemporary legal framework, the domestic non-state sector in Vietnam included the 
following ownership kinds: cooperatives, sole-proprietorships, limited companies and 
household enterprises. In reality, there has been one more ownership form, known as 
partnership7 enterprises, operating under no specific law (MPI-UNIDO 1999: 7). 
The classification by ownership is largely administrative. Households are small firms 
with up to 20 workers (Schaumburg-Muller 2005: 356). If they wish to expand further, 
they must register under the private enterprise law. Sole-proprietorships differ from 
household firms mainly due to their larger size and greater reliance on paid labour. 
Partnerships are distinguished from sole-proprietorships in that they have two or more 
owners. In reality, sole-proprietorships and de facto partnerships are somewhat similar 
since one of the owners of partnerships is only nominal (Ronnas 1992: 12). 
Even though the legal framework brought the non-state sector out of the 'grey zone', 
weaknesses of the government in managing the market economy did not encourage the 
development of this sector. Registration procedures were too complicated and costly. 
6 In Vietnam, a sole-proprietorship is officially named a 'private enterprise'. To avoid confusion, we use 
the word 'sole-proprietorship' for this kind of enterprise while the word 'private enterprise' is used to 
indicate private ownership types in general, which include sole-proprietorships, limited and shareholding 
companies, and partnership enterprises. 
7 The author believes that this kind of ownership originated from the category 'private-state joint-venture' 
under the centrally planned economy. It was, then, transferred to de facto private enterprise under the 
market economy. However, the basic legal framework at that time had not been changed to capture this 
ownership type 
16 
Private property rights were unclear. For instance, the Land Law (1988) only gave 
enterprises and individuals the right of using land in the long term. It did not state that 
land users had the right to use land as loan collateral, restricting a firm's ability to 
access capital. Capital and labour markets, which did not exist at that time, were also 
constraints to firms' operations. In addition, the state sector was given priority to keep a 
leading role resulting in unequal treatment between the state and non-state sectors in 
practice. Consequently, non-state enterprises faced many difficulties at the outset. 
Constraints toward firm entry limited the number of household businesses to register as 
private enterprises. In addition, a tendency of transferring from collectives to household 
firms following the de-collectivisation movement late in the 1980s led to the dominance 
of household enterprises in the economy (Table 2.2, page 33). As shown in Table 2.2, 
sole-proprietorships constituted only a small number during this period. The number of 
SOEs was small as well because they dominated other sectors such as education and 
administration that are excluded from this Table. 
Despite difficulties facing the non-state sector, economic reforms positively affected the 
economic growth of Vietnam. GDP growth rate was 4 times that of population in 1993 
as shown in Figure 2.1 (page 32). The country had one of the highest economic growth 
rates in the region. 
2.3.2 Second period (1993-1998): Transformation 
Many constraints facing the non-state sector in the first period still remained during this 
time. The issuance of a number of legal documents such as the Land Law (1993), the 
Labour Code (1993), the Law on Bankruptcy (1994), Amended Company Law (1994a), 
Amended Law on Private Enterprise (1994b) and the Cooperative Law (1996) did not 
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improve the policy environment. The unfavourable policy environment was reflected in 
the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress in 1996, which still favoured the state 
sector by confirming the consistent policy of developing the multi-sectoral economy 
under the socialist orientation while preserving the leading role of the state sector 
(Vietnamese Communist Party 1996). 
The sole improvement of the legal framework in this period was the Land Law (1993), 
which allowed land users to transfer land use rights and to use land as loan collateral. 
Other changes were minor. For example, compared with the Company Law and the Law 
on Private Enterprises, the only change in the Amended Company Law and Amended 
Law on Private Enterprise was the change of registration agencies from the provincial 
economic arbitrage to the provincial planning and investment committee. In addition, 
despite the encouragement from the Resolution of the Eighth Party Congress to develop 
de facto cooperatives and the issuance of the cooperative law in 1996, a few 
cooperatives were established. Nevertheless, the favourable economic condition during 
this period following the opening-up of the economy to the world in 1993 increased the 
number of non-state enterprises. Furthermore, trade liberalisation led to the appearance 
of more evolved private ownership types such as shareholding or joint-venture 
companies. 8 In 1994 only, the number of licensed businesses was little more than half of 
that of the period 1991 to the end of 1993 (Table 2.3, page 34). 
Not much improvement in the policy environment could be seen during the 
transformation period. However, the favourable economic environment promoted the 
development of the non-state sector in both qualitative and quantitative aspects. Most 
8 In our paper, we use the word 'shareholding' and 'joint-venture' company interchangeably. 
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enterprises during this period benefited from high GDP growth rate (Figure 2.2, page 
32) and demand expansion. Firms were more profitable, accumulated enough capital 
and upgraded technology. 
2.3.3 Third period (1999 -2005): Development 
The economic slowdown in Vietnam late in the 1990s brought the attention of the 
Vietnamese government to the non-state sector for its potential to create jobs and 
sustain economic growth. In this period many government efforts were made to create a 
better policy environment and a level playing field for non-state enterprises. A 
milestone was the issuance of the Enterprise Law (1999) that was considered the most 
successful legislation. This helped to simplify the registration procedures and market 
entry of firms. However, the leading role of the state sector was reconfirmed in the 
Ninth Party Congress in 2001 (Vietnamese Communist Party 2001 ). This explains why 
the non-state sector still faces an unfair competitive environment and can not achieve 
the robust development. 
Easier entry during this period pushed the number of non-state registered firms up to a 
high level (Table 2.4, page 34). Furthermore, the passing of the new Law on 
Cooperatives (2003) led to an increase in the number of cooperatives. In the period from 
2000 to September 2003 alone, the number of non-state registered firms, including 
cooperatives, sole-proprietorships, limited and shareholding companies was almost 
double that in the previous decade, from 45,000 to 83,890 firms (Carlier and Tran 
2004a: 1-2). For household enterprises, there have been no officially published figures 
so far. According to World Bank working paper No.30434 (Carlier and Tran 2004a: 6), 
the number of informal non-state and household enterprises may be up to 2 million at 
the end of 2002. If this figure is correct, the non-state sector in Vietnam is 
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characterised mainly by household firms, which account for around 95% of total non-
state firms (calculation based on the number of non-state registered firms). 
Despite the ease of entry barriers, constraints towards firms' operation remained. In 
addition, the financial crisis in East Asia in 1998 caused a half decline in FDI and GDP 
of Vietnam in both 1998 and 1999 in compared with the previous period (see Figure 
2.2, page 32). This led to a contraction of both external tradable activities and domestic 
aggregate demand. The less favourable economic environment and the increasing 
competition as a result of the considerable rise in the number of non-state firms 
increased the number of loss-makers (World Bank 1999b). According to the GSO, the 
number of operating firms was equal to nearly half of the registered establishments 
(second line in Table 2.4, page 34). 
To promote the development of the non-state sector, the Vietnamese government 
implemented the SOEs reform program with a particular focus on privatising SOEs and 
promoting the non-state sector. As a result, Resolution 05 9 of the Ninth Central Party 
Committee 10 in 2002 on reforming mechanisms and policies to stimulate the 
development of the private sector, and Decision 94/2002/QD-TTG11 on 17th July 2002 
about government programs to implement Resolution 05 were issued. Government 
attention was also addressed to SMEs as they accounted for more than 99% of the non-
state sector (GSO 2003). Consequently, a program that supports SMEs was 
9 Translated from the Vietnamese: 'Nghi quyet H()i nghi !fut thu 5 Ban Chfrp Hanh Trung lf ong Dang 
kh6a IX ve tiep t\lC d6i m6i CO' che, chinh sach, khuyen khich va t~o dieu kien phat trien kinh te tu nhan'. 
1° Central Party Committee members are elected through the Communist Party Congress. They meet 
every two months to specify the Party Congress' strategy into Resolutions. 
11 Translated from the Vietnamese: 'Quyet dtnh s6 94/2002/QD-TTG ngay 17/07/2002 ve chuong trinh 
hanh d()ng cu.a chinh phii th\fc hien Nghi quyet hQi nghi !fut thu 5 Ban Chfrp Hanh Trung lf ong Dang 
kh6a IX v8 tiep t\lC d6i m&i CO' che, chinh sach, khuyen khich va t~o dieu kien phat trien kinh te tu nhan'. 
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implemented following the government Decree No.90/2001/CP-ND 12 on supporting the 
development of SMEs. 
The most valuable legal document which reflects government efforts in creating a 'level 
playing field' is the new enterprise law in 2005. This law is applied for all kinds of 
enterprises regardless of their economic sectors. Limited and shareholding companies in 
which the state holds less than 50% of legal capital also operate under this law. 13 
Recently, the Tenth Party Congress, in March 2006, confirmed supporting programs for 
SMEs and the sentence "preserving the leading role of the state sector" was removed 
(Vietnamese Communist Party 2006). This promises more favourable economic 
conditions for the sustainable development of the non-state sector in the future. 
2.4 The non-state sector 
2.4.1 Characteristics 
Ownership structure and economic activities 
The non-state sector in Vietnam consists of a small part of formal private enterprises 
and cooperatives, and a major part of informal household businesses. At the beginning 
of the reform process, private ownership types were more concentrated under the form 
of sole-proprietorships. Calculations based on the number of firms in Panel A, Table 2.5 
(page 35) show that this ownership form accounted for more than 70% (72.09% from 
1991to1993, and 78% in 1994). Multiple owners (limited and shareholding companies) 
12 Translated from the Vietnamese: 'Nghi djnh cua Chinh phu s6 90/2001/ND-CP ngay 23 thang 11 niim 
2001 v6 trq giup phat tri@n doanh nghi~p vira va nh6'. 
13 Before 2005, the enterprise law was applied only for domestic private enterprises. SOEs and FIEs 
operated under the law on SOEs and the foreign investment law. 
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were limited, reflecting the risky business environment as well as the insecure property 
rights. Economic activities were also concentrated in manufacturing industry, trade and 
services, finance, and construction (Panel A, Table 2.5, page 35). Although new 
registered enterprises were outnumbered by private enterprises, their registered capital 
was small compared with that of SOEs (Panel B, Table 2.5). This suggests that private 
enterprises are equipped with less mechanised capital and are concentrated in labour-
intensive areas. 
Within the manufacturing industry, non-state enterprises concentrate on food 
processing, construction materials, and wood products (Table 2.6, page 36). It is 
understandable because these industries require low capital investment, have low risk 
and generate high interest. Entry to more high-tech industries such as equipment and 
machinery, electronics, and chemical industries seems to be constrained because of lack 
of capital and the monopoly of the state sector during this period. Constraints facing 
non-state enterprises will be studied further in Section 2.4.3. 
Efforts of the Vietnamese government in creating a sound business and policy 
environment have affected the ownership structure. According to the countrywide 
enterprise surveys carried out from 2000 to 2004 by the GSO, the percentage of 
mul~tiple ownership types including limited and stock companies has increased 
significantly, whereas the percentage of sole-proprietorships has reduced from 58.70% 
in 2000 to 35.69% in 2004 (Table 2.7, page 37), much lower compared to the more than 
70% at the beginning of the reform process. 14 This decrease can be partly explained by 
the inverse transformation from sole-proprietorships to household firms to benefit from 
14 It should be noted that the ownership structure in Table 2. 7 does not include cooperatives. If this kind 
of ownership is added, the proportion might be changed. 
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tax advantages 15 and avoid an over-regulated environment towards private firms. 
Though the number of private ownership types has increased considerably, the non-state 
sector is still dominated by household enterprises, which accounted for 98.84% of the 
non-state sector in 1999 (GSO 2002). 
In contrast to ownership structure, the distribution of economic activities has not been 
changed much during this period compared with the beginning period of the reform 
process. Firms have still concentrated in trade, hotel and food processing industries 
(World Bank 2004). This suggests that lack of capital and human resources, as well as 
the state sector monopoly, constrain non-state enterprises to engage in high-tech and 
" -·\,., 
high-return industries. In addition, most non-state enterprises produce products for 
domestic markets. They neither engage much in export activities nor compete with 
imports (Kokko and Tingvall 2005). 
Firm size and technology 
Generally, the domestic non-state sector stays small compared to the state and foreign 
invested sectors. According to the enterprise countrywide surveys from 2000-02 by the 
GSO (2003), nearly 99% of non-state enterprises are at small and medium scale, having 
up to 300 workers (as shown in the bottom of Table 2.8, page 38). Of these, more than 
90% have up to 50 workers and a capital of under 10 billion VND 16 (bottom of Tables 
2.8 and 2.9, pages 38, 39). Figures in Table 2.10 (the first and fourth column, page 40) 
show that, on average, non-state enterprises employed 29.74 workers during the 2000-
15 In Vietnam, household enterprises are not required to retain accounting records for calculation ofvalue-
added and profit taxes, but pay lump-sum taxes to local authorities (MPI-UNIDO 1999) 
16 VND is Vietnamese currency. The exchange rate in 2000 is: US$ 1 = 14 168 VND. 
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04 period, one twelfth of that of state enterprises and one ninth of that of foreign 
invested companies. Among non-state ownership types, limited and shareholding 
companies are the largest. 
Domestic non-state enterprises are far behind SOEs and FIEs not only in terms of 
labour, but also in terms of capital. For instance, figures in Table 2.10 show that 
working capital, fixed assets and long-term financial investment per unit of labour of 
non-state enterprises are much smaller than those of SO Es and FIEs. Less capital is also 
reflected in Table 2.11 (page 41) where non-state enterprises, particularly cooperatives, 
are found to use the highest proportion of only hand tools in 1998. This suggests that the 
non-state sector possesses obsolete technology. 
2.4.2 Performance 
Reducing poverty 
Though the number of non-state enterprises has risen significantly, they are 
concentrated in some developed areas such as the Red River Delta (especially Hanoi, 
the capital), the south east, and the Mekong River Delta (especially Ho Chi Minh City, 
the biggest commercial city in the country). Based on the Vietnam household living 
standards surveys (VHLSS) 1992 and 1998, Vijverberg (1998) and Vijverberg and 
Haughton (2002) give evidence of higher standards of living and participation in a non-
farm household enterprises. Moreover, the report written by Steer and the Centre for 
International Economics (Steer and CIE 2001) states that regions with higher numbers 
of registered private enterprises have relatively low poverty rates. However, this result 
must be examined further as regions with higher concentration of non-state enterprises 
are also home to higher proportions of SOEs and FIEs (World Bank 2004). 
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Generating employment 
One of the biggest issues for the Vietnamese leader is to create jobs for the expanding 
labour force, of which more than 50% are untrained and unskilled workers (World Bank 
2004). Furthermore, labour redundancies from the state sector following the 
privatisation and the movement of unskilled workers from rural to urban areas are 
pressing concerns, as to how to create enough jobs for these workers. Non-state 
enterprises have become a good part of the solution. According to the annual 
countrywide enterprise surveys carried out during the period 2000-2004 by the GSO, 
the percentage of employment in non-state enterprises has increased from 33.26% in 
2000 to 52.39% in 2004 (Panel B Table 2.12, page 42). On the other hand, the 
proportion of jobs in the state sector has decreased because of privatisation. It should be 
noted that the GSO collects data from formally registered firms, so the data may miss a 
proportion of employment in household and informal private enterprises. If these 
enterprises are added, the proportion of jobs created by the non-state sector may be 
considerably higher than the published figures. The VHLSS 1997-8 find that the non-
state sector employed more than 64% of industrial workers in 1997. Given these facts, 
the non-state sector plays an important role in generating employment for the whole 
economy. 
Efficiency and contribution to GDP 
The enterprise countrywide surveys 2000-2 conducted by the GSO reveal that among 
ownership types, the non-state sector exhibits the highest percentage of loss-making 
enterprises (20.4%) and the lowest ratio of profit per unit of capital. Figures in Table 
2.13 (page 42) also indicate that non-state enterprises have lower revenue per unit of 
labour than SO Es. These figures make non-state enterprises appear to be less efficient 
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than SOEs. However, if we compare differences between capital and revenue per unit of 
labour, the performance of non-state firms is not trivial. For instance, in 2000, while 
non-state enterprises used nearly one-third the capital of SOEs, they produced similar 
revenue per unit oflabour. 
Despite the increasing number of firms, the contribution to GDP of the non-state sector 
during this period is diminishing (Table 2.14, page 43). A possible explanation is the 
increasing contribution to GDP of the foreign invested sector. Nevertheless, the results 
raise concerns about the sustainable growth of the non-state sector and its role as the 
core component of the economy. Chapters 3 and 4 give a deep insight into the 
performance of this sector. 
2.4.3 Constraints 
Despite the easing of entry barriers and the improvement in the business environment, 
non-state enterprises still face many constraints towards their operation and 
development. Limited access to factors of production such as land and capital, lack of 
market opportunity and information on markets, insufficient transparency in the existing 
legal framework leading to red tape and the discretion of state officials, unskilled 
workers and managers as well as negatively biased social norms, are all hindrances. 
Capital 
Given the fact that most non-state enterprises own obsolete technology and are short of 
both working and fixed capital, access to government loans, especially low interest rate 
credits, is the critical condition for firms to develop. In the surveys on non-state SMEs 
carried out by ILSSA in 1991, 1996 and 2001, the majority of firms consider lack of 
capital as the major constraint to their development. The countrywide enterprise 
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surveys in 2000-2 by the GSO show that the proportion of credit capital of all 
ownership types accounts for 38% of the increasing investment capital. This credit 
capital is mainly provided to SO Es and FIEs. A very minor proportion of credit capital 
comes to non-state enterprises. 
Limited access to capital is attributed to complicated procedures and harsh requirements 
on collateral biased towards non-state enterprises. While SOEs can use any of their 
assets, including business contracts, as collateral, banks accept only land use right as 
collateral if borrowers are non-state enterprises and most do not have this. Machinery 
and business contracts are not accepted as collateral. In addition, to be an eligible 
candidate, firms must have a profile of long-term operation. This is impossible for non-
state enterprises as the non-state sector was legally recognised only a decade ago. 
Land 
According to the industrial countrywide survey in 1998 by the GSO, on average, an 
SOE has 1610 square metres (m2) of premises and land, a FIE has 550 m2, whereas a 
non-state enterprise has only 170 m2• While SOEs do not use all their premises, non-
state firms experience a lack of sufficient premises to develop their operation (World 
Bank 2004). 
The survey of 300 non-state firms in Hanoi and surrounding areas carried out by the 
World Bank in 2004 draws a gloomy picture about the development of the non-state 
sector due to lack of land. The survey reveals that most firms interviewed are concerned 
about premises constraints and consider this an obstacle for their robust development. 
Non-state firms complain that it takes time for them to find appropriate premises, but 
the rent contract term is often short as landlords expect to raise rents in the near future. 
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To have large premises for their production processes, non-state firms have to rent from 
SOEs or in industrial zones, or they must find places in other provinces. However, 
SO Es can not lease their premises formally. Furthermore, due to lack of infrastructure in 
industrial zones and other provinces, as well as complicated procedures and highly 
informal costs, most non-state enterprises give up their expanding production plans 
(Carlier and Tran 2004a). 
Market opportunity 
Another obstacle for non-state enterprises is access to markets. To survive and grow, 
firms need a larger market share. However, the enterprise countrywide surveys in 2000-
2 by the GSO reveal that 48% of firms find it hard to access market information (World 
Bank 2004). Carlier and Tran (2005) find that important market opportunities, for 
instance, public bidding contracts, are designed deliberately to be biased in favour of 
SOEs. Moreover, promoting commercial contracts between non-state enterprises and 
larger firms such as SOEs or FIEs is limited due to lack of an efficient judiciary system 
to protect property rights and solve economic disputes in Vietnam. Support from 
government to access market information is inefficient. Non-state firms have to rely on 
their own personnel while most of their managers lack marketing and management 
skills. 
Discretion of tax officials 
Lack of transparency in the existing legal system causes red tape and the discretion of 
officials in government bodies. These result in many problems for non-state firms. Tax 
officials often visit firms, reasoning that non-state enterprises are dishonest and have 
'tax fraud' behaviour. The time a firm needs to receive tax officials requires a full-time 
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employee to take charge of this duty. Furthermore, the existing legal system in Vietnam 
requires that a formal transaction should be justified by a 'red invoice' 17 and the 
procedure of getting a 'red invoice book' is very complicated and costs time (see Carlier 
and Tran (2004a) for more detail). In addition, arbitrariness by tax officials in 
determining what items and how much could be deducted as expenses, is very common. 
To avoid these troubles, firms choose bribes as the most efficient solution. This, in tum, 
causes no motivation for firms to report their genuine financial situation. Consequently, 
they lose potential investors and opportunities to access credit. 
Unskilled workers and inefficient out-sourcing services 
The majority of the labour force in the non-state sector is unskilled and has a low 
training level. Except for a small proportion, people often engage in the non-state sector 
after failing to get jobs in SO Es or FIEs. This stems from social norms, which consider 
non-state enterprises as dishonest and vulnerable (Webster 1999), contributing to biased 
attitudes towards the non-state sector from public and government bodies. 
Given poorly trained workers and managers, non-state firms can benefit from 
outsourced services. Yet, free business development services from the government are 
of low quality and often cannot meet firms' need. Also, paid services are too expensive 
for their quality (Service-Growth Consultants Inc and Thien Ngan Co.Ltd 1998). In 
addition, firms lack information about business development services and their roles 
towards enterprise development. Even worse, firms hesitate to use outsourcing fearing 
that their internal information may benefit rivals (GTZ-VCCI-Swisscontact 2002). 
17 The 'red invoice' is considered formal and approved by the state budget in Vietnam. It is red and issued 
by the Ministry of Finance. 
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Consequently, non-state enterprises relying on their in-house services need to employ 
more staff, which increases costs of labour. This weakens their competitiveness. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter provides an investigation of the historical development, general 
characteristics, performance and constraints facing the non-state sector in Vietnam. 
'Doi moi' economic reforms in 1986 created a legal framework for the formation and 
development of the non-state sector. Since then, a number of legal decrees have been 
issued aiming at building a better policy environment for non-state firms to develop. 
However, the emphasis on the 'leading role' of the state sector causes an 'uneven 
playing field' between economic sectors. 
The non-state sector in Vietnam consists of a small proportion of private enterprises and 
cooperatives, and a larger proportion of household businesses. At the beginning of the 
reform process, the ownership structure of private enterprises was concentrated in sole-
proprietorships. Their activities were also focused in labour-intensive areas with low 
capital investment such as food processing, trade and services. Policy changes have 
promoted the development of more evolved ownership types including limited and 
shareholding companies. However, there has also been an inverse transformation from 
sole-proprietorships to household firms to avoid the over-regulated environment. In 
addition, economic activities have not changed much, suggesting that there are still 
obstacles in some economic areas. 
Generally, non-state enterprises are small in terms of both labour and capital compared 
to the state and foreign invested sectors. Although they perform well in generating jobs 
and there has been a significant increase in the number of new entry firms, their 
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contribution to industrial output and GDP 1s modest, raising concerns about their 
economic performance. 
Despite the easing of entry barriers for firms, constraints towards the operation and 
development of non-state enterprises still remain. Capital shortages, limited access to 
capital, land, market opportunities and information, all impede the development of non-
state firms. The discretion of government officials, especially tax officials,. unskilled 
workers and managers, as well as social norms, are also hindrances. The second round 
of the reform focusing on promoting sustainable development of the non-state sector, 
especially the removal of the emphasis on 'preserving the leading role of the state 
sector', promises a fair competitive environment and the sustainable development of the 
non-state sector. 
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2.6 Appendix 2.1 
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Table 2.1 Annual growth rate (%) 
1955-1960 
1961-1965 
1966-1970 
1971-1975 
1975-1980 
GDP National income 
13.5 9.0 
9.6 7.1 
0.7 0.4 
7.3 6.5 
1.4 0.4 
Source: Dao (1990: 16) 
Population 
3.5 
2.9 
3.0 
2.6 
2.0 
Table 2.2 Number of non-state industrial establishments (at 01 Jan annuall~), 1986-1992 
Year Total SO Es Cooperatives Sole proprietorships Household firms 
Panel A: Absolute value 
1986 41 357 3 141 37 649 567 NIA 
1987 37 609 3 157 33 962 490 NIA 
1988 354 020 3 111 32 034 318 318557 
1989 359 506 3 020 21 901 1 248 333 337 
1990 393 518 2 762 13 086 770 376 900 
1991 459 158 2 599 8 829 959 446 771 
1992 377 105 2 268 5 723 1 114 368 000 
Panel B: Percentage 
1986 100 7.59 91.03 1.37 NIA 
1987 100 8.39 90.30 1.30 NIA 
1988 100 0.88 9.05 0.09 89.98 
1989 100 0.84 6.09 0.35 92.72 
1990 100 0.70 3.33 0.20 95.78 
1991 100 0.57 1.92 0.21 97.30 
1992 100 0.60 1.52 0.30 97.59 
Note: NI A: not available 
Source: GSO (1994) 
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Table 2.3 Number oflicensed business by ownership kind, 1991-1994 
Total From 1991 to the end 1994 
(To the end of 1994) of 1993 
Number Registered Number Registered Number 
of firms capital offrrms capital offrrms 
(Bill.VND) (Bill.VND) 
Total 19 025 6 620.8 12 180 4 700.6 6 845 
Sole 13 772 2 000.2 8 684 1 321.2 5 088 
proprietorships 
Limited 5 120 3 598.8 3 390 2 572.7 1 730 
companies 
Shareholding 133 1 021.8 106 806.7 27 
companies 
Source: Statistical year book (GSO 1994) 
Table 2.4 Number of registered and operating firms, 2000-2002 
I. Number of registered firms* 
II. Number _of operating firms** 
Of which 
Cooperatives 
Sole proprietorships 
Limited companies 
Share holding companiesa 
31/12/2000 31/12/2001 31/12/2002 
59,413 80,453 101,988 
34,695 43,839 54,655 
3,237 3,646 4,104 
20,548 22,777 24,794 
10,458 16,291 23,485 
452 1,125 2,272 
Note: (8) This kind of ownership includes only non-state shareholding, not 
companies with state stockholders. The total number, hence, may 
differ slightly from the figures published by the GSO. 
Source:(*) Ministry of Planning and Investment (2003) 
(**)The enterprise countrywide surveys 2001-2003 
Registered 
capital 
(Bill.VND) 
1 920.2 
679 
1 026.1 
215.1 
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Table 2.5 Number of licensed enter~rises bl: ownershiJ! type and economic activity from 1991 to 1994 
Ownership types Sole Ltd. Stock SO Es Total Sole Ltd. Stock SO Es Total 
proprietorship company company proprietorship company company 
Economic activities Panel A: Number of firms Panel B: Registered capital(%) 
From 01/01/1991 to end of 1993 From 01/01/1991 to end of 1993 
Total 8506 3197 96 4602 16401 4.44 8.41 2.63 84.52 100.00 
Agriculture, forestry 74 42 4 789 909 1.24 1.84 0.10 96.82 100.00 
Fishery 908 23 2 66 999 22.59 6.44 7.73 63.24 100.00 
Mining 9 4 0 58 71 0.43 3.94 - 95.63 100.00 
Manufacturing 3083 1083 27 1903 6096 
industry 3.90 6.90 0.79 88.40 100.00 
Construction 676 447 8 750 1881 7.62 14.89 1.59 75.90 100.00 
Trade, services 1306 1538 16 907 3767 3.59 15.80 0.64 79.97 100.00 
Hotel 80 56 0 64 200 9.25 20.51 - 70.24 100.00 
Finance, credit 2370 4 39 65 2478 9.16 0.25 36.57 54.02 100.00 
1994 1994 
Total 6097 1646 30 333 8106 13.30 19.06 4.51 63.12 100.00 
Agriculture, forestry 21 23 1 28 73 1.68 6.64 0.49 91.19 100.00 
Fishery 1163 11 1 4 1179 90.97 3.78 2.42 2.83 100.00 
Mining 2 5 0 4 11 0.04 0.71 - 99.25 100.00 
Manufacturing 2103 391 7 159 2660 
industry 7.50 13.78 1.31 77.42 100.00 
Construction 253 217 2 39 511 15.75 47.61 10.11 26.53 100.00 
Trade, services 710 929 9 74 1722 12.39 42.34 4.67 40.60 100.00 
Hotel 131 65 0 23 17.49 15.75 - 66.76 100.00 
Finance, credit 1714 5 10 2 1731 55.26 0.43 43.98 0.33 100.00 
Source: GSO (1994) 
35 
Table 2.6 Percentage of O[!erating firms b~ industr~ from 1990 to 1993 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Private enterprises 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Equipment and machinery 3.38 3.65 1.89 3.52 
Electronics 1.82 1.36 0.90 1.08 
Metallic products 2.60 2.29 1.97 1.96 
Chemical 3.64 3.23 2.60 3.28 
Construction materials 13.77 22.52 23.52 13.91 
Wood and wood products 18.44 16.48 22.17 12.16 
Food processing 45.84 37.96 21.54 51.20 
Textile 5.58 4.59 17.68 6.92 
Other 4.94 7.92 7.72 5.96 
Cooperatives 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Equipment and machinery 4.05 4.86 5.33 5.01 
Electronics 0.83 1.01 0.86 0.81 
Metallic products 9.21 10.98 10.90 10.89 
Chemical 6.07 7.79 8.26 7.45 
Construction materials 21.41 22.31 20.28 18.50 
Wood and wood products 12.41 11.67 11.81 10.42 
Food processing 27.07 21.66 21.97 32.08 
Textile 11.62 11.62 12.85 7.32 
Other 7.33 8.11 7.75 7.51 
Household enterprises 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Equipment and machinery 4.75 3.86 2.82 1.90 
Electronics 1.38 1.22 0.94 0.27 
Metallic products 7.11 6.95 4.92 4.63 
Chemical 1.18 0.96 1.00 0.78 
Construction materials 7.74 8.34 11.16 11.93 
Wood and wood products 16.21 16.11 18.17 19.56 
Food processing 35.93 36.61 40.14 39.11 
Textile 19.66 19.08 14.58 14.00 
Other 6.04 6.87 6.28 7.81 
Source: GSO (1994) 
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Table 2.7 Non-state ownership structure from 2000 to 2004 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Number of non-state enterprises 35004 44314 55236 64526 84003 
Total percentage 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Cooperatives 9.25 8.23 7.43 6.43 6.37 
Sole proprietorships 58.70 51.40 44.89 39.76 35.69 
Partnerships t 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 
Limited companies 29.88 36.76 42.52 46.75 48.71 
Stock companies with State shareholder 0.87 1.06 1.01 1.04 0.97 
Stock companies 1.29 2.54 4.11 6.00 8.24 
Note: f This new legal form of partnerships differs from that existed at the beginning of the 
reform process. They were more evolved and defined, and added to the private sector in 
the enterprise law in 1999. 
Source: The countrywide enterprise surveys 2000-2004 (GSO). These surveys do not collect 
data from household enterprises. 
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Classified bv number of workers 
Number 
of firms Upto5 5-9 10-49 50 -199 200 - 299 300 - 499 500 - 999 1000- 5000 to 4999 more 
Total 34695 10132 10772 10447 2599 282 227 147 87 2 
+ Cooperative 3237 114 993 1472 493 50 49 45 21 
+ Sole proprietorships 20548 9203 6014 4659 583 42 33 8 6 
+ Limited companies 10458 801 3683 4137 1390 175 132 85 53 2 
+Shareholding companies 452 14 82 179 133 15 13 9 7 
. 2001 
Total 43839 11742 13750 14074 3357 371 280 165 96 4 
+ Cooperative 3646 191 1249 1607 469 51 37 30 12 
+ Sole proprietorships 22777 9384 7020 5564 701 54 35 13 6 
+ Limited companies 16291 2042 5295 6429 1944 228 179 105 65 4 
+Shareholding companies 1125 125 186 474 243 38 29 17 13 
2002 
Total 55236 12005 17992 19130 4735 538 445 269 117 5 
+ Cooperative 4104 173 1309 1960 524 59 43 29 7 
+ Sole proprietorships 24794 9166 7989 6600 889 72 46 26 6 
+ Limited companies 23485 2431 8159 9499 2632 299 253 142 65 5 
+Shareholding companies 2272 226 524 948 436 56 40 26 16 
Source: From the website ofGSO (www.gso.gov.vn/surveys/industry/firms classified by number of workers [cac cu('>c dieu tra/doanh nghi~p/so lm;mg 
doanh nghi~p phan theo qui mo lao d('>ng] 
Note: Percentage of firms having up to 300 workers: 
2000: 98.66% 
2001: 98.75% 
2002: 98.48% 
Of SMEs, firms up to 50 workers account for: 
2000: 91.58% 
2001: 91.39% 
2002: 90.31% 
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Table 2.9 N b . , I loved. 2000 
-
Number Classified by capital employed (Bill.VND) 
of firms 
Up to 0,5 0,5 -1 1 - 5 5 -10 10 -50 50 -200 200 - 500 500 more 
Total 34695 16112 6334 9239 1569 1240 170 21 
+ Cooperative 3237 1208 467 1240 187 122 12 1 
+ Sole proprietorships 20548 13058 3648 3383 310 137 11 1 
+ Limited companies 10458 1798 2183 4420 1012 905 125 14 
+Shareholding companies 452 48 36 196 60 76 22 5 
2001 
Total 43839 18039 8252 13191 2247 1820 255 27 
+ Cooperative 3646 1406 491 1399 217 124 7 2 
+ Sole proprietorships 22777 12764 4536 4821 438 201 15 1 
+ Limited companies 16291 3672 3097 6527 1453 1335 188 18 
+Shareholding companies 1125 197 128 444 139 160 45 6 
2002 
Total 54655 18454 10846 18856 3353 2699 387 48 
+ Cooperative 4104 1486 587 1588 280 158 4 1 
+ Sole proprietorships 24794 12248 5316 6300 608 299 20 3 
+ Limited companies 23485 4443 4678 9975 2152 1916 284 32 
+Shareholding companies 2272 277 265 993 313 326 79 12 
Source: From the website ofGSO (www.gso.gov.vn/surveys/industry/firms classified by capital [cac cu()c dieu tra/doanh nghi?p/so luqng doanh 
nghi?p phan theo qui mo ngu6n v6n] 
Note: Percentage of firms having up to 10 Bill.VND 
2000: 95.85% 
2001: 95.18% 
2002: 94.24% 
to 
10 
1 
9 
8 
1 
1 
6 
12 
5 
7 
39 
Table 2.10 Firm characteristics by ownership types in 2000 and 2004 
2000 2004 
Average Working Fixed assets Average Working Fixed assets 
labour capital per &LTt labour capital per andLT 
(number of labour financial (number of labour (billion financial 
workers) (billion investment workers) VND) investment 
VND) per labour per labour 
(billion (billion 
VND) VND) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total 83.64 0.28 0.12 62.89 0.34 0.13 
SO Es 362.66 0.32 0.11 489.53 0.50 0.16 
Central SOEs 629.52 0.44 0.14 771.42 0.64 0.19 
Local SOEs 213.25 0.12 0.06 278.63 0.22 0.11 
Non-state enterprises 29.74 0.09 0.03 29.47 0.17 0.06 
Cooperatives 56.31 0.04 0.02 29.51 0.08 0.03 
Sole proprietorships 11.50 0.07 0.03 14.41 0.10 0.04 
Partnerships 28.25 
- 0.05 21.19 0.28 0.08 
Limited companies 49.42 0.09 0.03 34.06 0.15 0.06 
Stock companies with state share 202.86 0.17 0.05 225.83 0.42 0.12 
holder 
Non-state stock companies 96.43 0.45 0.08 44.44 0.28 0.08 
Foreign invested companies 267.26 0.56 0.36 331.07 0.40 0.23 
Firms with 100% foreign 334.87 0.29 0.16 370.52 0.25 0.13 
investment 
Joint-venture with foreisn ,eartner 181.21 1.20 0.85 218.85 1.10 0.70 
Source: Enterprise countrywide surveys in 2000 and 2004 (GSO) 
Note: t LT: long term. 
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Table 2.11 Number of industrial firms by technology and ownership types, 1998 
Total Proportion of enterprises by 
(number) technology 
Power Manually Only hand 
driven and operated tools 
semi- machinery 
power 
driven 
machinery 
Total 9299 21.51 62.30 16.19 
Central SOEs 569 37.96 60.11 1.93 
Local SOEs 1252 32.67 59.66 7.67 
Cooperatives 949 9.28 48.25 42.47 
Sole proprietorships 4213 10.09 72.63 17.28 
Limited companies 1438 26.91 57.37 15.72 
Stock companies with state shareholder 33 24.24 63.64 12.12 
Stock companies 30 23.33 63.34 13.33 
Foreign invested companies 435 51.73 41.83 6.44 
Joint-venture between State and foreign 294 62.93 35.71 1.36 
Joint-venture between private and foreign 76 51.32 46.05 2.63 
Joint-venture between mix of economic sectors 10 60.00 40.00 0.00 
Source: The countrywide enterprise survey 1998 (GSO) 
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Table 2.12 Percenta;e of em2Io~ment b~ economic sectors, 2000-2004 
Economic sector 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Panel A: Number 
Total 3 129 433 3 443 939 3 966 715 4 314 833 4 725 350 
State sector 2 088 531 2 114 324 2 260 306 2 264 942 2 249 902 
Domestic non-state sector 1040902 1 329 615 1706409 2 049 891 2 475 448 
Panel B: Percentage 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
State sector 66.74 61.39 56.98 52.49 47.61 
Domestic non-state sector 33.26 38.61 43.02 47.51 52.39 
Source: the countrywide enterprise surveys: 2000-4 (GSO) 
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Table 2.13 Revenue per unit of labour by ownership types, 2000-2004 l 
(Billion VND/labour) 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 0.21 0.21 0.25 0.27 0.29 
SO Es 0.21 0.22 0.27 0.29 0.32 
•Central SOEs 0.24 0.25 0.32 0.34 0.36 
•Local SOEs 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.25 
Non-state enterprises 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.24 0.26 
• Cooperatives 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.07 
• Sole proprietorships 0.30 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.32 
• Partnerships 0.21 0.29 5.78 15.89 0.09 
• Limited companies 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26 
• Stock companies with State shareholder 0.17 0.19 0.20 0.26 0.34 
• Stock companies 0.14 0.16 0.17 0.21 0.24 
Source: The countrywide enterprise surveys: 2000-2004 (GSO) 
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Table 2.14 Contribution to GDP by ownership types(%) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
Ownership types 
SO Es 40.18 39.93 40.48 40.00 38.74 38.52 38.40 38.38 39.08 39.10 
Non-state enterprises 53.52 52.68 50.45 49.98 49.03 48.20 47.84 47.86 46.45 45.76 
Cooperatives 10.06 10.03 8.91 8.90 8.84 8.58 8.06 7.99 7.49 7.09 
Private enterprises 7.44 7.40 7.22 7.24 7.26 7.31 7.95 8.30 8.23 8.49 
Individual businesses 36.02 35.25 34.32 33.83 32.93 32.31 31.84 31.57 30.73 30.19 
Foreign invested companies 6.30 7.39 9.07 10.03 12.24 13.27 13.76 13.76 14.47 15.13 
Source: From the website of GSO (www.gso.gov.vn/statistics/national account/ contribution to GDP by ownership [so li~u thong ke/tai khoan qu6c gia/ccr 
du t6ng san phfu.n trong nu&c theo gia thi.rc ts phan theo tha.nh phfui kinh ts va nga.nh kinh t€] 
q 
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CHAPTER3 
FIRM EFFICIENCY: 
Effects of family labour, location and government support 
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3.1 Introduction 
The non-state sector in Vietnam has played an important role in reducing poverty and 
generating jobs, especially for low skilled labour from rural areas (Webster and Taussig 
1999; World Bank 1999a; Kokko and Sjoholm 2004; Rand et al. 2004; Schaumburg-
Muller 2005). Nevertheless, its contribution to GDP has diminished, from 53.52% in 
1995 to 48.20% in 2000 and 45.76% in 2004 (GSO 2005). In addition, constraints 
facing non-state enterprises have impeded this sector to grow to a larger scale. Until 
2002, the non-state sector was still characterised as small scale with more than 90% of 
firms employing up to 50 workers (GSO 2003). 
Concerns about the non-state sector performance has generated a series of papers 
analysing qualitatively the effects of market oriented policies on non-state firm 
performance such as MPI-UNIDO (1999), Sakai and Takada (2000), Steer and CIE 
(2001), Schaumburg-Muller (2005) and CIEM (2006). The examination is recently 
extended to the quantitative analysis of the non-state sector performance (Vijverberg 
1998; Vijverberg and Haughton 2002; Gustavsson and Kokko 2004; Hansen et al. 2004; 
Kokko and Sjoholm 2004). However, questions remain as to the effects of market 
policies on firm efficiency and factors, including location and government support that 
have contributed to improve efficiency across industries. Answers to such questions 
provide guidance to promote efficient performance of the non-state sector. 
This chapter uses the data of non-state manufacturing SMEs collected by ILSSA of 
Vietnam in collaboration with the SSE of Sweden in 1991, 1996 and 2001 and the 
stochastic frontier approach to investigate technical efficiency (TE) of non-state firms. 
The results provide insights as to what contributes to improved performance and what 
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might be done to improve firm technical efficiency. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 outlines the basic 
concept of TE and its determinants in the manufacturing sector. Section 3.3 reviews the 
theoretical framework of the stochastic frontier method based on which econometric 
estimates of production and inefficiency functions are performed. A brief description of 
data and variables is given in Section 3.4. Section 3.5 characterises econometric models. 
Empirical results are provided in Section 3.6 and Section 3.7 concludes. 
3.2 Technical efficiency: basic concept and its determinants 
3.2.1 The basic concept of technical efficiency 
TE of an individual firm can be defined as the ratio of its actual/observed output to the 
maximum output that the firm can obtain given the input level and production 
technology. Maximum output can be achieved if the firm can apply best practice 
techniques and if it faces no constraints from the environment in which it operates. In 
this case, the firm is fully technically efficient. The maximum or frontier output can be 
estimated using either the parametric method such as the stochastic frontier approach 
(SF A) or non-parametric method as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Firms that 
operate below the frontier production function (FPF) are technically inefficient. The gap 
between the actual and frontier output is referred to as technical inefficiency and is 
caused by various determinants including non-price, organisational and institutional 
factors. 
3.2.2 Determinants of technical inefficiency 
Pitt and Lee (1981) provided a pioneering empirical work that studies the effects of a 
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firm's attributes including firm size, age and ownership on TE. Using pooled data 
obtained from individual Indonesian weaving firms in 1972, 1973, and 1975, they 
applied the SF A with two-stage analysis 18 and found a positive relationship between 
firm size and efficiency. In contrast, the correlation between firm age and efficiency is 
negative. They also found that domestic firms performed better than foreign ownership 
enterprises. 
Following Pitt and Lee (1981), Little et al. (1987) applied the same methodology of a 
two-stage analysis to examine the effects of factors such as firm size, age, worker and 
owner experience, and owner education level on TE. Using cross-sectional data 
obtained from firm surveys in five manufacturing industries (shoemaking, printing, 
soap, machine tooling and metal casting) in India in 1977, Little et al. found no 
relationship between firm size and TE in all industries, except for machine tooling 
industry. They concluded that the relationship between firm size and TE for small 
industries may be either positive or negative depending on how superior or inferior was 
organisation ability. The relationship between firm age and TE was also insignificant 
and human capital had either positive or insignificant effects. Little et al., then, 
suggested that entrepreneur marketing and financial management skills are more 
important for small and handicraft industries. 
The development of the SF A of Kumbhakar et al. (1991) and Reifschneider and 
Stevenson (1991) to analyse the determinants of technical inefficiency in one stage 
since 1991 has induced a series of papers in the efficiency area. Admassie and 
18 The stochastic frontier approach with two-stage analysis runs the frontier production function first, 
then, regresses the predicted inefficiency effects or technical efficiency level on its supposed 
determinants. However, this approach is noted as inconsistent by Kumbhaka et al. ( 1991) and 
Reifschneider and Stevenson ( 1991 ). 
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Matambalya (2002), using cross-sectional data from a small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) survey in Tanzania in 1991, found that younger firms were more efficient and 
the effect of firm size on TE was mixed. The effect of human capital, as proxied by the 
average duration of training of labour and management, is mixed as well. 
Similar results were found in Asia countries for SMEs. Wiboonchutikula (2001) found 
that small firms were more efficient in Thailand, while Yao (1998), and Mini and 
Rodriguez (2000) revealed the inverse relationship in China and the Philippines. A 
negative impact of firm age on TE is found in Kalirajan and Hill (1993) for the 
Indonesian garment industry in 1986. Other papers such as Liu and Liu (1996), Kong et 
al. (1999), and Vu (2003) provide empirical evidence on the effect of the performance 
bonus system on firm TE. 
The effects of urban location are considered to be positive on firm performance as firms 
can benefit from better educated workers, well-informed information and a more 
accessible technology market. However, Glancey (1998) argues that firms located in 
urban areas may face higher factor prices due to greater competition for factors of 
production, especially land and labour, hence, may be less efficient than those in rural 
areas. Empirical evidence in Liu and Liu (1996), Kong et al. (1999), and Vu (2003) 
support Glancey's argument. 
Studies on the impact of government support including financial provision, technical 
and marketing consultation, training workers and managers, and facilitating 
subcontracts on firm TE are rather limited. For instance, Mini and Rodriguez (2002) 
revealed a positive relationship between subcontracting and TE in the textile industry in 
the Philippines. On the other hand, Iqbal and Urata (2002), by summarising Kimura's 
paper, stated that subcontracting might not be a source of efficiency. Though, not 
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studying TE, Rasiah (2002) gave evidence of various government supports, especially 
support in providing maximum information for subcontract-searching, promoting 
subcontractor performance in Malaysia. 
3.3 Theoretical framework 
To assess those factors that contribute to efficiency in the Vietnamese non-state small 
and medium manufacturing enterprises, we estimate a stochastic production frontier. 
This approach was first independently developed by Aigner et al. (1977) and Meeusen 
and Van Den Broeck (1977). The issue was later fully developed for panel data in 
Battese and Coelli (1995). 
Following Battese and Coelli (1995), the stochastic FPF for unbalanced panel data can 
be written as: 
(3.la) 
or in logarithmic form as: 
(3.lb) 
where Y;, denotes output of firm i, at time t. X;, is the vector of inputs for firm i at time 
t. f3 is the vector of unknown parameters to be estimated. Time t is included in the 
frontier function to measure either technological progress (Battese and Coelli 1995; 
Kong et al. 1999) or the effect of unobservable variables on output over time (Kompas 
et al. 2004). Random error term, vit, is independently identical distribution N (0, a;) 
and independently distributed of uit . v;, takes into account a random variation of 
frontier output due to factors beyond the control of firms such as weather, input 
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breakdowns and damaged products. Uit reflects one-side deviations of actual output 
from the maximum level of production due to the technical inefficiency resulting from 
factors under the firm's control in the direction that all actual output is below the 
maximum level. If a firm is fully technical efficient, Uif =O, otherwise it will be greater 
than zero depending on the level of efficiency. The subtraction of the non-negative 
random variable uit from vit means that the logarithm of yit is smaller than it would 
otherwise be if technical inefficiency did not exist. 
The more generalised assumption for the distribution of uit is that it follows a normal 
non-negative truncation of the N (µit, a;) distribution (Kumbhakar and Lovell 2000). 
This assumption eases to a certain level the criticism of the distributional effect on 
estimated parameters and TE level. Furthermore, it allows uses of the maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) method, which can estimate the parameters of both frontier 
and inefficiency functions simultaneously. This overcomes the estimation inconsistency 
of the two-stage analysis and outweighs the conventional estimation methods of panel 
data in the sense that MLE takes into account different influences on the FPF of 
different efficiency levels (Coelli et al. 1998). 
To analyse the determinants of technical inefficiency, the common assumption is that 
the mean of normal truncated at zero distribution N (µ;pa;) is a function of 
explanatory variables including firm-specific characteristics as well as institutional 
factors and can be specified by equation (3.2) as: 
(3.2) 
where zit is a vector of explanatory variables determining the technical inefficiency of 
50 
production over time. 8 is a vector of unknown coefficients to be estimated. Wu 
follows a normal distribution N (0, O'; ). Provided that the inefficiency effects are 
stochastic, some input variables can be included in the inefficiency function such as the 
way suggested by Huang and Liu (1994) to capture the non-neutral shift of the FPF. 
Time trend or dummy year variable can be also included into the model (3.2) depending 
on whether data is time series or at a point in time to investigate technical inefficiency 
change. 
The individual technical efficiency can be measured as: 
TE, 1 = __ E_x_p_(_l n_Y-'-;'"""1 _I _u-'-;'"""1 ,_x-'1'"'"". 1 _) _ = e - u u 
Exp (ln Yit I u ;, = 0, x it) (3.3) 
where Y;, in the numerator is the actual output, and Y;, in the denominator is evaluated 
at the MLE (Kalirajan and Hill 1993). TEu will take values between zero and one, 
depending on whether a firm is completely inefficient or fully efficient. 
Following Coelli et al. (1998), although the specifications in equations (3.1) and (3.2) 
are defined in terms of panel data, they can be estimated for cross-sectional data using 
FRONTIER 4.1 software (Coelli 1996). Both cross-sectional and panel models are 
estimated in this chapter. 
3.4 Data and variables 
3.4.1 Data 
The data used in this chapter were collected by ILSSA, an institute of MOUSA of 
Vietnam in collaboration with the SSE of Sweden. The sample is of small and medium 
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non-state enterprises in Vietnam in 1991, 1996 and 2001. In accordance with the 
dominance of the small-scale non-state sector, the data is limited to firms with less than 
100 employees. 
The sample consists of key information on non-state SMEs. Firms are selected equally 
between the southern and northern parts of the country and between metropolitan or 
more developed areas including Ha Noi, Hai Phong and Ho Chi Minh city, and non-
metropolitan or less developed areas 19 such as Phu Tho, Ha Tay, Quang Nam and Long 
An. A wide range of activities is covered including processing of agricultural products, 
other manufacturing, repair shops, commerce/trade, hotels, restaurants, cafes and 
catering, and transport. The data set used in this chapter is confined to only non-state 
enterprises in the manufacturing industry. 
By adopting the standard international trade classification (SITC) revision 3, firms in 
the sample can be classified in sub-industries including (1) SITCO-food processing, (2) 
SITC5-chemicals, (3) SITC6-manufactured goods classified chiefly by material, (4) 
SITC7-machinery and transport equipment, and (5) SITC8-miscellaneous manufactured 
articles. 
In 1991, the survey collected data of more than 900 firms with different ownership 
types including household firms, sole-proprietorships, cooperatives, partnership 
enterprises, and a small number of small state enterprises in both metropolitan and non-
metropolitan areas of Vietnam. After dropping state enterprises and missing values, 
only 233 observations remain in the sample. 
19 The surveys use the word 'urban' and 'rural' to indicate metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas, 
respectively. 
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During the 1991 survey, there had been no thought of a repeat survey. Therefore, when 
the second survey was implemented in 1996, only around 300 firms were detected as 
previously sampled. Thus, the second survey in 1996 collected data on 300 previously 
surveyed firms together with 500 new ones. 608 observations remain in the sample after 
dropping missing values. For more information about the first and second surveys, 
readers can refer to Ronnas and Ramamurthy (2001). 
In 2001, the survey collected data of 900 new firms and 600 previously surveyed 
enterprises including those that had survived from 1991to1996. Since the second round 
survey, two other ownership kinds, including limited and shareholding companies, have 
appeared on the scene. They are somewhat similar in economic characteristics and are 
known as more advanced technical and managerial skills firms. There has been a 
significant transformation in ownership during this period as well. Households have 
become more similar to sole-proprietorships but are reluctant to register as private 
firms. In contrast, many sole-proprietorships have transformed into households to 
benefit from tax regulations. Furthermore, the old type of cooperatives, which were 
synonymous with socialist collective enterprises either disappeared or were transformed 
into market-oriented genuine cooperatives20 (Ronnas and Ramamurthy 2001: 22). After 
dropping missing values, 1131 observations are left in the sample. Detailed information 
about the third survey can be found in Rand et al. (2004). 
Table 3.1 (page 70) provides the structure of firm ownership and size for each year. As 
seen in this Table, household enterprises have the smallest size, around 6 workers per 
enterprise, on average. Other ownership forms are much larger, especially limited and 
20 A new cooperative is an independent production unit. It does not rely on government assistance and has 
power in decision-making. 
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shareholding companies. Overall, the proportion of micro firms, having up to 10 
workers, is highest in food processing (SITCO) and miscellaneous (SITC8) industries, 
while the chemical industry (SITC5) has the lowest proportion of micro firms. 
Since the number of observations in the short-run 1991-96 and the long-run 1991-96-
2001 panel models are small21 , these models may suffer measurement errors that can be 
overcome with large samples. Therefore, to give the most accurate picture about 
efficiency of non-state SMEs in Vietnam between 1991 and 2001, the chapter estimates 
separately cross-sectional models for each year and the short-run unbalanced models for 
the period 1996-2001. To control for heterogeneity in technology among industries, 
separate functions for each industry are estimated. 
3.4.2 Variables 
In the frontier functions, output is measured by the value of total products22 produced in 
the observed year at current price. Capital is total owned assets including buildings and 
land on which the building is constructed, machinery and hand tools reported by firms. 
Since the surveys failed to collect the number of working hours that is more suitable for 
a small industry characterised by households, as pointed out by Little et al. (1987), the 
chapter uses the number of workers as labour input. Materials include the value of 
intermediate inputs and energy. For the panel model, outputs and materials are deflated 
by the GDP deflator, calculated by the GSO of Vietnam. Since statistical yearbooks in 
Vietnam are presented in different formats before and after 1995, it is difficult to find a 
21 Among 300 firms detected as observations in the panel since 1991, only 191 and 110 enterprises 
survive until 1996 and 2001, respectively. 
22 The value of total products consists ofa main part of total revenue, which includes revenue from sale of 
goods, services, lease of equipment and interest received reported by the surveys. 
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suitable statistical criterion to deflate capital. Hence, the chapter relies on the 
expenditure shares of GDP on fixed investment calculated by the Asian Development 
Bank as a deflator for capital. Details of some key variables across years and industries 
are summarised in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 (pages 71, 72, 73). 
3.5 Econometric models 
The two most common functional forms for the stochastic FPF described by equations 
3.la and 3.lb are the Cobb-Douglas and the Transcendental Logarithmic Production 
Function or translog specifications. The advantages of the translog model over the 
Cobb-Douglas are that the translog function relaxes the restrictions of constant input 
elasticities and the requirement that the elasticity of substitution is equal to one (Berndt 
and Christensen 1973). The functional forms for both specifications are expressed as 
follows: 
Cobb-Douglas form: 
Translog form: 
In Yit = /3 0 + /3 1 ln Kit+ /3 2 In Lit+ /3 3 ln Mi1 
+ /3 4 ln Kit ln Lit + /3 5 In Kit ln M it + /3 6 ln Lit In M it 
+ /3 7 (ln Kit) z + /3 s (ln Lit) z + /3 9 (ln Mu) z + v it - u it 
(3.4a) 
(3.4b) 
where J-;1 is output, Kit, Lit , and Mil are three factors of production (capital, labour and 
materials respectively). The second line of equation 3.4b expresses the interaction terms 
between logarithm of input factors, and the third line describes their squared terms. The 
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subscript t is equal to 1 if the model is cross-sectional. 
For the preferred model, the generalised likelihood ratio test23 is used to test the null 
hypothesis that the Cobb-Douglas is an adequate representation for the data given the 
translog form. Results from the tests are provided in Table 3.5 (page 74). As shown in 
the Table, manufactured goods industry (SITC6) has the consistent Cobb-Douglas 
production function whereas miscellaneous industries (SITC8) are characterised by a 
translog specification for the whole period studied. Changes in technologies used are 
found for other industries. However, the translog specification, which is often found in 
micro data, dominates the industries studied. 
Determinants of TE that are found in the literature are modeled in the inefficiency 
function. This function is written separately for 1991 in equation 3.5a, and for 1996 and 
2001 in equation 3.5b. This is because the limited group has appeared since 1996. 
µit = 00 + 8i_ hhit + o2soleproprietorshipit + o3cooperativeit +o4 metropolitan.it 
(3.5b) 
23 The likelihood ratio (LR) test is twice differenced in the log-likelihood value for the unrestricted and 
restricted functions and calculated as: 
LR= 2(Lu -L,) 
The LR has approximately chi-squared distribution with the degree of freedom equal to the number of 
parameters assumed to be equal to zero in the null hypothesis. The critical value of LR is drawn from 
Kodde and Palm (1986). 
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where hh is a dummy variable for household enterprises, soleproprietorship is a dummy 
variable for sole-proprietorships and cooperative is a dummy that takes the value 1 if a 
firm is a cooperative and 0 otherwise. There are only four kinds of ownership appearing 
in the inefficiency function because the characteristics of partnerships are similar to 
those of sole-proprietorships, they are regrouped in the 'sole-proprietorship' group. 
Similarly, characteristics of shareholding and limited companies are also very alike, 
they are also combined in the 'limited' group. To avoid the dummy trap, the sole-
proprietorship group is excluded from the model (3.5a) as a reference group, and the 
limited group is excluded from the model (3.5b) as a base. 
A dummy variable metropolitan takes the value 1 if a firm is located in metropolitan 
areas and 0 otherwise, to control for differences in location. Firm size, defined by size, 
is a dummy variable that takes the value 0 for micro firms and 1 for small and medium 
enterprises employing up to 200 workers. 24 Firm age, defined by age, is the number of 
years calculated since a firm's establishment. A dummy variable exper takes the value 1 
if the entrepreneur engages in production of similar products prior to establishing a firm 
and 0 otherwise. A dummy variable bonus takes the value 1 if a firm applies a 
performance bonus system and 0 otherwise. Government assistance to firms is denoted 
by the type of aid in terms of credit (ca) and non-financial assistance (nfa). Sub is a 
dummy variable taking the value 1 if a firm is a subcontractor and 0 otherwise. 
Under the assumption of normal distribution for v it and the truncated normal 
distribution for uu , the coefficients of the frontier and inefficiency functions can be 
24 Though the surveys limit firm size to less than 100 employees, some enterprises in the sample employ 
up to 200 workers. 
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estimated jointly by the maximum likelihood method. Battese and Corra ( 1977) derive 
the likelihood function of the parameter r ' which has the value between 0 and 1 
depending on whether er; or er; is equal to zero, in terms of the two-variance 
parameters of the frontier function: 
er2 
r = _u where er2 = er2 + er2 er2 v u 
and er; and er; are variances of noise and the inefficiency effects, respectively. If the 
value of y is· near zero, deviations from the frontier function are attributed mostly to 
noise, while the value of nearly 1 indicates that deviations are mainly due to firm-
specific technical inefficiency. 
3.6 Empirical results 
3.6.1 Cross-sectional models 
The three-step procedure of FRONTIER 4.1 allows us to obtain the frontier function 
evaluated at the maximum of the likelihood function when u; equals 0. If a firm is 
inefficient, its actual output is placed below the frontier level by the term u; , depending 
on how much inefficiency exists. FRONTIER 4.1 also reports the result of the null 
hypothesis that technical inefficiency effects are absent. 25 This is the case of no 
inefficiency function and no deviation due to technical inefficiency 
(i.e. r = 00 = 01 = ... = 011 = 0 ). The model is then equivalent to the average response of 
25 The value for this test is calculated by FRONTIER4.l and reported as the 'LR test of the one-sided 
error'. 
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the frontier function, which can be estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS). Results 
from the likelihood ratio test confirm the presence of technical inefficiency effects in all 
industries (Table 3.6, page 74) except in manufactured goods (SITC6) in 1991 and food 
processing (SITCO) in 1996. 
Results from estimated stochastic FPF for the 1991 (Table 3.7, page 75) raise concerns 
about the correct measurement of capital since the coefficient of this input is 
insignificant in almost all industries. The significant coefficient is found in the food 
processing industry (SITCO) but it is negative. A possible explanation for the 
measurement error in capital is due to difficulties to evaluate exactly the value of such 
an input. It should be noted that total owned asset is mainly measured by the value of 
buildings including the value of land on which the building is constructed. The difficult 
evaluation was due to a 'land fever' [s6t d~t] which happened in Vietnam in 1991 
(Ministry of Finance 2005) when land prices shot to an abnormally high level. It would 
be the case that some firms might exaggerate their building values because their 
evaluation might be distorted by either 'land fever' or market transaction reasons. 
In the inefficiency functions, insignificant effects of determinants are often found. This, 
again, suggests that there might be problems with measurement errors and also more 
observations may be needed. Given these limitations, little can be told from the 1991 
models. 
The estimated models for 1996 and 2001 are presented in Table 3.8 (pages 76, 77). 
Based on the estimated FPF, productions elasticities are calculated and given in Table 
3.9 (page 78). Two main points can be drawn from Table 3.9. First, the main component 
of output results from intermediate inputs followed by labour suggesting that non-state 
SMEs in Vietnam have low added values and low returns. Second, the structure of 
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elasticity does not change much during the period studied. This implies that SMEs still 
stick to low-cost labour advantages. Webster (1999), by summarising findings from 
other developing countries, states that if firms cannot get rid of a low-cost labour trap 
and fail to build the ability to climb up the value-added ladder, they cannot compete in 
the market. The results and Webster's conclusion raise concerns about the 
competitiveness of non-state SMEs in Vietnam if nothing will be changed in the near 
future. This issue should be considered in the SME promoting program. 
Regarding to the determinants of technical inefficiency effects for non-state SMEs in 
Vietnam during 1996-2001, the likelihood ratio test in Table 3.6 (page 74) confirms the 
presence of technical inefficiency effects in almost all industries during this period. Two 
more hypotheses are tested in Table 3.10 (page 78) to find the most suitable method of 
estimation and the effects of firm and environment-specific characteristics given the 
presence of technical inefficiency effects. 
The first null hypothesis in Table 3.10, which specifies that technical inefficiency 
effects are not stochastic, is rejected. Thus the suitable estimation method is MLE. If the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, ie, r = 0, the variance of the inefficiency effects, 
a; , is also equal to zero and the model reduces to a traditional mean response function 
in which variables in the inefficiency function are included in the frontier function. In 
that case, the parameter 80 is not identified. Hence, the critical value for this null 
hypothesis is z;-distribution. The estimate of nearly 1 for y shows that all deviations 
of actual output from the frontier level are due to technical inefficiency 
The second null hypothesis that firm specific and institutional factors do not affect 
technical inefficiency ( 8; = 0 for all i, and 8; = 0 for all i>O) is also rejected. This 
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indicates that the joint effect of these explanatory variables in the inefficiency models is 
significant although the individual effects of some variables are statistically 
insignificant. Based on the estimated results of technical inefficiency functions for 1996 
and 2001 in Table 3.8, a summary of these findings in terms of inefficiency effects is 
made and given in Table 3.11(page79). 
Family labour effects 
The sign and power of each ownership variable in Table 3.11 indicate that technical 
efficiency in terms of ownership varies with industry. No difference in efficiency 
among ownership types is found in food processing (SITCO) and chemicals (SITC5) 
industries. However, household enterprises appear to be more efficient than limited 
companies wherever a statistical effect is estimated. This finding is surprising because 
limited and shareholding companies are hypothesised, on average, to be more advanced 
in both technology and management skills. A possible explanation for the unexpected 
result is due to a higher proportion of family labour in household enterprises such as in 
manufactured goods (SITC6) in 1996, machinery and transport equipment (SITC7), and 
miscellaneous manufacture (SITC8) in 2001 (Table 3 .12 - page 79). 
The consistent trend of less efficiency of micro firms relative to SMEs is only found in 
machinery and transport equipment (SITC7) in both 1996 and 2001. Results in other 
industries show inconsistency. In those industries that use more family labour, it would 
appear that micro firms tend to be more technically efficient than the small and medium 
group. Evidence for this conclusion is that when the ratio of family to total labour in 
micro firms, calculated using the data set, decreases from 0.223 in 1996 to 0.183 in 
2001 in chemical industries (SITC5), micro firms tum from more efficient in 1996 to 
less efficient than the small and medium group in 2001. This finding bears out the 
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suggestion of Little et al. (1987) that the number of working hours is the better indicator 
for labour input in small industries characterised by households because family labour 
often works longer, and with more commitment than hired labour. Thus, the frontier 
functions, which fail to capture the number of working hours, may indicate that smaller 
firms are more efficient. 
Firm age 
Empirical studies often show that firm age has either insignificant or negative impacts 
on technical efficiency. The small and medium manufacturing industry in Vietnam is no 
exception. For instance, Table 3.11 (page 79) shows either insignificant or statistically 
negative efficiency effects of firm age during the period 1996-2001. The negative effect 
of firm age on technical efficiency implies that firm age reflects differences in 
technology generation, rather than the 'learning by doing' process. This does not mean 
that 'learning by doing' is not important in Vietnam, but rather it reflects the fact that 
new established firms benefit more from advanced technology. Indeed, the data set 
reveals that firms concentrate on either 'very young' or 'very old' poles. For these old 
firms, their 'learning by doing' process may be offset by obsolete technology compared 
to that of younger firms. The same result is found in Little et al. (1987) for the case of 
India. They conclude that firm age may have little independent effect and it probably 
reflects the impact of obsolete technology. This issue will be discussed more in panel 
1996-2001 models. 
Metropolitan effects 
The results in Table 3.11 (page 79) indicate the presence of agglomeration economies. 
Better-educated workers and managers, easier access of information, and market 
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opportunities are all factors that tend to make firms in metropolitan areas more 
technically efficient than their counterparts in less developed areas in all industries, with 
the exception of miscellaneous industries (SITC8) in 2001. According to Malesky 
(2004), both workforce and owners in metropolitan areas of Vietnam have much higher 
technical and managerial training as well as educational level than their counterparts in 
less developed areas. Another factor that may make firms in non-metropolitan areas less 
efficient is market opportunities. For instance, the survey from which the data are 
obtained shows that lack of demand is the most common reason given for temporarily 
shutting down a business. The percentage of firms in non-metropolitan areas that give 
this reason is much higher than in metropolitan areas, as shown in Table 3.13 (page 80). 
Government assistance and institutions supporting market 
A pressing concern for Vietnam is how to continue to reduce poverty in the face of the 
expansion of the labour force, and sustain economic growth. In this context, the private 
sector becomes the key element for institutional changes. The private sector promotion 
program carried out in 1999 with the issuance of the new enterprise law lowers entry 
and transaction cost significantly. As a result, the number of start-up non-state 
enterprises, most of which are household and micro firms, increased substantially. The 
objective of the government with the current reform and assistance package is to 
provide more credit and non-financial supports including consultations for managerial 
and technical problems, training managers and workers, and providing information for 
subcontract searching. This support should improve firm performance. However, results 
from Table 3.11 (page 79) do not reveal any systematic effect of direct government 
support on firm performance across years and industries. For instance, we find a 
positive effect of government support on technical efficiency in machinery and transport 
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equipment (SITC7), and miscellaneous industries (SITC8) in 1996 via credit assistance; 
in machinery and transport (SITC7) sectors in 1996, and food processing (SITCO) and 
miscellaneous manufacturing (SITC8) in 2002 via technical support. 
We observe that access to government's support increased over the period 1996-2001 
(Table 3.14, page 80), but this was associated with a change in the profiles of recipients. 
Firms seeking government support in 1996 are more profitable, at larger scale, younger, 
and the majority of them are located in metropolitan areas while the inverse is found for 
2001. The finding supports suggestions of Kokko and Tingvall (2005) that recipients of 
government aid are selected randomly, depending on the searching effort on firm side. 
Thus, it seems likely there are two kinds of firms searching for government support: 
strong firms that face many constraints restricting their potential growth (as in 1996) 
and weak firms that need support to survive (as in 2001). This also coincides with 
findings from Ronnas et al. (1998) and Ramamurthy (1998) that most of the successful 
firms in Vietnam rely on their own sources to grow. 
Sub-contracting 
The impact of institutions supporting markets on firm performance can be investigated 
indirectly through subcontracting. In the environment where the property rights are 
protected by a good legal system, firms are more willing to cooperate and thus promote 
their production (Levine 1998; McMillan and Woodruff 2002; Laeven and Woodruff 
2004). By contrast, without strong judicial institutions, firms find many business 
activities too risky (World Bank 2002), which impedes cooperation (Carlier and Tran 
2005). Calculations from the data set show around 30% of firms in the 1996 sample 
subcontract, and this percentage decreases to 18% in 2001. In our study, subcontracting 
has a positive effect on technical efficiency in manufactured goods (SITC6) in 1996 
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and food processing (SITCO) in 2001. However, such benefits from subcontracting are 
not evident in other sectors. Doan (1999) points out that weak enforcement of contracts 
and legal verdicts limits the relationship between subcontractors and contractors mainly 
to long-term cooperation. It appears that the passing of the new enterprise law has not 
improved the situation (CSEG and CIEM 2002; Carlier and Tran 2005) and 
enforcement of contracts remains a constraint facing non-state SMEs in Vietnam. 
Other variables effects 
Owner experience has either an insignificant or negative impact on technical efficiency 
in all industries, with the exception of the chemicals sector (SITC5) in 2001. 
Insignificant effects of performance bonuses are found in most industries during the 
period 1996-2001. Vu (2003) also finds an insignificant relationship between bonuses 
and technical efficiency level among SOEs in Vietnam. This may be due to the fact that 
workers in Vietnam often consider bonuses as a normal part of their salary rather than 
as an individual reward for good performance. 
3.6.2 Panel 1996-2001 models 
The estimation of panel models is induced from the mixed effects of firm age on 
technical efficiency. The conclusion from the estimated cross-sectional models is that 
firm age reflects differences in technology rather than the 'learning by doing' process, 
which is considered important in transition economies. Thus, if the impact of 
differences in technology is controlled for, firm age in the inefficiency function reflects 
more truly the 'learning by doing' process. 
Likelihood ratio tests confirm similar functional forms for the panel 1996-2001 data as 
for cross-sectional data and the presence of technical inefficiency effects in all 
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industries. Table 3 .15 (page 81) provides estimated functions for separate industries. As 
can be seen in this Table, results in inefficiency functions bear out findings from cross-
sectional models. The effect of bonuses is rather clearer. For those firms, which survive 
until the fifth year, their owners must gain more experience in motivating workers. 
In order to separate the effects of technology and human capital proxied by firm age, a 
dummy variable year2001 is introduced into the frontier function. The idea is that if the 
impacts of technology are filtered, firm age in the inefficiency function captures 
genuine human capital. The dummy variable year2001 is assumed to capture changes in 
output in the frontier function during the period 1996-2001 due to unobserved effects 
such as technology and business environment changes. T-tests in Table 3.16 (page 82) 
confirm the presence of year 2001 in food processing industry (SITCO) and in 
manufactured goods industries (SITC6) at 5% and less. 
The estimated models with the year dummy variable for food processing industry 
(SITCO) and manufactured goods industries (SITC6) are provided in Table 3.17 (page 
83). For the convenience of comparison, models without dummy year variable of these 
industries are replicated in this Table. As shown in Table 3 .17, year 2001 is negative and 
significant at 5% in food processing industry (SITCO) and at 1 % in manufactured goods 
industries (SITC6). 
The negative impact of year2001 reflects appropriately the current context of 
Vietnamese economy. The worsen business environment following the Asian financial 
crisis in 1998 (World Bank 1999a; 2003b; Ramstetter 2004) and degradation in 
technology used by non-state SMEs place down firm output in 2001 in food processing 
(SITCO) and manufactured goods (SITC6) industries. 
66 
In the inefficiency functions, firm age is still insignificant, showing no relationship with 
technical efficiency. Little et al. (1987:199) argued that marketing and financial 
managements are the key factor for the success of a firm in small industries 
characterised by craftsman-entrepreneurs. Sakai and Takada (2000:6), in their research 
of SMEs in Vietnam, stated that 'most owner-managers of SMEs know little about 
managing a company, and go about it in their own way'. This is confirmed in Carlier 
and Tran (2005:5). Evidently, these initial low endowments cannot enable managers to 
catch up in the more complicated and increasing competitive environment, which 
requires high managerial skills. These findings may explain the fact that SMEs in 
Vietnam cannot grow to a larger scale (Carlier and Tran 2004). 
3.6.3 Mean technical efficiency 
Table 3.18 (page 84) documents TE level computed based on cross-sectional models for 
SMEs across years and industries. As can be seen from this Table, except for food 
processing industry (SITCO) in 1991 where mean efficiency level is equal to 55%, the 
average level of TE in other industries ranges from 71.9% (miscellaneous industry 
(SITC8) in 1996) to 90.8% (chemicals industry (SITC5) in 2001). The mean TE of 
SMEs in Vietnam is almost identical to the 87% of average efficiency obtained for SME 
manufacturing industry in Thailand by Wiboonchutikula (2001 ), and higher than the 
78% found for SO Es in Vietnam by Vu (2003). The percentage of firms reaching near 
maximum level (greater than 90%) of TE is high in 2001, especially in chemical 
industries (77.78%). However, efficiency level varies in a wide range from 0.001 to 
1.00 (Panel B, C and E) suggesting a number of firms with very poor efficiency level. 
Overall, there is an improvement in TE over the period studied in all industries except 
for machinery and transport equipment (SITC7) and miscellaneous (SITC8) 
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industries. In these industries, the percentage of firms reaching a higher level of 
efficiency decreases over time (Panel D and E). 
Firm characteristics by efficiency group are also summarised in Table 3.19 (page 85, 
86). It can be easily seen from this Table that the higher efficiency groups have higher 
rates of returns measured by the ratio of average profit over capital. Firms in these 
groups are younger and mostly located in urban areas. Figures in the Table confirm the 
advantages of family labour. For instance, if firms in the highest efficiency level group 
are small, the percentage of family labour is higher compared to other efficiency groups 
(SITCO, 2001; SITC5, 1996; 2001; SITC7, 2001). 
3. 7 Concluding remarks and policy implications. 
The chapter provides the estimate of technical efficiency of non-state small and medium 
manufacturing industries in Vietnam. Using firm level data in Vietnam in 1991, 1996 
and 2001, stochastic frontier analysis shows that average levelS of efficiency of the non-
state small and medium manufacturing industries was high and increased during the 
period studied. Results also show a wide range in efficiency differences among firms, 
and the determinants of such differentials are identified. 
A micro enterprise with fewer than 10 employees in labour intensive industries, and a 
metropolitan location are both shown to be positively associated with higher levels of 
technical efficiency. The efficiency benefits of a micro enterprise may be explained by 
the benefits associated with family labour. The metropolitan efficiency effect is most 
likely due to the availability of better-educated workers and managers, and also market 
opportunities in metropolitan areas relative to non-metropolitan areas. 
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The calculated production elasticities indicate that non-state manufacturing SMEs in 
Vietnam still stick to low-cost labour advantages and thus, have low added value and 
returns. In addition, the dominance of insignificant effects of firm age reflects no gain 
from the 'learning by doing' process. By contrast, positive and significant impacts of 
firm age in few sector, reflect differences in technology generation during the transition 
period. The results raise concerns about competitiveness of this sector. This matter 
should be considered in the private sector promoting program. 
The results indicate few benefits from government assistance in terms of credit and non-
financial services. However, support from government does not appear to be 
systematically based on any performance criteria. This suggests that government 
promotion of technical efficiency should refocus its support on economic criteria. 
Strengthening technical assistance and institutions that promote cooperation among 
firms may also be helpful in terms of improving technical efficiency. 
Some suggestions are also made for the follow-up surveys. Firstly, attention should be 
focused on collecting capital information. Secondly, the number of working hours, 
instead of the amount of labour, should be collected if possible so that the effect of firm 
size will be calculated more appropriately. 
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3.8 Appendix 3.1 
Table 3.1 Firm ownershif! and firm size 
SIT CO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 
Ownership (percentage) 
•Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 
•Household 29.63 59.74 85.32 15.38 31.68 48.15 23.53 45.89 72.82 15.38 20.93 69.18 39.29 44.44 73.46 
•Privatet 59.26 28.57 6.75 73.08 38.61 16.05 60.00 28.50 12.66 71.79 53.49 13.21 39.29 28.89 8.46 
•Cooperative 11.11 2.60 1.98 11.54 13.86 11.11 16.47 14.98 6.33 12.82 16.28 6.92 21.43 10.56 6.15 
•L&S 9.09 5.95 15.84 24.69 10.63 8.18 9.30 10.69 16.11 11.92 
Firm size (average number of workers) 
•Household 3.00 5.19 6.56 4.00 6.44 8.69 4.05 4.69 6.61 3.50 6.22 6.34 5.00 6.46 8.18 
•Privatet 6.94 14.18 12.65 20.00 14.95 22.38 15.73 17.59 14.91 11.54 16.39 17.52 10.14 26.69 31.14 
•Cooperative 42.33 21.50 24.20 33.00 25.36 27.44 25.21 31.90 33.54 25.40 27.86 28.54 39.08 35.42 33.75 
•L&S 54.28 46.07 43.31 38.8 35.77 28.16 52.50 23.00 37.48 39.48 
Percentage of micro firm in each industry 
77.78 74.02 81.35 38.46 48.51 46.91 43.53 55.55 57.69 56.41 39.53 65.41 60.71 43.89 69.13 
Note: t The word 'private' used in this Table indicates sole-proprietorship firm to save space. 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics for key variables in 1991 
Average Stdev Min Max 
(a) Food processing- SITCO (27 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong(*) 56 793.41 47 793.17 1425 146 778 
• Capital Thousand dong 34 555.3 72 015.61 120 266 500 
• Labour Number of workers 9.70 13.30 54 
• Materials Thousand dong 42 624.59 37 840.63 1330 106 547 
• Age Year 7.07 7.35 1 32 
(b) Chemicals - SITC5 (26 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 153 487.2 199 581.7 600 950 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 133 648.1 233 536.7 210 1 071 000 
• Labour Number of workers 19.04 29.24 3 152 
• Materials Thousand dong 177 326.9 281 861 4 886 1250160 
• Age Year 6.46 6.32 26 
(c) Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials - SITC6 (85 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 98 194.07 160 859.5 1 500 1 013 760 
• Capital Thousand dong 120397.1 350 783.6 10 3 060 900 
• Labour Number of workers 14.54 18.65 154 
• Materials Thousand dong 81 407.04 160 935.6 410 924 184 
• Age Year 5.92 6.57 34 
(d) Machinery and transport equipment- SITC7 (39 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 83 348.21 119 146.3 3 000 651 440 
• Capital Thousand dong 83 364.13 133 268.6 1 050 500 000 
• Labour Number of workers 12.07 11.01 2 50 
• Materials Thousand dong 63 350.18 89 723.36 850 469 210 
• Age Year 8.18 8.99 34 
(e) Miscellaneous manufactured articles - SITC8 (56 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 116086.9 219978.9 1500 1000000 
• Capital Thousand dong 73686.91 164819.8 15 747600 
• Labour Number of workers 14.32 17.49 2 70 
• Materials Thousand dong 90 907.02 186 418.9 280 850 000 
• Age Year 8.59 8.68 34 
Note: (*) Dong is the currency in Vietnam. The exchange rate in 1991 was 8,850 dong per USD 
(this source of exchange rate is provided in Ronnas (1992: 22) 
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Table 3.3 Summary statistics for key variables in 1996 
Average Stdev Min Max 
(a) Food processing- SITCO (77 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong(*) 1 350 378 4 668 553 7 200 34 200 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 286 763.7 742 186.4 2 500 5 320 000 
• Labour Number of workers 12.65 26.54 215 
• Materials Thousand dong 1096136 4 032 439 4 800 30 400 000 
• Age Year 8.21 7.79 38 
(b) Chemicals - SITC5 (101 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 1 098 770 2 826 791 6 480 18 000 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 869 154.8 2 252 038 6 100 16 800 000 
• Labour Number of workers 18.19 32.02 2 300 
• Materials Thousand dong 867 925.8 2 431 071 2 325 16 400 000 
• Age Year 9.68 9.28 37 
(c) Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials - SITC6 (207 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 1072392 4 774 284 4 500 64 500 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 484 787.4 1 140 371 10 10 700 000 
• Labour Number of workers 15.75 23.28 200 
• Materials Thousand dong 868 223.9 4 424 647 2 828 60 000 000 
• Age Year 8.26 8.23 38 
(d) Machinery and transport equipment - SITC7 (43 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 1 187 895 2 207 314 25 440 10 800 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 730 485.1 1388263 500 6 910 000 
• Labour Number of workers 19.49 21.63 2 100 
• Materials Thousand dong 883634.5 1818325 16188 8768000 
• Age Year 11.37 9.24 1 37 
( e) Miscellaneous manufactured articles - SITC8 (180 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 1 298 777 4 321 848 350 53 400 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 750612.7 2537670 1000 26 600 000 
• Labour Number of workers 20.36 23.80 150 
• Materials Thousand dong 901 883 2 471 439 1 128 27 400 000 
• Age Year 9.15 8.95 59 
Note:(*) Dong is the currency in Vietnam. The exchange rate in 1996 was 11,033 dong per USD 
(source: http://www. imfstatistics .org/imf/ifsBrowser .aspx) 
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Table 3.4 Summary statistics for key variables in 2001 
Average St dev Min Max 
(a) Food processing - SITCO (252 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong(*) 1 083 997 3 378 779 9 000 31 800 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 777 642.9 2 326 228 3 000 22 700 000 
• Labour Number of workers 9.68 15.82 1 120 
• Materials Thousand dong 894 722.5 3 007 186 4490 28 400 000 
• Age(**) Year 10.75 8.15 1 50 
(b) Chemicals - SITC5 (81 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 2 768 684 6 980 204 25 000 41 000 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 2 738 038 5 575 052 3 000 41 500 000 
• Labour Number of workers 20.41 33.47 2 250 
• Materials Thousand dong 2 288 995 5 828 910 9 340 35 500 000 
• Age Year 9.29 6.39 1 27 
(c) Manufactured goods classified chiefly by materials- SITC6 (379 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 878 911.8 2 876 967 3 000 33 900 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 824 500 2 129 446 1 600 21200 000 
• Labour Number of workers 11.12 18.06 1 257 
• Materials Thousand dong 774 464.3 2 740 695 2 941 31 100 000 
• Age Year 9.06 8.23 0 71 
(d) Machinery and transport equipment- SITC7 (159 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 813 796.8 1 525 079 6 500 9 680 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 935 979 2 002 814 720 20 400 000 
• Labour Number of workers 11.14 13.24 1 85 
• Materials Thousand dong 680 574.3 1426910 3 296 9 140 400 
• Age Year 11.52 9.64 1 59 
( e) Miscellaneous manufactured articles - SITC8 (260 obs) 
• Output Thousand dong 1 414 168 4 897 688 5 000 43 000 000 
• Capital Thousand dong 1 144 303 2 734 624 3 300 21 200 000 
• Labour Number of workers 15.43 20.62 129 
• Materials Thousand dong 1 169 018 4 291 188 1 850 ~6 800 000 
• Age Year 10.06 8.10 0 42 
Note: (*)Dong is the currency in Vietnam. The exchange rate in 2001was14,725 dong per USD 
Source: http://www.imfstatistics.org/imf/ifsBrowser .aspx) 
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Table 3.5 Generalised likelihood ratio tests for functional form 
SIT CO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
Null Production function is Cobb Douglas 
Hypothesis P4 = Ps = ... = P9 = o 
X~.99 - value 16.074 
z 2 - statistic 
1991 14.52 2.18 14.48 8.44 19.16 
1996 17.00 46.78 12.20 6.78 73.64 
2001 61.52 34.92 12.90 36.32 40.72 
Panel 96-2001 25.95 100.30 12.44 26.93 25.49 
Decision 
1991 Accept H 0 Accept H 0 Accept H 0 Accept H 0 Reject H 0 
1996 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Accept H 0 Accept H 0 Reject H 0 
2001 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Accept H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
Panel 96-2001 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Accept H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
Note: (1) The critical value for the hypothesis is obtained from Kodde and Palm's (1986) 
Table 1 
(2) SITCO: food processing; SITC5: chemical; SITC6: manufactured goods classified 
by materials; SITC7: machinery and transport equipment; SITC8: miscellaneous 
manufacture 
Table 3.6 Generalised likelihood ratio test for the absence of technical inefficiency effects 
Null 
Hypothesis 
x~.99 - value 
z2 - statistic 
1991(*) 
1996 
2001 
Decision 
1991 
1996 
2001 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
45.68 
25.49 
129.03 
Reject H 0 
Accept H 0 
Reject H 0 
Technical inefficiency effects are absent 
r = ao = 81 = ... = all = o 
25.55 
74.41 21.72 29.58 
108.00 154.57 26.78 
93.15 182.56 107.89 
Reject H 0 Accept H 0 Reject H 0 
Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
Reject H 0 Reject H 0 Reject H 0 
34.18 
241.97 
83.35 
Reject H 0 
Reject H 0 
Reject H 0 
Note: (1) The critical value for 1991 X~.99 is equal to 24.05 since the inefficiency functions 
include only 10 variables. 
(2) SITCO: food processing; SITC5: chemical; SITC6: manufactured goods 
classified by materials; SITC7: machinery and transport equipment; SITC8: 
miscellaneous manufacture 
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Table 3.7 The estimated frontier and technical inefficiency functions for 1991 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
Number of observations 27 26 85 39 56 
Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er 
1 Stochastic FPF 
Constant 1.443*** 0.079 1.858*** 0.542 1.927*** 0.309 1.738*** 0.622 6.232*** 1.084 
K -0.091 *** 0.022 0.025 0.021 0.028 0.020 0.044 0.058 0.291 * 0.158 
L 0.498*** 0.058 0.191*** 0.050 0.177*** 0.065 0.589*** 0.131 0.189 0.424 
M 0.953*** 0.027 0.823*** 0.038 0.786** 0.035 0.744*** 0.053 -0.179 0.247 
K*L 0.024 0.023 
K*M -0.017 0.021 
L*M -0.044 0.036 
K*K -0.006 0.009 
L*L 0.045 0.060 
M*M 0.055*** o.oi5 
2 Tift 
Constant 0.058 0.458 3.092** 1.396 -0.136 0.498 -1.622 1.090 
Household -0.213 0.154 -7.119*** 2.547 -0.176 0.461 1.004** 0.510 
Cooperative 1.302*** 0.325 2.863* 1.483 0.488 0.317 -1.367 1.037 
Metropolitan -0.409*** 0.132 -6.527*** 1.323 0.346 0.516 0.985* 0.542 
Small and medium group 0.233 0.167 -7.741*** 1.784 0.636 0.394 0.182 0.651 
Age -0.006 0.009 -0.144 0.114 0.019 0.012 0.039** 0.019 
Experience 0.605 0.468 0.994 1.034 -0.769** 0.359 -0.035 0.510 
Bonus 0.316*** 0.094 1.187 1.719 0.504* 0.279 0.116 0.524 
Government credit assistance -0.141 0.501 0.714 1.013 0.413 0.472 0.526 0.796 
Non-financial assistance 0.204 0.152 1.929 1.293 -0.028 0.311 0.284 0.413 
Subcontract -1.376*** 0.308 8.817*** 2.712 0.547*** 0.204 -1.220 0.770 
Sigma squared 0.012*** 0.004 2.004*** 0.497 0.098* 0.055 0.184*** 0.061 
Gamma 0.999*** 0.017 0.998*** 0.001 0.164 0.653 0.684*** 0.120 
Log likelihood 23.66 -0.932 -8.193 -8.269 
Mean technical efficienc~ 0.55 0.736 0.735 0.827 
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively 
t Technical inefficiency function. The inefficiency function for SITC6 disappears as the likelihood ratio test rejects the presence of technical inefficiency effects 
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Table 3.8 The estimated frontier and technical inefficienc~ functions for 1996 and 2001 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Number of observations 77 252 101 81 207 379 
Coeff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er 
1 Stochastic FPF 
Constant 4.974*** 1.768 3.645*** 1.002 1.761 * 0.998 6.092*** 1.058 2.492*** 0.164 2.013*** 0.159 
K -0.548** 0.255 -0.065 0.127 0.442 0.351 0.092 0.138 0.033** 0.014 0.013 O.ol 1 
L 1.449*** 0.536 1.233*** 0.294 -0.519 0.689 0.206 0.261 0.258*** 0.036 0.220*** 0.023 
M 0.612** 0.309 0.431 ** 0.171 0.579* 0.349 0.116 0.147 0.769*** 0.019 0.826*** 0.014 
K*L -0.105** 0.046 -0.019 0.023 0.143** 0.068 0.066** 0.031 
K*M 0.059** 0.027 -0.018* 0.010 -0.190*** 0.056 -0.034** 0.016 
L*M -0.034 0.052 -0.104*** 0.027 -0.031 0.071 -0.081 *** 0.031 
K*K 0.003 0.015 0.015** 0.006 0.066** 0.030 0.007 0.006 
L*L 0.085* 0.045 0.132*** 0.032 -0.134 0.091 0.008 0.021 
M*M -0.015 0.018 0.034*** 0.009 0.105*** 0.027 0.053*** 0.012 
2 TIFt 
Constant -4.933*** 0.249 -0.177 0.809 0.160 0.547 1.311 * 0.748 -4.808*** 1.472 
Household 0.135 0.155 -0.102 0.714 -0.115 0.508 -4.871 *** 1.282 0.560 0.759 
Sole-proprietorship -0.055 0.149 -0.164 0.562 0.272 0.408 -5.121*** 1.487 1.668 1.274 
Cooperative 0.583 0.411 0.712 0.929 -0.118 0.484 -2.545*** 0.872 3.322** 1.611 
Metropolitan -0.361 *** 0.096 -2.903*** 0.605 -0.434* 0.223 -0.627 0.610 -0.473* 0.267 
Small and medium group 3.646*** 0.192 2.171*** 0.671 -0.597* 0.354 -1.463* 0.803 1.670** 0.713 
Age 0.048*** 0.004 0.012 0.025 -0.015 0.018 0.058** 0.023 -0.017 0.018 
Experience -0.063 0.062 -0.600 0.772 -0.797*** 0.212 -0.628 0.525 0.410** 0.177 
Bonus -0.172* 0.092 0.177 0.477 -0.143 0.182 -0.886 0.586 -0.109 0.148 
Government credit assistance 0.153 0.134 -0.045 0.852 -0.128 0.276 0.554 0.665 0.808*** 0.106 
Non-financial services -0.320** 0.150 0.733 0.600 1.123*** 0.341 -0.313 0.718 -0.162 0.613 
Subcontract -0.124* 0.074 0.264 0.628 0.089 0.214 -1.429* 0.773 -0.715 0.676 
Sigma squared 0.449*** 0.022 0.263*** 0.098 0.075*** 0.013 1.151*** 0.198 0.515*** 0.131 
Gamma 0.925*** 0.012 0.820*** 0.067 0.861 *** 0.023 0.966*** 0.007 0.904*** 0.046 
Log likelihood 15.37 -15.33 52.28 -46.99 -65.98 
Mean technical efficienc~ 0.894 0.811 0.908 0.818 0.876 
Notes: *, **,***denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively 
t Technical inefficiency function. The inefficiency function for SITCO for 1996 disappear as the likelihood ratio test rejects the presence of technical inefficiency effects 76 
Table 3.8 ~continued~ 
SITC7 SITC8 
1996 2001 1996 2001 
Number of observations 43 159 180 260 
Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er Coe ff. Std-er 
1 Stochastic FPF 
Constant 3.154*** 0.276 6.881 *** 0.966 10.556*** 0.932 6.088*** 0.982 
K -0.044** 0.017 0.115 0.106 0.132 0.142 0.047 0.159 
L 0.217*** 0.037 1.557*** 0.271 1.161 *** 0.299 1.305*** 0.251 
M 0.799*** 0.019 -0.241 0.170 -0.758*** 0.182 -0.041 0.146 
K*L 0.004 0.024 0.017 0.027 0.009 0.024 
K*M -0.025* 0.014 -0.023 0.019 -0.018 0.016 
L*M -0.130*** 0.034 -0.077*** 0.028 -0.137*** 0.029 
K*K 0.007 0.005 0.005 0.015 0.006 0.008 
L*L 0.063* 0.037 -0.029 0.038 0.102*** 0.033 
M*M 0.065*** 0.012 0.078*** 0.009 0.056*** 0.012 
2 TIFt 
Constant -0.168 0.455 0.191 0.458 -3.044*** 1.005 -5.414*** 1.175 
Household 0.604 0.444 -2.206*** 0.326 0.957 0.611 -1.576*** 0.517 
Sole-proprietorship 0.695 0.443 -0.813** 0.363 0.914* 0.512 1.125* 0.635 
Cooperative 0.913* 0.491 0.829** 0.393 1.304 0.838 -1.417* 0.862 
Metropolitan -0.246** 0.116 -0.589** 0.266 -3.809*** 0.707 1.276*** 0.337 
Small and medium group -0.241 ** 0.097 -1.942*** 0.319 1.144* 0.593 -0.620 0.402 
Age 0.001 0.004 0.018*** 0.007 0.038** 0.017 0.122*** 0.026 
Experience 0.019 0.073 0.958*** 0.267 0.618 0.693 1.951*** 0.368 
Bonus 0.287*** 0.096 -0.421 * 0.224 -3.131 *** .732 -0.398 0.295 
Government credit assistance -0.275** 0.130 -0.013 0.232 -1.265* 0.721 1.408*** 0.461 
Non-financial services -0.188** 0.090 0.769*** 0.220 2.145*** 0.453 -1.111 *** 0.365 
Subcontract -0.118 0.074 -0.100 0.201 -0.314 0.392 0.508* 0.308 
Sigma squared 0.017*** 0.004 0.284*** 0.049 1.402*** 0.239 0.911 *** 0.152 
Gamma 0.762*** 0.112 0.920*** 0.020 0.989*** 0.004 0.881*** 0.029 
Log likelihood 34.91 12.07 -44.36 -131.61 
Mean technical efficiencl:'. 0.835 0.835 0.719 0.824 
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels respectively 
t Technical inefficiency function 77 
Table 3.9 Production elasticities of ~arameters in the FPF 
SIT CO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
1996 
Capital 0.025 0.109 0.033 -0.044 0.021 
Labour 0.176 0.211 0.258 0.217 0.314 
Materials 0.858 0.714 0.769 0.799 0.622 
Returns to scale 1.059 1.034 1.060 0.972 0.957 
2001 
Capital 0.046 0.001 0.013 -0.004 0.002 
Labour 0.202 0.092 0.220 0.303 0.237 
Materials 0.857 0.838 0.826 0.747 0.764 
Returns to scale 1.105 0.931 1.059 1.046 1.003 
Note: SITCO: food processing; SITCS: chemical; SITC6: manufactured goods classified by 
materials; SITC7: machinery and transport equipment; SITC8: miscellaneous 
manufacture 
Table 3.10 Likelihood ratio tests for random and firm-s~ecific effects 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
Null hypothesis 1. y=O 
X~.99 - value 8.27 
;c; - statistic 
1996 144.78 56.68 10.74 213.52 
2001 109.08 160.76 58.06 78.24 65.08 
Decision 
1996 Reject H0 
2001 
Null hypothesis 2a. 80 = 81 = ... = 811 = 0 
X~.99 - value 25.55 
x;2 - statistic 
1996 80.82 65.46 26.78 128.52 
2001 128.4 81.52 67.14 69.84 62.34 
Decision 
1996 Reject H0 
2001 
Null hypothesis 2b. 81 = ... = 811 = 0 
X~.99 - value 24.05 
;c;1 - statistic 
1996 38.18 53.56 201.98 84.5 
2001 99.92 33.6 53.08 49.44 37.88 
Decision 
1996 
2001 Reject H0 
Note: The critical value for the hypothesis is obtained from Table 1 in Kodde and Palm's 
(1986) 
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Table 3.11 Summa!! for inefficiencl'. effects 
SIT CO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Household + - - -*** + + -*** + -*** 
Sole-proprietorship 
-
+ -*** + + -** +* +* 
Cooperative + + 
-
-*** +** +* +** + -* 
Urban -*** -*** -* - -* -** -** -*** +*** 
Small and medium group +*** +*** -* -* +** -** -*** +* 
Age +*** + - +** - + +*** +** +*** 
Experience - - -*** - +** + +*** + +*** 
Bonus -* + - - - +*** -* -*** 
Government credit assistance + 
- -
+ +*** -** 
-
-* +*** 
Government assistance -** + +*** - - -** +*** +*** -*** 
during operation 
Subcontract -* + + -* - - - - +* 
Notes: *, **,***denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 level respectively 
The correlation between any variable in the Table and TE is contrary to the sign appearing in that Table. 
The likelihood ratio test confirms no technical inefficiency effects in food processing industries in 1996 
Table 3.12 Proportion of family labour across l'.ear and indust!! (pro~ortion) 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Household 0.44 0.39 0.36 0.21 0.49 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.37 0.31 
Sole-proprietorship 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.06 
Cooperative 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.01 
L&S 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 
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Table 3.13 Reasons some firms have to close their businesses temporarily 
Lack of input Lack of Lack of Other Total 
demand labour 
1996 
Metropolitan 3 (3.95) 43 (56.58) 0 (0.00) 30 (39.47) 76 (100.00) 
Non-metropolitan 18 (20.22) 59 (66.29) 2 (2.25) 10 (11.24) 89 (100.00) 
2001 
Metropolitan 1 (1.49) 40 (59.70) 0 (0.00) 26 (38.81) 67 (100.00) 
Non-metropolitan 20 (10.70) 132 (70.59) 5 (2.67) 30 (16.04) 187 (100.00) 
Note: The number in parentheses is in percentage. 
Table 3.14 Profiles of government support recipients 
1996 2001 
Credit assistance 
• Percentage of recipients 15.62 28.12 
• Firm average profit(*) (thous.VND) 149 082.00 86 889.06 
• Firm size (average number of workers) 29.58 13.61 
• Firm age 8.61 9.39 
• Metropolitan located (percentage) 57.89 23.89 
Technical assistance 
• Percentage of recipients 22.20 44.83 
• Firm average profit (thous.VND) 141 659.50 72 312.44 
• Firm size (average number of workers) 29.64 14.73 
• Firm age 8. 72 10.28 
• Metropolitan located (percentage) 67.41 36.88 
Note:(*) Profits are reported by firms and deflated by the inflation rate 
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Table 3.15 Panel 1996-2001 models 
Coefficients 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 SITC8 
Functional form Trans log Translog Cobb-Douglas Translog Trans log 
Number of observations 93 88 227 92 203 
1 Stochastic production frontier function 
Constant 7.411 *** 6.219*** 2.497*** 4.905*** 4.766*** 
K -0.109 0.057 0.011 0.310* 0.247 
L 2.053*** 1.032*** 0.314*** 0.829* 1.035*** 
M -0.247 -0.062 0.774*** -0.035 0.024 
K*L -0.011 0.024 -0.014 -0.009 
K*M 0.008 -0.021 -0.054*** -0.037 
L*M -0.192*** -0.096** -0.026 -0.065 
K*K 0.002 0.006 0.013* 0.009 
L*L 0.165*** 0.013 -0.019 0.018 
M*M 0.055*** 0.056 0.065*** 0.056*** 
2 Technical inefficiency function 
Constant -4.484*** -0.200 -1.521* -1.298 -5.482*** 
Household 2.743*** 0.377* -3.048*** -1.737*** -0.156 
Sole-proprietorship 0.273 0.696* -2.274** -0.631 3.433*** 
Cooperative 3.475*** 0.259 0.053 0.214 2.026** 
Urban -1.411 *** -1.458*** -2.025*** -0.291 -1.872*** 
Small and medium group 2.419*** 0.829*** 2.245** -0.878** 1.466* 
Age -0.022 -0.010 0.009 0.024*** 0.088*** 
Experience 0.709 0.061 -0.709 1.615*** 0.246 
Bonus -1.306*** -0.635*** -0.419 -0.199 -3.047*** 
Government credit assistance -0.756 -0.551 1.254* -0.347 -0.659 
Government assistance during operation 1.137* 0.678** -1.055 1.072*** 1.711 ** 
Subcontract -0.961 -0.239** -1.350** -0.390 -1.313 
Sigma squared 0.378*** 0.102*** 1.242*** 0.186*** 1.606*** 
Gamma 0.951 *** 0.775*** 0.963*** 0.893*** 0.929*** 
Log likelihood 22.828 26.764 -91.979 19.148 -134.547 
Mean technical efficiency 0.862 0.878 0.801 0.865 0.765 
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Table 3.16 Testing for the presence of dummy variableyear200J 
Null Hypothesis 
t0.95 -value 
t - statistic 
SITCO SITC5 SITC6 SITC7 
-2.15 
No dummy year in the frontier model 
P year2001 = 0 
1.96 
-1.21 -3.05 -0.27 
SITC8 
-0.22 
Decision Reject H 0 Accept H 0 Reject H 0 Accept H 0 Accept H 0 
Note: SITCO: food processing; SITC5: chemical; SITC6: manufactured goods classified by 
materials; SITC7: machinery and transport equipment; SITC8: miscellaneous 
manufacture 
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Table 3.17 Models with dummy year variable 
Coefficients 
SITCO: Translog SITC6: Cobb-Douglas 
No dummy year Dummy year No dummy year Dummy year 
1 Stochastic production frontier function 
Constant 7.411 *** 8.999*** 2.497*** 2.402*** 
K -0.109 -0.229 0.011 0.028*** 
L 2.053*** 2.369*** 0.314*** 0.310*** 
M -0.247 -0.462* 0.774*** 0.771 *** 
K*L -0.011 -0.012 
K*M 0.008 0.018 
L*M -0.192*** -0.223*** 
K*K 0.002 0.003 
L*L 0.165*** 0.182*** 
M*M 0.055*** 0.061 *** 
Year2001 -0.118** -0.133*** 
2 Technical inefficiency function 
Constant -4.484*** -2.133** -1.521* -4.485*** 
Household 2.743*** 1.433** -3.048*** -2.977*** 
Sole-proprietorship 0.273 -0.533 -2.274** -1.963*** 
Cooperative 3.475*** 1.893** 0.053 0.643 
Urban -1.411*** -1.081 *** -2.025*** -1.319*** 
Small and medium group 2.419*** 1.917*** 2.245** 3.059*** 
Age -0.022 -0.009 0.009 0.001 
Experience 0.709 0.215 -0.709 -1.047*** 
Bonus -1.306*** -1.095*** -0.419 -0.008 
Government credit assistance -0.756 -0.951 1.254* 1.723*** 
Government assistance during operation 1.137* 0.682 -1.055 -1.078*** 
Subcontract -0.961 -0.577 -1.350** -1.078*** 
Sigma squared 0.378*** 0.208*** 1.242*** 1.798*** 
Gamma 0.951 *** 0.922*** 0.963*** 0.978*** 
Log likelihood 22.828 23.778 -91.979 -83.017 
Mean technical efficiency 0.862 0.875 0.801 0.799 
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Table 3.18 Efficiency level 
Panel A: SITCO Panel B: SITC5 Panel C: SITC6 
1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 1996 2001 
Efficiency range 0.19-0.99 0.11-1.00 0.003-0.97 0.08-0.97 0.31-0.98 0.04-0.96 0.04-1 
Percentage of firms in range 
<=0.50 51.85 1.58 11.54 7.92 3.70 5.31 1.58 
0.51-0.70 29.63 1.59 15.38 4.95 1.23 6.76 2.37 
0.71-0.80 7.41 4.36 23.07 10.89 3.70 14.01 5.01 
0.81-0.90 3.70 24.21 26.92 45.54 13.58 59.90 45.91 
>=0.91 7.41 68.25 23.08 30.69 77.78 14.00 45.12 
Mean efficiency 0.55 0.894 0.736 0.811 0.908 0.818 0.876 
Panel D: SITC7 Panel E: SITC8 
1991 1996 2001 1991 1996 2001 
Efficiency range 0.18-0.98 0.56-0.98 0.15-0.97 0.18-0.97 0.001-0.97 0.03-0.96 
Percentage of firms in range 
<=0.50 30.77 5.03 8.93 20 2.31 
0.51-0.70 7.69 11.63 6.92 5.36 15 3.08 
0.71-0.80 5.13 32.56 11.32 12.50 12.78 19.61 
0.81-0.90 0.00 18.60 40.25 30.36 36.67 68.07 
>=0.91 56.41 37.21 36.48 42.86 15.55 6.92 
Mean efficiency 0.735 0.835 0.835 0.827 0.719 0.824 
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Table 3.19 Firms characteristics b~ efficienc~ grouE 
Characteristics Unit 
SIT CO 
2001 
Efficiency range <80% 80% to 90% >90% 
• Size #Workers 30.71 18.31 5.27 
• Age Years 14.76 10.40 10.47 
• Unpaid labour ratio # unpaid workers/# workers 0.07 0.14 0.44 
• Profit/ capital VND 10 100 160 
• Urban ratio Urban firms/total firms 0.53 0.44 0.34 
SITCS 
1996 2001 
Efficiency range <80% 80%to90% >90% <80% 80%to90% >90% 
• Size #Workers 21.25 24.33 8.71 10.28 14.80 22.39 
• Age Years 14.00 8.71 7.89 8.57 7.40 9.67 
• Unpaid labour ratio # unpaid workers/# workers 0.09 0.06 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.05 
• Profit/capital VND 40 90 260 50 20 80 
• Urban ratio Urban firms/total firms 0.42 0.69 0.91 0.43 0.80 0.95 
SITC6 
1996 2001 
Efficiency range <80% 80%to90% >90% <80% 80%to90% >90% 
• Size #Workers 23.69 11.71 19.24 21.47 12.98 6.69 
• Age Years 10.69 7.60 7.18 10.77 9.29 8.49 
• Unpaid labour ratio # unpaid workers/# workers 0.07 0.43 0.08 0.05 0.13 0.25 
• Profit/ capital VND 110 190 240 30 70 80 
• Urban ratio Urban firms/total firms 0.63 0.65 0.64 0.43 0.30 0.48 
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Table 3.19 Continued 
Characteristics Unit 
SITC7 
1996 2001 
Efficiency range <80% 80%to 90% >90% <80% 80% to 90% >90% 
• Size #Workers 15.28 17.11 25.56 9.89 12.79 10.24 
• Age Years 12.94 14.67 7.75 15.08 11.11 9.94 
• Unpaid labour ratio # unpaid workers/# workers 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.17 0.11 0.17 
• Profit/ capital VND 80 210 190 130 20 90 
• Urban ratio Urban firms/total firms 0.89 0.89 1.00 0.43 0.68 0.79 
SITC8 
1996 2001 
Efficiency range <80% 80% to 90% >90% <80% 80%to 90% >90% 
• Size #Workers 14.97 26.65 21.19 13.03 16.09 16.55 
• Age Years 10.58 8.26 7.31 15.95 8.51 6.80 
• Unpaid labour ratio # unpaid workers/# workers 0.17 0.06 0.05 0.18 0.14 0.15 
• Profit/ capital VND 70 140 110 30 90 350 
• Urban ratio Urban firms/total firms 0.39 0.73 0.88 0.44 0.39 0.15 
86 
CHAPTER4 
CONTRIBUTION OF PRODUCTIVITY AND 
FIRM SIZE TO VALUE-ADDED: 
Case study of non-state firms 
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4.1 Introduction 
An understanding of the factors contributing to a firm's profit and value-added, also at 
the industry level, is important to both firm owners and policy makers. In this chapter an 
index number profit decomposition method is extended to account for the nature of 
manufacturing industrial data, i.e., firms produce different numbers of outputs and use 
different numbers of inputs, to evaluate firm and industry performance. This different 
dimensionality results in difficult problems of aggregating and decomposing separate 
price effects with the profit decomposition method. 
To overcome the problem of decomposing profit and value-added given the data 
characteristics, a new indexing decomposition method, called the error index 
decomposition method (EIDM), is developed using the value-added of total factor 
productivity (TFP) measurement. The EIDM allows for differences in a firm's value-
added to be decomposed into separate effects due to variations in productivity and firm 
size in both labour and capital. It also helps resolve the dimensionality problem by using 
the industry deflator instead of the observed price. This approximation introduce biases 
into TFP measurement (Coelli et al. 2003; Diewert 2006b) and, thus, an error term is 
added into the decomposition equation to capture measurement biases and white noise. 
The method is applied to non-state small and medium manufacturing enterprises in 
Vietnam over the period 1996-2001 and shows that productivity is a core contributor to 
the success of a firm. 
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 describes the profit 
decomposition and the EIDM. Details of data and variable measurement are presented 
in Section 4.3 while Section 4.4 discusses the value-added TFP index for non-state 
SMEs in Vietnam. The decomposition of factors contributing to a firm's value-added 
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is analysed in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 concludes with suggestions as to how to promote 
firm and industry performance in Vietnam. 
4.2 Methodology 
Lawrence, Diewert and Fox (LDF) (2001) and Fox, Grafton, Kirkley and Squires 
(FGKS) (2003) have developed an index-number profit decomposition (INPD) method 
that explains changes in a firm's variable profits from productivity, output prices, 
variable input prices and firm size. LDF apply this method to assess the contribution of 
these factors on profitability of Telstra, Australia's major telecommunications carrier. 
FGKS extend this approach to multiple cross-sectional data and compare firm 
performance in the British Columbia halibut fishery. The current chapter adapts and 
extends the methodology to the manufacturing firm level data in Vietnam. 
The INPD method defines the variable non-zero profits of an arbitrary firm b, !Cb 
relative to the variable profits of another firm a, 1C a as: 
(4.1) 
Using Fisher's weak reversal test, the variable profit index defined in equation ( 4.1) is a 
product of price and quantity indexes, i.e, 
(4.2) 
where pa,b and Qa,b are the price and quantity indexes of the 'netputs', respectively. In 
the 'netputs' vector, output quantities are treated as positive while variable input 
quantities are treated as negative. The result from equation ( 4.2) is, hence, the relative 
variable profit or the gross return to capital index between two firms. 
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Using the translog identity exploited by Diewert and Morrison (1986), FGKS prove that 
if a firm's profit function ;r is in translog form, and under the profit maximising 
behaviour, the capital TFP26 index between two firms a and b is exactly equal to a 
Tomqvist implicit netput quantity index, divided by the capital index. That is: 
Qa,b 
Ra,b =--
Ka,b (4.3) 
where Ra,b is the capital TFP index. Qa,b is the implicit netput quantity index derived 
from (4.2) and Ka,b is the capital quantity index. 
Deriving Qa,b from ~4.2), substituting into (4.3), and rearranging, we have: 
(4.4) 
pa,b and Ka,b are also in the Tomqvist form and calculated as: 
M 1 
pa,b = exp[£; 2" (s! + s:) ln(p! Ip:)] (4.5) 
N 1 
Ka,b = exp[~ 2" (s! + s;) ln(k! I k; )] (4.6) 
Pm is the price of m'h commodity and kn is the quantity of n'h capital component, 
profit share of fixed input n. Using the multiplicative nature of the Tomqvist index, 
26 We call this productivity the capital TFP as the denominator is only the capital index rather than the 
index of primary inputs as in value-added TFP or the aggregate index of all inputs including capital, 
labour and intermediate inputs in gross output TFP. 
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pa,b and Ka,b can be further decomposed into individual or group component effects of 
output and variable input prices and capital as: 
M 
pa,b = IT pa,b 
m;J 
(4.7) 
N 
and Ka,b = I1 ka,b 
n;J 
(4.8) 
4.2.1 Adapted method 
When applying the method of FGKS to firm level data in Vietnam, we face the problem 
of different dimensionality. It is very often the case that two different firms produce 
different numbers of heterogeneous outputs and use different numbers of intermediate 
inputs in the same industry. Hence, the traditional bilateral index number theory breaks 
down as it requires the same dimensionality (Bresnahan and Gordon 1996; Gordon and 
Griliches 1997; Diewert 2003). Consequently, we cannot decompose the price index 
pa,b into the output and intermediate input price indexes to calculate each individual 
index. There are two approaches to correct the problem. 
4.2.1.1 The relationship between value-added TFP and capital TFP 
Decomposing the 'netputs' price index pa,b into two components as follows: 
(4.9) 
where Ptb is the labour price index and P.a,b is an aggregate price index of other 
"netputs" including output, non-energy intermediate input and energy. 
As a result, the profit decomposition method can be rewritten as: 
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(4.10) 
The capital TFP index Ra,b can be calculated based on its relationship with value-added 
TFP as: 
(4.11) 
where KTFP is the capital TFP, VATFP is the value-added TFP, VA is value-added, :r 
is variable profit, L(VAh, VA 0 ) and L(:rh, :r0 ) can be calculated using the logarithmic 
mean tool. The relationship in equation ( 4.11) is proved in Appendix 4.1. 
4.2.1.2 The VA TFP measurement based approach 
First, we define the value-added total factor productivity (VA TFP) index of firm b 
relatively to firm a as follows: 
Qa,b 
ea,b = _!:'d_ 
Q;;i (4.12) 
where ea,b is the VA TFP index, Qi;/ is the value-added quantity index and Q;t is the 
primary inputs (capital, labour) quantity index. The non-zero value-added is defined as 
revenue minus the intermediate cost, that is, 
va = r - cM = py- wx (4.13) 
where r is revenue, cM is intermediate cost, y is output quantity, xis intermediate input 
quantity, p and w are the price of those factors, respectively. In this TFP measurement 
approach, the intermediate inputs are treated as negative outputs. Any production unit is 
considered as a mechanism that turns capital and labour into 'value-added'. Thus the 
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productivity measured in (4.12) is the difference in the value-added quantity that cannot 
be explained by differences in capital and labour. 
I( Q;;/ cannot be calculated directly, for example, if the data of outputs and 
intermediate inputs are only available in terms of value, it is preferable to use the 
implicit VA quantity index based on Fisher's weak reversal test, i.e, 
ga,b Qa,b _ 
VA = P.,a,b 
VA 
(4.14) 
where ga,b is value-added index and P;/ is the price index of output and intermediate 
inputs. 
Substituting Q;} into ( 4.12) and rearranging, we obtain: 
(4.15) 
In practice, when we face the problem of different dimensionality, as in the case in the 
Vietnamese data we use, it may not be possible to aggregate P;/ based on the observed 
price information from the data set. In such cases, it is possible to use the aggregate 
price index or deflator for the industry published by the national statistics office. The 
VA TFP index is now defined as: 
ga;b / P,'a,b 
e'a,b = VA Q a,b KL 
(4.16) 
where p'a,b is the deflator for each industry. The use of the deflator as a proxy for the 
observed price is an approximation and, thus, may introduce biases into the TFP 
measurement due to the deviation of individual price from the deflator or the average 
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price. To see how these biases could occur in practice, readers can refer to Coelli et al. 
(2003). Equation (4.15) now can be written as: 
( 4.17) 
In equation ( 4.17), capital and labour are exogenous, the deflator is given. If e'a,b is 
computed independently, the identity would be exact only if Q 0 ·b is the product of the 
components on the right-hand side of this equation. If errors in measurement exist, they 
will be captured in the derived Q 0 ·b • It is more reasonable to treat V ATFP as a residual 
that captures the unexplained differences between outputs produced and inputs used. 
However, with the presence of measurement biases and white noise, the residual TFP 
also captures this error. A way to correct this potential problem is to decompose ea,b in 
( 4.15) into two components as follows: 
(4.18) 
where e'a,b is calculated independently, which captures unexplained differences 
between outputs and inputs due to factors relating to TFP; a captures unexplained 
differences caused by measurement biases and noise. 
Equation ( 4.17) thus can be redefined as: 
0 a,b = e'a,b aR'a,bQa,b 
- VA KL ( 4.19) 
In this equation, all components but a are computed independently. The term a is 
treated as a residual which captures measurement biases and noise. This approach is 
analogous to the stochastic frontier approach where the error term is decomposed into 
technical efficiency and white noise (see Aigner et al. 1977; Meeusen and van den 
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Broeck 1977). 
If we employ the Tomqvist index, we can decompose the primary input index into 
labour and the capital quantity indexes as follows: 
ga,b = e'a,b aP.'a,bQa,bQa,b 
- VA K L (4.20) 
where Qtb and Q;·b are the quantity index of labour and capital, respectively. This 
indexing method allows differences in a firm's VA to be broken down into separate 
effects due to productivity difference, the composite impacts of differences in the price 
of output and intermediate inputs, and firm size in terms of both labour and capital. 
Because many firms in the sample cannot meet the requirement of having positive 
variable profits if using the first approach, we decide, in this chapter, to apply the 
second approach to analyse the effects of productivity, price of VA, and firm size on a 
firm's VA. 
4.2.2 Benchmark firm 
For cross-sectional comparative purposes, a benchmarking firm must be chosen in the 
index decomposition. The FOKS method uses the most profitable firm as the reference. 
This benchmarking firm is also used in Fox et al. (2006) and Grafton et al. (2006). Their 
purpose is to compare every firm with the best performing one to help identify what 
factors may be constraining profits in the rest of the industry. However in the context of 
the transitional economy, the most profitable firm may be the 'star'. In other words, 
there could be very large differences between the most profitable firm, the 'star', and 
the majority of firms, making such a comparison difficult. For instance, firms may lag 
far behind the 'star' due to big differences in technology used, management skills and 
marketing skills. To facilitate comparison, especially where large differences exist 
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among firms, we use a 'sample mean' firm as a reference and compare every firm with 
this hypothetical representative firm. 
We use the method pioneered by Christensen et al. (1981) and Caves et al. (1982) for 
multilateral cross-country comparisons. In their works, output, productivity and input 
levels of an arbitrary firm/country are compared with the hypothetical representative 
firm/country defined as the geometric mean with output vector ln Y; and input vector 
ln X; where Y; and X; are output and input levels of each individual firm/country. The 
advantage of using the geometric sample mean firm is that it allows indexes to satisfy 
the transitivity condition to allow multilateral comparison (see Appendix 4.2 for the 
proof). A number of papers (Baily et al. 1992; Hill 1997; Motohashi 2005) follow this 
approach in making cross-sectional comparisons. The results of using the geometric 
mean firm as a benchmark are similar or somewhat better to those using the arithmetic 
mean firm. 27 
In our approach, we create the hypothetical representative firm for the total 
manufacturing industry, and make comparisons to this level. Given that output and 
intermediate inputs are measured in terms of the value of deflated revenue and cost, the 
quantity indexes are calculated implicitly. Capital quantity is measured by the sale price 
of assets while labour is measured by the number of workers. This is comparable across 
firms. 
27 All results using the arithmetic mean firm are available from the author upon request. 
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4.3 Data and variable measurement 
4.3.1 Data 
The EIDM is applied to the pooled sample of non-state manufacturing SMEs in 
Vietnam. The data were collected by the ILSSA of MOLISA of Vietnam in 
collaboration with the SSE of Sweden in 1996 and 2001. The sample covers different 
non-state ownership characteristics including household firms, sole-proprietorships, 
cooperatives, partnership enterprises and limited companies. 
In 1996, the survey collected data from nearly 800 firms. The 2001 survey collected 
data of around 1400 firms of which approximately 600 were surveyed in 1996. After 
dropping missing and irrelevant values28, 307 and 603 observations remain in the 1996 
and 2001 samples, respectively, making the total number of the pooled sample 910. 
Among these firms, only 90 enterprises were surveyed in both years. In our chapter, we 
divide the sample into two groups: micro firms with less than 10 workers and small and 
medium (SM) firms that employ between 10 and 300 workers. 29 Table 4.1 (page 128) 
documents the characteristics of firms by ownership types. 
4.3.2 Variable measurement 
Labour 
Labour quantity is measured as the number of workers. The implicit labour price for 
each firm is calculated by taking total wage divided by the number of paid workers. For 
28 A number of firms do not meet the requirement of having positive value-added as required by the 
indexing method. 
29 Although medium firms are defined as having up to 300 workers, in reality, almost all small and 
medium enterprises in Vietnam have fewer than 50 workers. 
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enterprises which use only family labour, their labour price is replaced by the minimum 
implicit labour price. This is because calculations from the data set show that mean 
profit of these enterprises is just below half of that of enterprises using paid labour. The 
profits are the return to family labour. Total wage of every firm is then adjusted by 
taking the implicit labour price multiplied by total number of workers. 
Capital 
The surveys collected data of total owned assets including buildings, machinery and 
inventories at their current sale price for each firm. It should be noted that the survey 
lumped land value into the value of buildings, and so we use the term 'building' to 
indicate the total value of building and land. According to Morrison (1999), inventories 
should not be included as a capital measure as they do not provide productive 
services. 30 In our case, inventories account for a small proportion of capital, we follow 
Morrison's (1999) suggestion of excluding inventories from the measure of capital. 
Price of capital 
To calculate the primary input quantity index, we need a capital cost to compute the 
relevant cost share. In the standard case, the rental price or user cost of capital is the 
sum of depreciation cost, interest rate cost and risk premium. Unfortunately, in 
transitional and developing countries, a risk premium is not available and is hard to 
calculate. As a result, the premium is not included as a capital cost. 
30 This opinion is, however, objected to by Diewert (2006b). 
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As the surveys did not collect any information about the age of assets, we follow the 
suggestion of Diewert (2006a) to compute the rental price of an n-year old asset as 
follows: 
(4.21) 
where: J: is the rental price of an n-year old asset, 
P; is the purchase price of the asset at the beginning of period t 
P:+i is the value of the depreciated asset at the end of period t 
i' is the expected asset inflation or depreciation rate, which is assumed to be 
equivalent to the inflation rate in this chapter 
Since P:+i will only be received by the end of the period, it must be divided by 
the discount factor (1 + r') where r' is the nominal interest rate. 
When applying this approach, it turns out that almost all f: values are negative. The 
results confirm the suggestion of Morrison ( 1999) that land is virtually meaningless in 
terms of its productive input because if land values are improving, its rental price could 
be negative. This is also true in the case of Vietnam where land prices increased 
substantially during the period studied. As there is no way, given the data available, to 
exclude land value from the value of 'building', we calculate the rental price of capital 
as the interest rate cost only. 
To provide accurate measures of the contribution to value-added changes, we convert 
all values into 1994 constant prices. Outputs and intermediate inputs are deflated by the 
appropriate deflator for the two-digit sub-industry in which the firm belongs. Wages are 
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deflated by the consumer price index (CPI). To compute the deflator for capital 
quantity, we use either the investment for construction, or the value of an increase in 
fixed assets under investment31 • Both criteria give the same result. Capital cost is 
deflated by the inflation rate to get the real user cost of capital. Summary statistics of 
the data are provided in Table 4.2 (page 128). 
4.4 V ATFP index for non-state manufacturing SMEs in Vietnam 
The V ATFP index ()' a,b in equation ( 4.20) is calculated for the pooled sample based on 
the value-added TFP approach suggested by Balk (2003). Following Balk (2003), the 
relationship between the gross-output and the VA TFP indexes can be expressed as: 
lnVATFP= L(r1,ro) lnGOTFP 
L(VA1,VA0 ) 
(4.22) 
where JGOTFP is the gross-output TFP index, r 1 , r 0 are revenue at periods 1 and 0 and 
VA', VA 0 are value-added at period 1 and 0. L(r1 ,r0 ) and L(VA1 ,VA 0 )are developed 
using the tool oflogarithmic mean as follows: 
a-b L(a,b) = where a and bare two real numbers. 
ln(a/ b) 
Based on the above relationship, the V ATFP index for cross-sectional data can be 
developed as follows: 
31 These deflators are computed by taking current price divided by the constant price in 1994 (sources: the 
General Statistics Office website -www.gso.gov.vn, Vietnam Statistical Yearbook 2001, and IMF 2001). 
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(4.23) 
where Q0 (.) is the output quantity index, Q;· (.) is the intermediate input quantity index, 
and Q; (.) is the primary input quantity index, r is revenue, c M is intermediate cost, y is 
output quantity, x is intermediate input quantity, p and w are the price of those factors, 
respectively. 
This approach is similar to the two-stage index. In the first stage, Q;· (.) aggregates the 
intermediate input quantities and Q; (.) aggregates the primary input quantities. These 
two sub-indexes, in tum, are aggregated in the second stage. Unless Q;·(.) and Q;(.) are 
superlative but not necessarily of the same form, the consistency in aggregation 
condition is achieved (Diewert 1978; Balk 2003; Pursiainen 2005). 
The primary input quantity index is computed using the Tomqvist form as: 
' 2 aJ~ + aJ~ 
lnQ; =fr 1 2 1 (lnq~ -lnqn (4.24) 
where m; = t;q; is the cost share of each primary input. If firm a is the average 
LPiqi 
i=I 
benchmark, its weight is calculated as: 
(4.25) 
The VATFP index is calculated using equations (4.23) and (4.24). The reference firm is 
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chosen as the geometric mean firm having the output vector In I; and input vector 
In X; . Output and intermediate input quantity indexes are computed by relating the 
deviation of firm deflated revenues and intermediate costs from the industry mean. The 
appropriate deflator for these indexes is the output prices constructed for particular 
industries (Morrison 1999; Coelli et al. 2003). The list of sub-industries, number of 
observations and the price deflator are provided in Appendix 4.3. The plotted VATFP 
indexes are presented for the whole manufacturing industry in Figures 4.1-2 (page 124). 
In Figures 4.1-2, observations of each year are separated by the solid vertical line while 
the dashed line separates firms in each year (1996 and 2001) into micro and SM groups. 
The horizontal line divides TFP indexes below and above 1. The above 1 group includes 
firms with a TFP level greater than that of the average firm, and the below 1 group 
contains firms with a TFP level less than the level of the average firm. 
Figure 4.1 represents TFP indexes by observation, where firms are ranked in ascending 
order of capital. As shown in this Figure, there is an increasing trend of TFP indexes 
along with capital in 1996, but the pattern is less pronounced in 2001. This may be 
because a large proportion of 'building' is land and its values rose considerably due to 
land specification in 2000 (Ministry of Finance 2005). Thus, more capital does not 
necessarily imply more machinery or more advanced technology, at least for the latter 
period. In order to analyse the relationship between TFP and technology, we graph TFP 
indexes in ascending order of machinery (Figure 4.2, page 124). The increasing trend of 
TFP indexes is clearer for both 1996 and 2001. Firms with higher machinery capital 
have higher TFP levels. 
A striking feature of the Figures is that the majority of firms in the 1996 sample have 
TFP indexes greater than 1 while the inverse is found for 2001. In other words, 
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many firms in 2001 have TFP levels less than that of the average firm. An explanation 
for this finding is that the 2001 sample included more household enterprises, which are 
considered to have a large proportion ofland, but use much less machinery, as shown in 
Table 4.1 (page 128). 
Firm ownership and performance 
The non-state sector in Vietnam includes four ownership types. They are household 
enterprises, sole-proprietorships, cooperatives and limited and shareholding (L&S) 
companies. To examine which kind of ownership performs more efficiently, we graph 
VATFP index distribution for each kind of ownership32 in Figure 4.3 (page 125). As 
shown in Figure 4.3, household enterprises perform less efficiently than sole-
proprietorships and L&S companies. This is, perhaps, not surprising because sole-
proprietorships and L&S companies are considered to be more advanced than household 
enterprises in terms of both technology and management skills. 
In Chapter 3, we find that household enterprises appear to be more technically efficient 
than L&S companies. Furthermore, micro firms are more efficient than larger 
establishments. The results in this chapter indicate that household and micro firms are 
less efficient than more advanced enterprises at larger scale in terms of TFP. One 
possibility is that sole-proprietorships, limited companies and larger firms may have 
higher allocative efficiency than household and micro firms. In seeking for more 
explanation, we try to link the relationship between TFP and technical efficiency (TE) 
by using the simplest case where there are only two firms. For simplicity, we assume 
that each firm produces one output y and uses one input x. 
32 The transitivity property of using the sample mean benchmark allows us to compare performance 
among different firms (Coelli et al. 1998). 
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The situation can be summarised as: two firms a and b where firm b is of a larger scale 
than firm a. Firm a has higher TE than firm b, i.e., TE a I TE b > 1 while TFP0 is less than 
TFPb , i.e., TFPb I TFP0 > 1 . 
Let us define: TFP = Actual_ ouput = Actual_ output * Potential_ output 33 
• 
or TFP= y =~.L 
x y x 
Actual_ input Potential_ output Actual_ input 
(4.26) 
where y • is defined from the frontier production function (FPF) estimated by the 
stochastic frontier approach. Equation ( 4.26) can be written as: 
TFP = TE.TFP* (4.27) 
Then TFPb = TE b .TFPb* ( 4.28) and TFP0 = TE a .TFP: ( 4.29) 
Divided ( 4.28) by ( 4.29), we have: 
TFPb TEb TFPb* TFPb TEb y; I xb 
--=--.--. or--=--.-"'-. -
TFPa TE a TFPa TFPa TE a Ya I Xa 
(4.30) 
Two cases are followed: 
• Case 1: xb =x0 , then y; =y: as two firms have the same FPF. Thus, (4.30) 
becomes: 
TFPb TEb h' . d' h . . TFPb l d TEb l 
-- = -- . T 1s 1s contra 1ctory to t e s1tuat10n as -- > an -- < . 
TFPa TE a TFPa TE a 
33 I am grateful to Professor Kaliappa Kalirajan for his advice on this equation. 
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The case can be illustrated as in graph 1 below: 
Graph 1: x b = x 0 
. . 
y,,_=y,, 
.Ya. 
. 
. 
••-w•• ••••••• -~ I 
. 
' . 
. 
. 
I 
. 
. 
. 
' 
x,, = x,,. 
Note: TIE is technical inefficiency. 
TIE~ 
TFP,, 
If xb = x0 and TE0 > TEb, TFPa must be greater than TFPb. Therefore, the case that 
xb = x0 is ruled out. 
From equation (4.30), we have: 
Yb.*/xb __ TFPb.TE0 >l · as each component on the right-hand side 1s assumed to be 
Ya I x0 TFPa TEb 
greater than 1. 
* • 
Then: Yb >Ya. 
xb xa 
(i) If the FPF exhibits diminishing returns to scale (DRTS), the situation is satisfied 
when xb < xa as illustrated in graph 2. 
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Graph 2: xb < xa and DRTS 
TIE._ 
TFP._ 
• • 
As can be seen from graph 2, when TFPb > TFPa and TE a > TEb , then Yb > ~. 
xb xa 
However, this case is also ruled out as it violates the assumption that firm b is at a larger 
scale than firm a. 
(ii) If the FPF exhibits increasing returns to scale (IRTS), then xb must be greater than 
xa as illustrated in graph 3. 
Graph 3: xb > xa and IRTS 
. 
y~ 
TIE~ 
. 
y,, 
----------------- ------ -----:~ I 
•' I .,.~.,,,. I 
,• I 
........... ·"'· : 
I 
Ya. 
x,, 
• • 
As shown in graph 3, Yb >Ya , TFPb > TFPa and TE a > TEb. This situation is also 
xb xa 
106 
satisfied when the FPF exhibits constant returns to scale (CRTS). 
In conclusion, the conditions TF~ < TFP,, and TE a > TE b are simultaneously satisfied 
when the FPF does not exhibit DRTS. Returns to scale (RTS) coefficients calculated 
based on the estimated frontier production functions in Chapter 3 are approximately 
equal to or greater than 1 in almost all sub-industries. This, together with the above 
relationship between TFP and TE may imply that many non-state SMEs in Vietnam 
exhibit the IRTS function. If this possibility dominates other reasons such as allocative 
efficiency, SMEs can increase their input level to maximise profits provided that their 
management skills meet the scale operation. 
4.5 Value-added decomposition 
4.5.1 Factors contributing to value-added 
Our focus is to analyse the contribution of factors including productivity, the composite 
effects of output and intermediate input prices, labour and capital, to value-added of an 
arbitrary firm relative to the pooled sample mean firm in the period 1996-2001. 
When comparing the index values in the indexing decomposition method, if a value-
added index is greater (less) than 1, value-added of a compared firm is higher (lower) 
than that of the hypothetical representative firm. For decomposition, a component index 
of more (less) than 1 implies that the contribution of that factor to value-added is higher 
(lower) than it is for the reference firm. The contribution to value-added of each factor 
of an arbitrary enterprise relative to the average firm can be investigated through 
Figures 4.4a-f (page 126), where pooled indexes are plotted in ascending order oflabour 
and capital. 
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As can be seen in Figures 4.4a-f, VA indexes increase as firm size gets larger. 
Particularly, for the SM group, the majority of indexes is above 1 in both 1996 and 
2001. One of the important contributions to this increasing trend is TFP. The larger the 
firms are, the higher is the contribution of productivity to VA (Figure 4.4b ). Labour is 
another important contributing factor (Figure 4.4c) while the contribution of capital to 
VA is not consistent. At each level of firm size, capital indexes vary in a range with a 
somewhat similar lower value. However, the upper value gets larger as firm size 
increases (Figure 4.4d). This is because more capital sometimes implies a higher 
proportion of land rather than advanced technology. Finally, a rise in the price of 
outputs and intermediate inputs in the manufacturing industry during the period 1996-
2001 leads to a higher contribution of price to VA in 2001 compared to 1996 (Figure 
4.4e, page 126). Error indexes reported in Figure 4.4f reveal that the bigger the firm is 
the unexplained difference between outputs and inputs due to measurement biases and 
less noise. 
To provide an insight into the contribution of each factor of production, we provide the 
plotted partial productivity indexes of labour and capital in Figures 4.5-6 (page 127). 
Partial productivity or average product of labour and capital is defined as the value-
added per employee and per unit of capital, respectively. 
As can be seen in Figure 4.6 (page 127), capital productivity increases with firm size in 
each year, reflecting the efficient use of capital of larger firms. On the other hand, 
labour productivity (Figure 4.5, page 127) is similar across firm sizes, except for a 
slightly increasing trend for the 'micro' group in 1996. Similar labour productivity 
indicates no advantage in the unit labour cost of larger firms. The increasing 
contribution of labour to VA is, therefore, solely attributed to a higher absolute value of 
VA as a result of a higher proportion of wages when firms hire more labour rather 
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than the increase in the value of a product. This indicates that in order to increase their 
competitiveness and profits, SMEs should increase capital or/and reduce the wage 
proportion in VA by increasing labour productivity. Given the fact that most SMEs in 
Vietnam face a capital shortage (Ramamurthy 1998; Ronnas et al. 1998; MPI-UNIDO 
1999; World Bank 1999b; Sakai and Takada 2000; Malesky 2004), increasing labour 
productivity that leads to lower unit labour cost should be a priority. This, in turn, 
requires better management methods and skilled workers. 
Geometric means of indexes in Table 4.3 (page 129) support the findings from Figures 
4.4a-e, i.e., the average contribution of all factors in the SM group is higher than in the 
micro group. During the period studied, 1996 marks the significant contribution of 
productivity to value-added. Nevertheless, smaller productivity indexes in 2001 do not 
imply the decreasing trend of productivity. Rather, it reflects that the 2001 sample 
includes many more inefficient performers. 
The above results depict an accurate picture of the economy of Vietnam during the 
period 1996-2001. Entry constraints including complicated registration procedures, long 
processing of application forms and corruption, pushed entry costs up to a very high 
level (GTZ-CIEM-UNDP 2004) early in the 1990s. This limited non-state firms to the 
best performers only. In addition, favourable economic conditions in the mid-1990s 
with rapid economic growth and expanding effective demand (World Bank 1999b; 
2003a; Ramstetter 2004) have probably made firms more productive. 
The success of the non-state sector and the awareness of constraints facing private 
SMEs led to programs promoting the private sector in 2000 with the issuance of the law 
on private enterprise. This has simplified registration procedures and lowered entry 
costs, resulting in a boom of registered private firms. However, the majority of new 
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entry firms are household and micro firms with obsolete technology and low 
management skills. In addition, the contracted demand following the financial crisis in 
Asia in 1998 may have lowered average performances in 2001. 
To investigate which of several possible factors contribute to the success or failure of a 
firm, we categorise the pooled sample into 20 _quantiles and extract the highest, lowest 
and middle 5% performing groups. The value-added decomposition for each group is 
provided in Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 (page 130-2). 
A cross-comparison of these Tables shows that productivity is the most important factor 
contributing to the success of the top 5% (Table 4.4, page 130), while in the bottom 5% 
the contribution of productivity is small (Table 4.5, page 131 ). The contribution to 
value-added in the middle 5% group is equally divided between three factors including 
productivity, labour and capital (Table 4.6, page 132). Thus, it is suggested that to grow 
sustainably, firms must shift to productivity as a core contributor. 
4.5.2 Government assistance and firm characteristics 
To analyse the impact of government support on a firm's performance, we categorise 
government assistance in terms of both financial and non-financial supports including 
consultations for managerial and technical problems, training workers and providing 
market opportunities in Table 4.7 (page 133). 
Panel B of Table 4.7 shows differences among groups. The middle 5% receives the least 
in government support. Most government support is allocated to the lowest and the top 
5% groups. In Vietnam, government support is provided in response to requests from 
firms. It would seem there are of two kinds of firms that look for support: weak 
performers that need support to survive, and strong firms that face constraints 
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restricting their potential growth. In addition, there has been an increase and a shift in 
government assistance during the period studied. While the top 5% group received more 
support than the bottom 5% in 1996, the opposite was true in 2001, and the differential 
in receiving support between the two groups became larger. 
A lower proportion of better performing firms receiving government credit assistance 
may be attributed to complicated procedures and high costs of accessing credit 
application, which deflect efficient firms from borrowing and lead to adverse selection. 
The other possibility may be due to the weakness of the banking sector in appraising 
commercial credits (Calier and Tran, 2004). A high proportion of poorly performing 
firms with lower management skills that resort to government non-financial support 
reflects the ineffectiveness of this program. Surveys on business services for private 
SMEs in Vietnam (Service-Growth Consultants Inc and Thien Ngan Co.Ltd 1998; 
GTZ-VCCI-Swisscontact 2002) show that lack of information about non-financial 
support and its role in the growth of firms, and its quality, are hindrances. 
Consequently, better performers have to rely on their internal services leading to an 
increase in recruitment, and hence, operating costs. This may explain why larger firms 
have no advantage in unit labour cost. 
Characteristics of the 5% groups are provided in Table 4.8 (page 133). As shown in this 
Table, gross returns to capital34 of the top 5% of firms are much higher than those of the 
middle 5%, while the bottom 5% experience losses. This raises concerns about the 
survival rate of poorer performers. Among ownership kinds, household enterprises 
account for a small proportion in the top 5% in comparison with above 90% of that kind 
34 For self-employed enterprises, variable profits are the return to both family labour and capital. 
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of ownership in the bottom and the middle 5% groups. On the other hand, the 
percentage of more evolved ownership types, such as private enterprises and limited and 
shareholding companies, are higher in the top 5%. Although gaining some tax 
advantages35, this suggests that by being reluctant to become formalised, household 
enterprises may suffer from loss of access to larger markets. Table 4.8 indicates that 
firms in the top 5% group are much larger than those in the other groups, on average. 
Moreover, most of the firms in this group are located in urban areas while the majority 
in the bottom and the middle 5% groups are located in rural areas. A higher percentage 
of urban firms in the top 5% group most likely reflects advantages of having higher 
technical and managerial training, as well as educational level of workers and managers 
in urban areas in Vietnam (Malesky 2004 ). 
4.6 Concluding remarks 
An indexing method is developed to decompose the contribution of productivity, prices 
and firm size to a firm's value-added. To avoid the problem of different dimensionality 
of outputs and inputs within the same industry, an industry deflator is used instead of 
the observed price. The use of the deflator gives an approximation and may introduce 
biases into total factor productivity measurement. Thus, an error term is added into the 
decomposition equation to capture measurement biases and white noise. The method is 
then applied to non-state small and medium manufacturing firm-level data in Vietnam 
between 1996 and 2001. 
35 In Vietnam, household enterprises are not required to retain accounting records for calculation ofvalue-
added and profit taxes, but pay lump-sum tax to local authorities (MPI-UNIDO 1999). 
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The results reveal an increasing trend of total factor productivity with the use of 
machinery capital and value-added with firm size. The decompositions indicate that 
total factor productivity is the most important factor contributing to a firm's value-
added. Moreover, larger firms use capital more efficiently than smaller firms, while 
labour productivity is somewhat similar among different firm sizes. Thus, the increasing 
contribution of labour to value-added is attributed only to the higher absolute value of 
value-added as a result of higher wage proportion, not necessarily to a higher value of a 
product. This finding raises concerns about weak management skills, unskilled workers 
and weak competitiveness of non-state small and medium manufacturing enterprises in 
Vietnam. 
In order to compete in the world market, it would seem Vietnamese private small and 
medium enterprises should increase their productivity, especially labour productivity by 
investing more in advanced technology and/or training managers and workers, as well 
as using out-sourcing services from the government to release burdens from over-
recruitment. This, in turn, requires an effective government support program. 
Although the Vietnamese government has created a better policy environment and 
increased assistance services to firms, the analysis shows that the majority of recipients 
are poor performers. Given that productivity is a core component factor to the success 
of firms, which can benefit from skilled workers, managers and outside specialised 
services, the Vietnamese government should improve its non-financial support program. 
A particular focus should be on providing information and improving quality of 
assistance services as well as on smart selection of which kinds of firms to support to 
enhance their economic performance. 
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4.7 Appendix 4.1 
The relationship between value-added TFP measure and the capital TFP measure 
To develop the relationship between the value-added TFP and the capital TFP, we use 
the logarithmic mean tool: 
L( a, b) = a - b where a and b are two positive real numbers 
ln(a/ b) 
Let us define: 
Where VA is value-added, R is revenue, C1 is intermediate cost, CL and CK are labour 
and capital cost, respectively. 
1 Value-added TFP index 
The value-added TFP index is defined as: 
In VATFP =In QvA - In Q; (1) 
Using Fisher's weak reversal test, the primary cost index can be defined as: 
c_h I c~ = P; 0Q; (2) where P;' and Q; are price and quantity indexes of primary inputs. 
In a similar manner, we have: 
In order to compare the V ATFP and the capital TFP indexes, we decompose the 
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primary cost ratio using the logarithmic mean formula as: 
(5) 
Substitute (2), (3) and ( 4) into (5), we get: 
(6) 
Equation ( 6) shows how capital and labour can be aggregated into the primary input 
quantity index. 
Plugging ( 6) into ( 1 ), we get an alternative way to calculate VA TFP index: 
(7) 
2 The capital TFP index 
Define the variable profits or the gross return to capital as: 
VP=VA-Ci 
Then we have: 
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I 0 I I 0 0 I 0 I 0 
1 ( 1 / o) vp - vp va - cL va - c va - va c - c nvp vp = = L = L L 
L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) 
. 1 ( 1 1 o)- L(va', va0 )ln(va' lva0 ) L(cl,c~)ln(cl I c~) 
.. n vp vp - 0 -L(vp1, vp ) L(vp', vp0 ) 
1 0 Q = L(va', va0 ) l n _ L(cl,c~) l n L(va', va0 ) 1 Q _ L(cl,c~) l Q ~ nrvp VP I 0 nrVA nrL + n VA n L L(vp , vp ) L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) 
Then, 
l Q = L(va1, va0 ) 1 Q _ L(cl,c~) 1 Q 
n VP I 0 n VA I 0 n L L(vp , vp ) L(vp , vp ) 
(8) 
The capital TFP is defined as: 
(9) 
Substitute (8) into (9), we have: 
lnTFPK = L(va',vao)lnQvA L(cl,c~) lnQL -lnQK 
L(vp1, vp0 ) L(vp1, vp0 ) 
Or: 
lnTFPK = L(va',vao)[lnQvA- L(cl,c~) lnQL - L(vp',vp:)lnQK] 
L(vp1, vp0 ) L(va1, va0 ) L(va1, va ) 
(10) 
The part between the brackets of equations (7) and (10) has the same structure but the 
weights for labour and capital quantity indexes are different. The following result can be 
drawn: 
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Theorem 1 
lnTFPK = L(va1,va0 )1nVATFP if VA=CKL 
L(vp1, vp0 ) 
Proof: 
Then, the term in the brackets of equation (10) is equal to the right hand-side of (7): 
(12) 
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4.8 Appendix 4.2 
Benchmark firm in profit decomposition method and transitivity condition 
1 Benchmark firm in profit decomposition method 
Most works in the profit decomposition area including Fox et al. (2003), Fox et al. 
(2006), and Grafton et al. (2006) use the best performer as a benchmark firm when 
making multi-cross comparisons. The singular advantage of this benchmark is that it 
helps other firms in the sample recognise which may be constraining their performance. 
The geometric mean firm, on the other hand, achieves the transitivity condition, thus 
making the multi-cross comparison valid. 
2 Transitivity or circularity condition. 
The transitivity condition requires that, for any three firms: k, s and l, a direct 
comparison between k and s yields the same index as an indirect comparison through l. 
That means: 
1 ks (1) 
Therefore, if we can prove ln I ks = ln I kl - ln Isl , the comparison satisfies the 
circularity test. In fact, not many indexes, including the Fisher Ideal index, satisfy this 
test. The problem seems to be much related to the weight used when calculating indexes 
(Dreschler 1973; Caves et al. 1982). Caves et al. (1982) prove that the Tornqvist-Theil 
index satisfies the transitivity condition when making multi-cross-section comparison 
with the use of the geometric mean as a benchmark. 
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2.1 Geometric mean firm as a benchmark 
To generalise, we take the output index to illustrate all the proofs. By convention, the 
bilateral output index of firm k relative to firms is defined as: 
(2) 
Where R; is the share of output i in the total revenue and Y; is the output level. 
The index in (2) is named by Caves et al. (1982) as the translog bilateral output index 
that has the base-invariant property. That means whatever firms are used as a base 
makes no difference. 
Supposing we define the bilateral comparison of each firm k and s to the geometric 
mean firm l, as having the output vector In Y; and the revenue share R; . They are 
calculated as: 
ln Y/ = ln Y; = ~ (ln Y/ + ln Y/) (3) 
R} =RI=~ (R/ + R/) (4) 
Using equation (2) for the bilateral comparison of each k ands to the geometric mean l, 
we have: 
1" k - k lnqk1 =2~ (R; +R 1 )(lnY1 -lnY1 ) 
I 
(5) 
And: In q •1 _!_" = ~ (R/ + R;)(ln Y/ - In Y;) 2 i 
(6) 
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If we can prove: 
ln q ks = ln q kl - ln q sl (7) 
the transitivity condition is satisfied. 
Plugging (5) and (6) into (7), yields: 
In qks = ~ L [(Rik+ RJ(ln Y/ - In YJ- (R/ + Ri)(ln Y/ - In YJ J (8) 
l 
Rearranging (8), we get: 
I _ 1" [(R/ In Y/ +~In Y/ - R/ln Yi - ~In Yi] 
n q ks - - L.J - -- ---
2 i - R / In Yi s - R i ln Y/ + R / In Yi + R i In Yi 
Substituting (3) and ( 4) into (9), we obtain: 
(R.k In yk + Rt + R/ In yk _ R.k In Y/ +In Y/ 
1 
In qks = - L 
2 i 
l l 2 l l 2 
-Rs I y s _ R/ + R/ I y s Rs In Y/ + In Y/ 
. n . n . + . ---"------
, l 2 2 
=_!_I 
2 i 
Rk Rs Rk Rk 
R.k In Y.k + _i In Y.k + _i In Y.k - _i ln Y.k - _i In Y! 
l l 2 l 2 l 2 l 2 l 
Rk R~ R~ R~ 
-R.s In ys - -' In ys - -' In Y! + -' In Y.k + -' In ys 
l l 2 l 2 l 2 l 2 l 
=> ln q ks = ~ L [Rik ln Y/ + R / ln Y/ - R / ln Y/ - Rt ln Y/ J 
I 
= ~ L [ R;k (ln Y/ - ln Y/) + R/ (ln Y/ - ln Y/) J 
I 
Thus, we have: 
(9) 
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(10) 
Comparing (2) and (10), we obtain In q ks = In q kt - In q st (5). Thus, the 
transitivity condition is satisfied. 
· 2.2 An arbitrary firm as a benchmark 
Using the best performing firm in the profit decomposition method is similar to the case 
of using an arbitrary firm as a benchmark. 
Supposing that l is an arbitrary firm in the sample of 3 firms: k, s and /. 
Similar to the previous case, we plug the translog bilateral output index into (7). 
Remember that l now is an arbitrary firm. 
In qks = .!_ L [(Rik+ R:)(In Y/ - In Y/)- (R/ + R:)(In Y/ - In Y/) J (11) 
2 i . 
Rearranging (11), we have: 
I 1 L [ R / In Y/ + R: In Y/ - R / In Y,1 - R: In Y,1 ] 
n q ks = 2 1 - R / In Y,8 - R / In Y/ + R / In Y,1 + R / In Y,1) (12) 
Adding and subtracting R/ In Y/ and R / ln Y/ into (12), we get: 
I 1 L [ ( R ,k + R ,S ) In Yi k - ( R ,k + R ,S ) In Y, s - R ,S In Y, k ] 
n q ks = 2 i + R 1k In Y/ + R: In Y/ - R ,k In Y/ - R: In Y/ + R / In Y/ ) 
= _!_ L [(Rik+ R/)(In Y/ - In Y/)- R/ (In Y/ - In Y/)] 
2 1 + R / ( ln Y/ - In Y/ ) + R: (In Y/ - ln Y/ ) 
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Then: 
The transitivity condition is, therefore, not satisfied. 
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4.9 Appendix 4.3 
List of industry and deflator 
1996 307 
15: Food product and beverages 58 1.2335 
17: Manufacture of textiles 20 1.2244 
19: Manufacture of leather products 8 1.4375 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 16 1.4228 
21: Paper and paper products 20 1.2037 
22: Publishing and printing 2 2.0097 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 4 1.1991 
25: Rubber and plastic product 43 1.2998 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 12 1.1477 
28: Fabricated metal products 39 1.2178 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 6 1.2165 
30: Office, accounting and computing machineries 4 1.0228 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 11 1.1841 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 3 1.2420 
35: Manufacture of other transport 13 1.5111 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 48 1.3654 
2001 603 
15: Food product and beverages 156 1.8236 
17: Manufacture of textiles 36 1.7082 
18: Manufacture of wearing apparel 9 1.7885 
19: Manufacture of leather products 4 1.6563 
20: Manufacture of wood and wood products 57 1.7125 
21: Chapter and chapter products 19 1.7155 
22: Publishing and printing 9 1.8942 
24: Chemicals and chemical products 6 1.4736 
25: Rubber and plastic product 38 1.6866 
26: Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 39 1.2373 
27: Manufacture of basic metals 10 1.6825 
28: Fabricated metal products 57 1.8587 
29: Machinery and equipment n.e.c 64 1.6147 
30: Office, accounting and computing machineries 7 3.0603 
31: Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 9 2.1825 
33: Medical and optical instruments, watches and clocks 3 2.7356 
36: Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c 59 1.9941 
37: Recycling 21 1.3393 
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Figure 4.4 Plotted indexes for the whole manufacturin~ industry 
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Labour productivity 
Figure 4.6 Capital productivity 
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Tables 
Table 4.1 Firms' characteristics by ownership 
Ownership type Percentage Average size 
(#of workers) 
Average 
machinery capital 
(Thous.VNDt) 
% of micro 
firmtt 
1996 
•Household 45.93 6.48 33,318.76 
• Privatettt 37.13 14.28 86,460.03 
• Cooperative 13.36 19.49 100,928.70 
• L&stttt 3.58 19.00 186,152.50 
2001 
•Household 71.10 6.89 31,451.33 
• Private 19.23 10.47 83,576.40 
•Cooperative 6.37 19.41 88,796.34 
• L&S 3.30 18.53 199,061.90 
Note: f VND is the Vietnamese currency 
82.27 
42.11 
17.07 
18.18 
81.23 
60.65 
5.88 
21.05 
tt Proportion of micro firms for each ownership type 
ttt The word 'private' used in this Table indicates sole-proprietorship to save space 
tttt L&S are limited and share holding companies, which are considered as modem 
enterprises with more advanced technology and management skills. 
Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
Obs Mean 
All year 
Revenue 
Intermediate cost 
Capital quantity 
Capital cost 
Number of workers 
Wages 
1996 
Revenue 
Intermediate cost 
Capital quantity 
Capital cost 
Number of workers 
Wages 
2001 
Revenue 
Intermediate cost 
Capital quantity 
Capital cost 
Number of workers 
Wages 
910 
910 
910 
910 
910 
910 
307 
307 
307 
307 
307 
307 
603 
603 
603 
603 
603 
603 
249,707.90 
178,718.50 
313,500.60 
33,464.83 
9.18 
47,075.26 
345,656.30 
244,882.80 
237,051.00 
47,844.28 
11.56 
51,673.86 
200,858.60 
145,032.80 
352,422.70 
26,143.95 
7.97 
44,734.01 
Std. Dev. 
360,876.50 
285,301.40 
330,221.20 
35,888.04 
8.20 
54,379.47 
500,245.70 
403,013.00 
226,059.70 
45,621.66 
9.97 
54,242.44 
249,718.70 
192,298.70 
366,308.60 
26,975.54 
6.83 
54,344.55 
Minimum Maximum 
4,025.52 3,242,805.00 
1,447.01 2,894,285.00 
19,061.88 1,825, 781.00 
2,273.97 220,944.20 
1.00 50.00 
228.31 441,704.70 
9,721.50 3,242,805.00 
2,464.06 2,894,285.00 
19,061.88 1,091,287.00 
3,824.04 220,944.20 
2.00 50.00 
360.52 341,630.90 
4,025.52 1,802, 157 .00 
1,447.01 1,160,767.00 
31,301.03 1,825,781.00 
2,273.97 136,767.10 
1.00 50.00 
228.31 441,704.70 
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Table 4.3 Decomposition of VA, means 
VA index VATFP Labour index Capital Price of 
index VA index 
All years 0.999 0.693 0.999 1 1.567 
Micro 0.674 0.601 0.681 0.819 
SM 2.383 0.948 2.335 1.549 
1996 1.521 1.111 1.249 0.802 1.278 
Micro 0.956 1.068 0.735 0.551 
SM 2.769 1.169 2.477 1.303 
2001 0.808 0.545 0.893 1.118 1.738 
Micro 0.590 0.483 0.661 0.954 
SM 2.083 0.786 2.214 1.808 
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Table 4.4 Value-added decoml!osition of the tol! 5% 
Obs# ga,b ea,b Q:·b Q;·b 
866 6.333399 3.177468 2.312897 1.297316 
867 6.457614 1.684347 2.746566 4.274981 
868 6.474408 5.28164 1.301005 .9528158 
869 6.596261 5.866185 .7227804 2.036501 
870 6.596407 4.301265 1.301005 1.53367 
871 6.619393 3.576254 3.469346 .2430137 
872 6.662159 2.645656 3.613902 .8801882 
873 6.733449 3.542949 1.445561 2.035977 
874 6.939845 3.762359 2.023785 1.146909 
875 6.952062 1.518718 3.035678 6.925396 
876 7.006394 1.800008 2.312897 5.218863 
877 7.018151 2.441775 3.903014 1.321192 
878 7.114271 1.799248 2.60201 5.637445 
879 7.283012 5.074273 1.156449 1.541069 
880 7.638051 2.271829 2.891122 3.40723 
881 7.745771 5.772073 .8673365 2.698256 
882 7.814726 3.880704 2.312897 .9946132 
883 7.895855 1.72758 3.758458 5.35303 
884 7.963151 4.581923 1.445561 1.894851 
885 8.021947 2.595615 3.035678 2.476144 
886 8.112936 2.458678 3.903014 2.163472 
887 8.159355 5.159977 1.301005 1.886904 
888 8.664277 1.688429 7.227804 3.047371 
889 8.983208 2.927916 3.035678 2.608006 
890 9.033883 3.083164 3.469346 2.063438 
891 9.035745 2.04375 6.215911 1.864083 
892 9.267273 8.940458 .8673365 1.200402 
893 9.323513 2.581944 3.32479 3.430323 
894 9.85041 3.639374 1.445561 3.75634 
895 10.05073 1.478439 7.227804 5.420322 
896 11.28711 4.664695 2.891122 1.462522 
897 11.39697 2.788985 3.469346 4.186698 
898 12.15696 5.830613 1.734673 2.257531 
899 13.37503 6.511017 1.879229 2.012583 
900 13.56179 3.1412 2.023785 8.023771 
901 14.76848 2.666792 7.227804 2.162098 
902 15.04996 5.568436 3.613902 1.108375 
903 15.77146 8.08873 .4336683 6.496079 
904 16.62528 6.298141 2.168341 3.626308 
905 16.75076 3.732363 5.059463 3.482274 
906 18.22855 4.295589 2.891122 5.704945 
907 18.55471 4.013647 5.782243 2.822873 
908 18.65354 2.993196 6.505024 4.940689 
909 19.37715 4.065256 6.938692 1.993004 
910 19.46366 5.861969 5.637687 .7972013 
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Table 4.5 Value-added decoml!osition of the bottom 5% 
Obs# Qa,b ea,b Q:·b Q;·b 
1 .0221907 .0058328 1.156449 1.467017 
2 .0261866 .0141805 .5782244 .8392093 
3 .0305447 .0274159 .5782244 .3533655 
4 .0389484 .0154105 .7227804 1.491514 
5 .0426397 .0564953 .5782244 .2073403 
6 .04392 .0333146 .5782244 .4721139 
7 .0443477 .0100758 1.156449 3.058001 
8 .0485871 .0500955 .5782244 .3393731 
9 .0513695 .0723478 .1445561 .4098919 
10 .0585476 .0639147 .4336683 .3899335 
11 .06222 .018824 1.011893 2.021177 
12 .0638219 .0173627 1.011893 3.029165 
13 .0656434 .04895 .5782244 .6516045 
14 .0677754 .0425398 1.011893 .3081507 
15 .0739116 .0672411 .5782244 .4146807 
16 .0763673 .1102105 .2891122 .3806861 
17 .0769565 .0236812 .2891122 2.875786 
18 .0775376 .0499945 .4336683 .9080416 
19 .0838628 .1120451 .5782244 .2724833 
20 .088127 .0756417 .8673365 .3020733 
21 .0897188 .0463952 .4336683 1.287952 
22 .0902585 .0516506 .7227804 1.033795 
23 .0911198 .2390505 .1445561 .2081835 
24 .0926844 .1670272 .4336683 .2080216 
25 .0929597 .0557785 .2891122 1.23207 
26 .0968796 .2179411 .2891122 .1911524 
27 .0982944 .0170503 5.926799 1.017318 
28 .0987843 .1395997 .4336683 .3167101 
29 .1013743 .2085929 .2891122 .2265644 
30 .1013836 .033455 3.758458 .6095545 
31 .1045014 .0714785 .5782244 .8197838 
32 .1049605 .0753954 .1445561 1.283163 
33 .1072337 .0719407 .8673365 .6755761 
34 .1080266 .1042017 .4336683 .6342632 
35 .1097273 .2227004 .4336683 .1377913 
36 .1197831 .1847934 .4336683 .2041028 
37 .1201673 .18089 .1445561 .4892802 
38 .1216678 .2660096 .4336683 .163633 
39 .1249323 .0719875 .8673365 .9599103 
40 .1260837 .2703467 .4336683 .1907057 
41 .129857 .2709684 .2891122 .2373217 
42 .1303425 .159084 .7227804 .3203692 
43 .1318643 .1963089 .4336683 .2470345 
44 .1352723 .2725876 .2891122 .2535096 
45 .1366107 .2748256 .2891122 .2308466 
46 .1368722 .0215595 .7227804 7.971208 
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Table 4.6 Value-added decom~osition of the middle 5% 
Obs# Qa,b ea,b Qtb Q;·b 
434 .968731 .9174145 .4336683 1.537094 
435 .9741907 .586536 1.590117 .8586348 
436 .9825345 .5425875 1.011893 2.017084 
437 .9887013 1.391474 .7227804 .2567472 
438 .9896498 1.569447 .2891122 .5933043 
439 .9938028 1.012367 .8673365 .6164278 
440 .9946739 .4367236 1.734673 1.733457 
441 .9978226 .9042242 .7227804 .988138 
442 .9983649 1.369314 .7227804 .2599848 
443 1.003055 .5465402 1.011893 2.081835 
444 1.012428 .6600294 1.156449 1.195613 
445 1.016498 .4624216 .5782244 3.985603 
446 1.019176 1.587681 1.011893 .3527386 
447 1.0202 .4451812 .7227804 3.590213 
448 1.028275 .9350323 1.011893 .5410814 
449 1.030314 .9854756 1.011893 .6408744 
450 1.032538 1.401084 .5782244 .5463328 
451 1.03326 .9638195 .7227804 .9535281 
452 1.033558 .4428872 2.168341 1.154233 
453 1.033928 1.428662 .7227804 .2733924 
454 1.036203 .5426601 .7227804 2.852403 
455 1.03643 1.023699 .8673365 .605125 
456 1.041772 .8285618 1.590117 .2478777 
457 1.046919 .9974582 1.011893 .4616931 
458 1.047215 1.015956 .5782244 1.042435 
459 1.04943 .6570672 1.445561 1.031507 
460 1.051274 .6304138 1.011893 1.684894 
461 1.05166 .5437574 1.301005 1.71727 
462 1.051839 .6157228 1.445561 1.089481 
463 1.054049 .4029395 .8673365 4.000439 
464 1.054935 1.33764 1.011893 .2519045 
465 1.062654 .769043 .8673365 1.477553 
466 1.064244 1.081061 .7227804 .7912815 
467 1.068894 1.043222 .7227804 .9233864 
468 1.070638 .6796292 .8673365 1.65189 
469 1.076113 .5890272 1.011893 2.146587 
470 1.084105 .3435616 .5782244 5.102568 
471 1.087089 1.11002 .8673365 .5540317 
472 1.08802 .9318534 .8673365 .9557621 
473 1.091031 .7688022 .8673365 1.283229 
474 1.091601 .2848977 .7227804 7.242077 
475 1.092034 .8359437 1.156449 .7605289 
476 1.092725 .7847553 1.156449 .9395742 
477 1.093771 1.157341 1.011893 .4073623 
478 1.097422 1.17784 .8673365 .4570535 
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Table 4.7 Government financial and non-financial assistance 
Top Bottom Middle Top Bottom Middle 
5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 
Panel A: # of obs Panel B: Percentage 
Credit assistance 
All 
year 44 46 45 
Yes 9 22 5 20.45 47.83 11.11 
No 35 24 40 79.55 52.17 88.89 
1996 27 7 10 
Yes 6 1 0 22.22 14.29 
No 21 6 10 77.78 85.71 100.00 
2001 17 39 35 
Yes 3 21 5 17.65 53.85 14.29 
No 14 18 30 82.35 46.15 85.71 
Non-financial assistance 
All 
year 44 43 40 
Yes 15 26 9 34.09 60.47 22.50 
No 29 17 31 65.91 39.53 77.50 
1996 27 7 10 
Yes 12 3 1 44.44 42.86 10.00 
No 15 4 9 55.56 57.14 90.00 
2001 17 36 30 
Yes 3 23 8 17.65 63.89 26.67 
No 14 13 22 82.35 36.11 73.33 
Note: Figures in panel Bare in vertical percentage 
Table 4.8 Characteristics of the 5% ~rOUJ?S 
ToE5% Bottom 5% Middle 5% 
Variable profits (thous.VNDt) 234 390.60 -8 798.98 6 136.91 
Ownership (percentage) 
• Household firms 26.67 91.30 91.11 
• Sole-proprietorship 42.22 2.17 8.89 
• Cooperative 17.78 4.35 
• L & st t companies 13.33 2.17 
Labour (average number of workers) 21.91 5.02 6.60 
Age (average year of operation) 10.58 12.04 8.49 
Location (percentage) 
• Urban 71.11 21.74 46.67 
• Rural 28.89 78.26 53.33 
Note: t VND is the Vietnamese currency 
tt L&S are limited and share holding companies, which are considered 
modern enterprises with more advanced technology and management skills. 
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CHAPTERS 
INSTITUTIONS AND NON-STATE FIRM PERFORMANCE 
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5.1 Introduction 
Institutional economics (North and Thomas 1973; North 1991) emphasize the effects of 
institutions on economic growth through providing information, more secure property 
rights and stringent enforcement mechanisms to stimulate cooperation. Empirical 
investigations using cross-country-data have shown that better institutions are 
accompanied by higher economic performance (Hall and Jones 1999; Acemoglu et al. 
2001; Rodrik et al. 2002). Studies that have used micro or national-level data to analyse 
the effects of institutions on economic performance are rather limited and most have 
focused on ex-communist economies where property rights have recently been 
transferred from the state to individuals (Besley 1995; Johnson et al. 2002b). 
The literature on the impact of institutions on economic performance within countries 
has focused on enforcement issues and the administrative quality of the public sector. 
Berkowitz and De Jong (2003), for example, find that businesses are more likely to 
establish themselves in regions that have more political support from the local 
government in Russia, while Laeven and Woodruff (2004) show that more effective 
jurisdictions are associated with larger firms in Mexico. A critical survey of both 
theoretical and empirical impacts of institutions on economic performance can be found 
in Gagliardi (2007). 
In this chapter we investigate institutional reforms in Vietnam and the impact on firm 
economic performance using a provincial competitiveness index for 2006 (PCI06), and 
firm level data in Vietnam from 2005. A study of Vietnam is of particular interest 
because although it has a homogenous political system and government structure, and 
relatively equal government expenditures in different parts of the country, economic 
performance is substantially different across provinces (VNCI-VCCI 2005). 
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Compared to other low-income countries, Vietnam is also characterized by a high level 
of discretion by local government officials (Fforde and Vylder 1996: 260). 
The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5 .2 investigates institutional reforms and 
their implementation in different regions of Vietnam with a particular focus on the 
second phase of the Vietnamese reform process that began in 2000. An overview of the 
history and institutions in Vietnam is presented in Section 5 .3 while the data and 
variables used in our analysis are described in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 presents the 
econometric model and results of our investigations into institutional explanations for 
differences in economic performance across Vietnam. Section 5.6 offers concluding 
remarks. 
5.2 Vietnam: institutional reforms and implementation 
The economic reform process, called 'Doi moi' in Vietnam, has recognised the legal 
existence of the non-state sector since the beginning of the 1990s. Despite this legal 
landmark, the policy environment remained hostile to private businesses in the 1990s. 
Consequently, non-state firms faced many constraints to their establishment and growth. 
The Asian financial crisis in 1998 led to economic stagnation and thus contributed to 
the second phase of Vietnamese economic reforms. These stage two reforms have 
targeted the sustained growth of the non-state sector and were supported by the 
Enterprise Law of 1999. We investigate these institutional reforms and their 
implementation and impacts on firm performance through firm surveys. In this Section, 
we focus on three aspects of institutional performance: (i) provision of information; (ii) 
security of private property rights; and (iii) lower transaction costs that arise from 
reduced administrative procedures and less discretion by state officials. 
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5.2.1 Providing information 
Vietnam has been characterised by a lack of transparency and a service sector to support 
business development (IMF 2000). For instance, the Economist Intelligence Unit's 
report on Vietnam in 1997 observed that there were no business services (including 
information provision) in any of its listed labour categories. 
A survey on 153 firms in Vietnam in 1998 conducted by Service-Growth Consultants 
Inc (Canada) and Thien Ngan (Galaxy) Co.Ltd (Vietnam), with funding from Mekong 
Project Development Facility (MPDF) and the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
showed an increasing need for market information. One year later, in 1999, MPDF 
conducted a survey of 95 larger private manufacturers and found that a lack of market 
information was the second most important constraint to firm growth (Webster and 
Taussig 1999: 30). Managers often complained about their inability to find information 
on inputs, outputs, alternative suppliers, buyers, price and price trend (Webster 1999). 
Moreover, information about changes in policies and regulations as well as basic 
business registration such as firm name, address, and other details were not available to 
public and responsible officials (VNCI-CIEM 2004). 
The business environment has improved with the issuance of the Enterprise Law (1999) 
that requires firms and business registration bodies to publicise information relating to 
business registration. However, due to incompatibility among government bodies and 
the cost of publicising information in newspapers, the requirement has not been fully 
implemented and varies across provinces. For example, Da Nang (a central province) 
and Ho Chi Minh City have a website with basic firm information. These cities also 
have established a commercial promotion centre to provide firms with market 
information. By contrast, the implementation of the Enterprise Law in other 
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provinces is weak. For instance, in some provinces government agencies continue to 
complain about lack of information on firms and do not know the number of non-state 
firms under their supervision (GTZ-CIEM-UNDP 2004: 17). 
A lack of information persists as a major constraint to the development of non-state 
firms. A survey of 1200 private enterprises in 2001 carried out by the German Agency 
for Technical Cooperation (GTZ) and the Swiss Foundation for Technical Cooperation 
(Swisscontact), in collaboration with InvestConsult Group, revealed a strong demand 
for information about a variety of business topics. A shortage of information about 
market and regulations is also prevalent (GTZ-Swisscontact 2002). Another survey 
implemented in 2001 on 414 private enterprises by MPDF indicated that accessing 
market information and penetrating markets are the biggest obstacles, followed by lack 
of capital (Nguyen et al. 2002: 7). 
Acknowledging difficulties facing non-state firms, the Vietnamese Government issued 
Decree No.90/2001/CP-ND36 in support of the development of small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs)37 and Decision No.94/2002/QD-TTG38 to reform the mechanisms 
and policies to stimulate the development of the non-state sector. These decisions led to 
the formation of the Agency for SME Development (ASMED) in October 2002 that has 
as one of its key roles to provide a countrywide firm information system on technology, 
management, markets, promotion and government regulations related to firm operation. 
36 Translated from the Vietnamese: 'Nghi dinh cua Chinh phli sf> 90/2001/ND-CP ngay 23 thang 11 niim 
2001 vs trq giup phlit tri€n doanh nghi~p vira va nho'. 
37 SMEs in Vietnam are defined as having up to 300 workers. 
38 Translated from the Vietnamese: 'Quyet dinh sf> 94/2002/QD-TTG ngay 17/07/2002 vS chucmg trinh 
hanh d()ng cua chinh phli th\Ic hi~n Nghi quyet hQi nghi lfut thu 5 Ban ChAp Hanh Trung lf cmg Dang 
kh6a IX vS tiep t\lC d6i mcri co che, chinh sach, khuyen khich va t~o diSu ki~n phlit tri€n kinh te tu nhan'. 
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To date, ASMED has worked well in undertaking business registration and regulations. 
Its provision of market information, however, remains weak and implementation varies 
across provinces, depending on the attitude of local government officials towards the 
non-state sector (Malesky 2004). 
To overcome the shortage of information and promote cooperation among firms, firms 
have established their own business associations. In 2002, there were around 200 
business associations operating throughout the country (Nguyen et al. 2002, p. vii) and 
the 2001 survey of MPDF shows that business associations perform well in providing 
information on policies and legal issues to members. Unfortunately, only a few large 
and well-known business associations provide, at a modest level, market information. 
For instance, the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) is equipped with 
an internet-based information system for SMEs, which is transferred from GTZ 
(www.smenet.com.vn), and has set up a centre to promote cooperation among firms. 
Business development services (BDS) have also been encouraged by the provincial and 
central governments. However, a survey on 7 46 firms conducted in 2002 by CSEG39 
and CIEM40 shows that firms often complain about the quality of information that they 
have bought. Consequently, many firms obtain their information informally through 
friends and relatives (Figure 5.1, page 162). Firms in the survey also consider that a lack 
of information on markets and customers weakens their competitiveness. They, in 
particular, demand information on markets such as identity of local buyers, overseas 
clients, potential partners and price (CSEG and CIEM 2002). 
39 Crawford School of Economics and Government (CSEG) - the Australian National University 
4° Central Institute of Economic Management (CIEM) - The Ministry of Planning and Investment of 
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A recent survey conducted by the World Bank in 2004 of 42 enterprises that are 
contractors and subcontractors reveals that lack of information· is the most limiting 
constraint preventing cooperation. Searching for information about contractors and 
subcontractors is time-consuming. Consequently, firms, especially SMEs, have to rely 
on personal sources to advertise their products. Similarly, contractors find it hard to 
identify an appropriate supplier due to lack of basic data or items such as catalogues or 
brochures that also limit cooperation (Carlier and Tran 2005). 
In summary, institutional reforms since 2000 have improved the provision of 
information relating to regulations. However, weaknesses remain in providing market 
information and the implementation of the central government's regulations and 
policies varies across provinces. Given the preference of firms to rely on business 
associations to obtain information, the development of private institutions such as 
business associations and social norms to stimulate cooperation and sanction breaches is 
necessary. The Russian Chamber of Commerce which provides its members with 
information on companies that have been alleged to have breached contracts (Greif and 
Kandel 1995) may be a good example for Vietnamese business associations. 
5.2.2 More secure property rights 
In 2000, the IMF observed that Vietnam did not have secure private property rights. Six 
years later, the Heritage Foundation 2007 (Kane et al. 2007) gave a score of just 10% to 
Vietnam in terms of security of its property rights, whereas other measures of 
institutional performance are rated above 50%. 'Hot' problems that are related to private 
property rights, and often cited as impeding the private sector performance in Vietnam, 
are land, contract enforcement and dispute resolution. 
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5.2.2.1 Land 
According to the Constitution of Vietnam, land belongs to the state. The Land Law 
1993, however, recognises the right to use allocated land parcels. This law also allows 
holders to transfer and mortgage the land use right (LUR) for a specific period (Section 
2 - The Land Law 1993). However, because this law does not define clearly the 
functions of related government bodies, the implementation of giving land use right 
certificates (LURC) is very weak. As a result, many non-state firms have their own 
premises but do not have an LURC as collateral for loans. [For instance, according to 
the firm survey in 2002 by CSEG and CIEM, among non-state firms having their own 
premises, only 51.7% hold LURC]. This limits the potential of firms to borrow and to 
grow their businesses (e.g. Ronnas and Ramamurthy 2001; Carlier and Tran 2004a). 
A consequence of the planned economy and the Vietnam Constitution is that all utilised 
land is allocated to individuals and SOEs, and the procedure to apply for land for 
business purposes is both complicated and costly. Firms incur substantial transaction 
costs by visiting many government agencies, paying a large amount in terms of informal 
fees and waiting for around 2-3 years for the final decision (Carlier and Tran 2004b). 
Due to a lack of premises, non-state firms have also to rent un-utilised land from state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) unofficially or from individuals, weakening their 
competitiveness as the market rent is high compared to the official price stipulated by 
the government. In addition, the contract term is often of short duration because 
landlords want to raise rents after short periods to ensure 'catch up' with a rising land 
price. As a result, non-state firms avoid investing in long term assets on their rental 
premises (Carlier and Tran 2004b). The net result is an increase in both transaction and 
transformation costs. 
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To increase the land supply for non-state firms, the government issued the Land Law 
Amendment 1998 and the Domestic Investment Promotion Amendment 1998. These 
promote the construction of industrial zones and require provinces to publish 
information on available land. However, constructing industrial zones takes time 
because it requires compensation be paid for confiscated land. Moreover, there is no 
government body in charge of confiscated non-used land and the publication of 
information on available land depends on local governments (Malesky 2004). 
The new Land Law 2003 may be a turning point for issues associated with land tenure. 
As stipulated by this law, a subordinate system of Land Use Right Registration 
agencies41 is established to take charge ofLURC. This creates a 'one stop shop', saving 
much money and time for LURC applicants. Further, to increase land supply for the 
non-state sector, an agency called the Land Fund Development Organization42 was 
created. Its function is to confiscate non-used land previously allocated to SOEs and 
other organisations. Another break-through of the new Land Law 2003 is that it tries to 
create a clear distinction between formal and informal land prices.43 However, the 
implementation of this law, as in the case of providing market and other information, 
depends on practices oflocal government authorities (Carlier and Tran 2004b). 
41 Translated from Vietnamese 'Van phOng dang ki quy€n sir dvng ddt'. This is an agency belonging to 
local government bodies of natural resources and environment. 
42 Translated from Vietnamese name: T6 ChUc Phat Trien Quy Dk. 
43 The formal price of land is the price that the state pays for confiscated land. This is much lower than 
the market (informal) price, generating a huge benefit for those who get LUR from the state and thus 
induces corruption in this area. 
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5.2.2.2 Contract enforcement and dispute resolution 
The Vietnamese government has carried out many institutional refonns to stimulate the 
development of the non-state sector, but refonns of the judiciary system have been often 
neglected. To date, the sole improvement in this area is the anti-corruption 'voice' of the 
media towards the judiciary system. When weak contract enforcement has existed as 
part of 'business culture' (Doan 1999), the use of the courts to solve disputes is very 
low. For example, in a survey of 259 managers of non-state finns in Hanoi and Ho Chi 
Minh City in 1995-9744, only 9% said that a court or other government agencies could 
help to solve their disputes (McMillan and Woodruff 1999). Although the incidence is 
much higher in the south than the north of Vietnam (Malesky 2004 ), this proportion is 
much lower than in other transition economies (Johnson et al. 2002a). 
Weaknesses in the judiciary system and an attitude that litigation may lead to a negative 
reputation encourages finns to rely on business associations to solve their disputes. 
Calculations based on the data set of the CSEG and CIEM finn survey in 2002 shows 
that only 7% of finns in the sample had disputes during the period of 5 years. Once 
disputes arise, however, business associations are the most common method of 
resolution. The reasons for not using courts include fears about the complications of 
lawsuits, the possibility of an unfair judge and possible damage of reputation with 
business partners. 
A low level of business disputes is not necessarily a positive indication of economic 
development. Rather, it may reflect too much prudence in selecting partners. The survey 
on non-state SMEs of the Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs (MO LISA) in 
44 The survey was conducted with support of the Vietnam-Pacific Program and the Academic Senate of 
the University of California, San Diego. 
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1996 and 2001 reveals that cooperation is mostly between non-state SMEs and other 
domestic private enterprises in the same district/town. Relationships outside of the 
regions and with SOEs are few, and there is little cooperation with foreign companies 
(Table 5.1, page 165). Moreover, to get partners to enforce contract agreements, 
contractors (large firms) often delay their payment until the next delivery. This 
accumulates financial difficulties for smaller firms (subcontractors) (Carlier and Tran 
2005). 
As a measure to address problems in the judiciary system, firms in Vietnam prefer to 
rely on business associations to solve their disputes. Thus, strengthening the role of 
business associations should be considered in government policies. For instance, in 
Latin America, associations created by companies have helped to overcome problems in 
the judiciary system (Doner and Schneider 2000). 
5.2.3 Reducing administrative procedures and official arbitrariness 
A significant change in business costs has arisen from the issuance of the Enterprise 
Law 1999 in that many barriers preventing the establishment of firms have been 
reduced. Consequently, the time it takes to establish an enterprise has been reduced 
from 90 to 7 days, on average. The registration fee has also decreased from VND 10 
million to VND 500 thousand. Also importantly, the 'bureaucratic attitude' has 
diminished thanks to a clearer definition of the functions of each government body 
(GTZ-CIEM-UNDP 2004). The Land Law 2003 has also reduced administrative costs 
in obtaining LURC. Business operations, thus, have become more flexible and secure. 
In other areas such as tax reform, unfortunately, red tape and low transparency still 
remain as major obstacles to the establishment and growth of private firms. In a survey 
of 300 firms carried out by the MPDF and World Bank in Vietnam in 2002/03, 
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firms often complain about the discretion and bureaucratic attitude of tax officers. The 
fact that firms have to pay unofficial fees is common because tax officers usually hide 
information, making the regulation environment unclear (Carlier and Tran 2004a). 
Other problems also exist. For instance, legal documents in Vietnam require all 
transactions to be proved by a 'red invoice'45 that can be bought only at tax offices. 
Whenever firms come to buy, tax officers sell only one book (containing 50 invoices). 
This means firms have to come back in two weeks or a month to get more. For some 
firms, visiting a tax office is costly. According to a recent survey conducted by CIEM 
on 360 firms in 2007, on average, a firm has to spend 2,000 hours or 245 days per year, 
which is equivalent to hire one staff member to take charge of all tax procedures, while 
completing the tax regulations only requires about 30 days 
(http://www.dautuchungkhoan.com/Nganhang-Taichinh/2007 /08/23938.0TC). The 
issuance of the Tax Law in 2006, which was enforced in July 2007, will help as firms 
are allowed to calculate and pay taxes online. This is a major administrative reform and 
creates a 'one-stop shop' in terms of business taxation. 
5.3 Institutional implementation: reasons for differences and 
measurement 
The political system and government structures in Vietnam are identical everywhere but 
the implementation of the central government's laws and regulations varies across 
regions. In particular, differences are more pronounced between the north and south of 
45 This is the official invoice published by the Ministry of Finance. The name comes from its colour. 
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the country. History, geography and the complexity of laws and regulations are key 
factors explaining institutional variation. 
History and geography 
Vietnamese culture originated in the north and in the Red River Delta (RRD) in 
particular. Early in its history, the RRD was characterised by a high population density 
with almost all in rural areas with poor infrastructure that limited communications 
between districts and provinces (Gourou 1936). 
In terms of economic structure, the Vietnamese culture was historically characterised by 
wet rice cultivation and village settlements. The village was an autonomous community 
which collected taxes from its citizens and fulfilled its obligations to the state. Tax 
obligations of a village were levied on the number of its citizens. Because there was no 
official birth and death registration system, coupled with the difficult communication, 
chiefs of villages had incentives to hide the number of new births from the government 
to keep a proportion of collected taxes for their own benefit. The independence of 
villages was manifested by the sayings 'phep vua thua l~ lang' - translated as 'the laws 
of the King yield to the customs of the village' that is still true until today. 
The population of the RRD generated little surplus production. Commercial markets 
were very small. Citizens produced most of their need from food to housing materials, 
and were inclined toward saving (Gourou 1936). In summary, a high level of 
independence of local governments, lack of transparency between local and central 
governments, and self-sufficiency are the heritage of the north. 
The south, with its core area of the Mekong River Delta (MRD), has been settled by 
people from the north and centre of Vietnam since the 17th century. The first 
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migrants to the south from the north and centre were those who had lost, or could not 
find, a place in the villages (Thach Phuong et al. 1992). Difficulties for the first 
migrants stimulated a cooperative and audacious attitude among these frontiermen (Son 
Nam 2000). 
The contrast between the RRD and MRD is documented by Rambo (1973), Taylor 
(1983), Jamieson (1993) and Brocheux (1995). As described in these studies, village 
organisations in the south were much less rigid when compared to the closed political 
center of villages in the north. Moreover, less diversity in the environment reduced 
differences in locally adapted agricultural production and the need for systems as in the 
north. Contrary to the 'closed community' in the north, southern people have also been 
characterised as being open and less accepting of northern traditional norms. They 
consume more and this substantial consumption difference between RRD and MRD 
remains true today, as shown in Table 5.2 (page 165). 
More predictable and benign weather in the MRD, coupled with a convenient water 
transportation system, promoted faster economic development in the south. The south 
also experienced a greater western influence because the French exercised direct control 
in the south first and later developed French rule and administered indirectly the north, 
through local Vietnamese administrators (Jamieson 1993: 5). Moreover, twenty-five 
years of exposure to the world market economy until 197 5 has made southern 
Vietnamese more market-minded. 
The complexity of laws 
In Vietnam, due to the complexity of law, to guide the implementation of laws, a large 
number of sublaws such as decrees, decisions and regulations are issued. This, in tum, 
makes the regulatory environment more complicated, and the implementation of 
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laws depends very much on the interpretation of local officials (Gillespie 1993; Le et al. 
1999; Webster 1999; GTZ-CIEM-UNDP 2004; Nguyen et al. 2004). Even when 
regulations are clear, there are always opportunities for local authorities to apply their 
own interpretation to central policies (Tenev et al. 2003). 
Institution implementation measurement 
History, differences in culture and geography, and the complexity oflaws, have led to a 
high level of discretion by local authorities in the implementation of rules and decrees 
in Vietnam. This is particularly true in the implementation of the central government's 
regulations and policies towards the non-state sector. An indicator, which measures the 
attitude and the implementation of laws and central government regulations and policies 
at a provincial level, is the provincial competitiveness index (PCI). The first PCI was 
calculated in 2005 (PCI05) for 42 provinces, based on a firm survey and also on 
interviews with state officials in 2004. The PCI05 is a weighted index of 9 sub-indices: 
business entry costs; access to land; transparency and access to information; time costs 
of regulatory compliance; informal charges; implementation and consistency of 
policies; state sector bias; pro-activity of provincial leadership; and private sector 
development policies. While each sub-index is scored from 1 to 10, the PCI is marked 
from 1 to 100 with a higher score indicating better institutional performance. 
Following the success of the PCI05, the Vietnam Competitiveness Initiative (VNCI) - a 
USAID (the United States Agency for International Development) funded project, and 
the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry (VCCI) repeated its study in 2006 
based on the firm survey in 2005. Both PCI05 and PCI06 reflect the improvement of 
institutions at a provincial level since the issuance of the Enterprise Law in 1999. 
Nevertheless, the results from the PCI06 are considered more reliable for several 
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reasons. First, all 64 provinces of the country participated in 2005, thus increasing the 
number of surveyed firms three-fold (6379 businesses versus 2020 firms in 2004). 
Second, two new sub-indices, 'labour training' and 'legal institutions', were introduced 
(VNCI-VCCI 2006). The 'labour training' index assesses provincial assistance with 
skilled labour shortage while the 'legal institutions' index reflects the generalised trust 
of private businesses in the judiciary system to resolve disputes. Third, the methodology 
to calculate sub-indices, assigned weight, and the aggregate PCI was improved (VNCI-
VCCI 2006: 1 ). 
Overall, the PCI reflects the arbitrariness, red tape and corruption of local government 
officials in the way they implement legal documents and policies from the central 
government. As the PCI06 is more reliable in terms of statistics, most of the estimations 
in this chapter use the PCI06 and its sub-indices. 
5.4 Data and variables 
To analyse the impact of institutional changes on firm performance since the second 
phase of reform in 2000, we combine the use of the PCI06 described above and 
countrywide firm level data by province in 2005. The survey is conducted by the 
General Statistics Office of Vietnam. Although this is the country-wide enterprise 
survey, information on costs is limited to the sample. As the paper focuses on the effect 
of institutions on non-state enterprise performance, only the sub-sample of non-state 
manufacturing firms is used. In addition, the exclusion of missing and irrelevant values, 
including negative value-added (VA), visible outliers, large firms that employ more 
than 2,000 workers, and provinces with a small numbers of enterprises, reduces the 
sample to 1, 727 observations. Summary statistics from the firm characteristics of survey 
data are presented in Table 5 .3 (page 166) 
149 
Currently, the non-state sector in Vietnain includes household firms, cooperative 
enterprises, sole proprietorships, partnership enterprises, and limited and shareholding 
companies. However, the survey conducted by the GSO only collects information on 
formally registered firms. Thus, household enterprises are not included in the survey 
and because there are only four partnership enterprises included in the sample, we also 
exclude them from the analysis. 
Column 1, Table 5.3 shows that the majority of non-state enterprises in the sample are 
limited companies, followed by sole proprietorship firms. Firms at a small and medium 
size, using from 10 to 300 workers, dominate this sample. Most of the firms in the 
sample were established at the time the reforms took place in 2000 (column 2). Other 
indicators including firm size, fixed asset and VA show that large firms and advanced 
structures, including limited and shareholding companies, have higher VA and fixed 
assets. 
We model the effects of institutional differences by province on firm labour 
productivity. To control for differences in firm specific characteristics, dummy variables 
for firm size, including micro, small, medium and large groups46, firm age, capital 
intensity (as measured as fixed assets per worker) and ownership types are included. 
The economic environment that affects firm performance, such as the initial 
endowments of provinces including human capital and market size, is included in the 
model as a control. Human capital is measured by the percentage of graduates in the 
total population of each province using the 1999 population census data. Another way 
of measuring human capital is the proportion of students enrolled in professional high 
46 By definition, micro firms employ less than 10 workers while large firms have 300 workers and above. 
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school education as a proportion of the provincial total population in 2001. This 
variable reflects, to some extent, local needs for skilled workers. This information is 
extracted from the standard statistical book for 64 provinces of Vietnam (GSO 2005). 
Market size is measured by the proportion of population of each province over the total 
population and per capita GDP. Per capita GDP is calculated as the average value for 
the period 2001-04 [market size is included as a control because a large market can 
support mass production and advanced technologies (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Murphy 
et al. 1989) that can increase labour productivity (LP)]. Appendix 5.1 provides more 
detail on variables and indices used in the estimated models. 
5.5 Econometric model and results 
The model we estimate to analyse the impacts of institutions on firm performance in 
Vietnam is given by equation (5.1). 
(5.1) 
where: lpu is labour productivity of firm i at province j 
/30 is firm specific effect 
X; is a vector of firm specific characteristics 
Z j is a vector of the provincial initial endowment 
r is a vector of institution variables 
e u is the error term 
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As often cited in the literature, differences in history and culture are the reasons for 
differences in economic performance between the north and south of Vietnam. Kim 
(2006) finds evidence of differences in property rights between the north and south and 
attributes it to differentials in social norms and politics. To test the hypothesis that 
differences in history and culture affect firm performance, a North dummy variable is 
used as a proxy for institutions in model ( 5 .1 ). Controlling for differences in firm 
characteristics, human capital and market size, we find the evidence that, overall, firms 
located in the south perform better than those in the north (specification 1, column 1 and 
2, Table 5.4, page 167). 
The argument that the south used to be a market economy and thus has more experience 
under the liberalised era than the northern bureaucracy-rooted economy seems 
reasonable. However, Nguyen et al. (2004) argue that history is not an important 
indicator as the reform process began some 15 years ago. During that period the north 
approached western economies faster than the south as more scholarships to study in 
western countries were allocated to the north and returned scholars might bring western 
working styles to the north. They also make a comparison of economic performance 
among some provinces in the south with some in the north and conclude that differences 
in economic performance arise from differences in the implementation of legal 
regulations and policies rather than history. 
We argue that history still matters and differences in history and culture define the way 
institutions are implemented. Our evidence is that when PCI06 is added into 
specification 1, it is insignificant and the power of North becomes smaller (column 4, 
Table 5 .4 ). This is because PCf 06 is highly correlated with the north-south dummy 
(Table 5.5, page 167) and it is likely that the dominant impact of social norms 
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influences the power of the institutional variable. 
The relationship between the total PCI06 and its sub-indices with regions are also 
examined in Figure 5.2 (page 163) where each plotted dot reflects the province rank in 
implementing the central government institutions and policies. The vertical line divides 
provinces into northern and southern regions where northern provinces are located on 
the left of the line. The horizontal line goes through the middle performing points and 
splits plotted points into lower and higher governance performers (below and above the 
line, respectively). Overall, southern provinces are often found in the northeast comer of 
each figure, indicating that southern provinces implement the central government 
regulations and policies better than those in the north. It is also seen that the judiciary 
system is the worst performing area as the majority of provinces are located under the 
horizontal line (Figure 5.2e, page 163). 
To investigate the impact of institutional implementation on firm performance, we 
include PCI06 into model (5.1) and exclude North to reduce multicollinearity. The 
effects of sub-indices are also investigated by additional specifications presented in 
Table 5.6 (page 168). For instance, the effects of information provision on firm 
performance are examined in specifications 4 and 5 (Table 5.6). 'Information' in 
specification 4 presents the level of access to the central government regulations and 
policies at the province level, while specification 5 reflects the availability of market 
information. Differences in property rights can be evaluated through an 'access to land' 
index (specification 6) and disputes (specification 7). Disputes are measured by the 
'legal institutions' index, which indicates the confidence of the private sector in the 
judiciary system to resolve their disputes. The possible impact of a lowering of 
transaction costs through simplifying administrative procedures and reducing state 
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officers' arbitrariness on firm performance is analysed in specification 8. This 
specification of institutional performance is constructed from 'entry cost' and 'time 
costs of regulatory compliance' indices, respecting their weight in the PCI06. 'Labour 
training' presented in specification 9 does not reflect institutional reforms, rather it 
reflects the supporting attitude of local government to promoting the development of the 
non-state sector. This index is included in the analysis because unskilled workers and 
managers may impede growth of non-state enterprises and thus government assistance 
in this area could be important (see Appendix 5 .1 for the description of indices used in 
the estimated models). 
To check the robustness of variables included into various specifications, we apply a 
general-to-specific modeling approach in Hendry and Krolzig (2001). Once a general 
unrestricted model (GUM) is formulated, the algorithm of the method checks outliers, 
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defined by its number of a ouM unit. Impacts of these outliers on the dependant variable 
are neutralised by creating dummy variables for each outlier. In a second stage, a 
multiple search path using Monte Carlo simulation is used to evaluate relevant variables 
to be retained in the simplified model. Principally, the multiple search path removes 
insignificant variables from the GUM. After obtaining a specific model, the significance 
of parameters in the final selected model is evaluated in two over-lapping sub-samples 
(Owen 2003). Reliability statistics are reported. A higher reliability value indicates 
higher level of statistical significance of the selected variable in both the full sample and 
sub-samples. These results are presented in Table 5.6 (page 168). 
As shown in Table 5.6 (page 168), there is no heteroskedasticity in all models studied 
and the Chow tests at mid-point and 90th percentile breakpoints confirm the constancy 
of parameters. The results indicate that firm age has a positive effect on labour 
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productivity. One more year of operation makes firms more efficient presumably due to 
the accumulation of skills and experience, reflecting the 'learning by doing' process. 
Among different firm sizes, large groups are excluded from the model as a reference 
group. The Monte Carlo study retains only micro groups in the specific models. Small 
and medium groups do not satisfy the statistical significance of the 'pre-search' tests 
and thus, are excluded from the models. This implies that statistical differences in firm 
performance are only found between micro and large groups. Cooperatives perform less 
efficiently than sole-proprietorships (excluded from the model as a base) because they 
have disadvantages in terms of capital and flexibility in making decisions. 47 Limited 
and shareholding companies are modem establishments with advanced technology and 
management skills, hence performing better than sole-proprietorships. 
The proportion of graduates over total population in 1999 has the expected positive 
sign, at least in some cases (column 1 and 10, Table 5.6). The percentage of 
professional high school students (edusOJ) has an insignificant impact on firm 
performance and is excluded from the models by the general to specific modeling 
procedure. This may be because the number of students is not a good indicator for 
human capital of provinces as a proportion of students come from other provinces to 
study and later return to their place of origin. Per capita GDP also has the expected 
positive sign and the reliability of being included into the model of this variable is 
100%. 
47 Under the Law on Cooperatives, all members of a cooperative enterprise have an equal vote in every 
business. This limits the flexibility in decision making of firms. 
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Institutional effects 
The parameter of interest in equation (1), y, estimated by PcGets - software which is 
used to implement the general to specific modeling approach - reveals an interesting 
aspect of the institutional reforms in Vietnam. As expected, the overall institutional 
index PCI06 has a positive effect on firm performance (specification 3, column 1, Table 
5.6). The result shows that after controlling for differences in firm characteristics and 
provincial initial endowments, a one percentage point improvement in government 
practices increases firm LP by 0.7%. This is equivalent to an increase in the value-added 
of the sample mean firm by VND 77,496.5 per day that corresponds to a nearly three-
fold increase in the Vietnamese daily per capita GDP (VND 28,050.12) in 2005.48 
Information provision in specification 4 (column 4, Table 5.6) reflects the impacts of 
the transparency in governme~t policies and regulations on firm performance. 
Compared to the period before the enterprise law (1999), the availability of regulatory 
information has much improved with most provinces rated above the average level 
(Figure 5.2b, page 163). However, improvements in this area merely reduce troubles 
facing non.;state firms in terms of acknowledging the macro-economic environment, and 
thus can not promote firm performance. In fact, firms need market information to 
expand their businesses. Although the improvement in providing market information 
has been moderate, it has a positive effect on firm economic performance as reflected in 
specification 5 (column 7, Table 5.6). Provinces with a one percentage point higher in 
48 The sample mean firm employs 131.35 workers and has a ln(lp) =3.427. An increase by 0.7% of 
labour productivity is equivalent to an increase ofVND 590 per day. On average, this increases the VA of 
the sample mean firm by VND 77,546.5, nearly three times per capita GDP per day (VND 28,050.12). 
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providing firms with market information can increase firm LP by 5.3%. This is much 
higher than the increase of LP due to the improvement in the total PCI. 
Institutional reforms related to land issues have positive impacts on firm performance. 
Results from specification 6 (column 10, Table 5.6) show a big improvement in firm 
performance if the governance level is better. For instance, if Hanoi - the region with 
the highest human capital with per capita GDP almost twice that of Soc Trang (a poor 
province in the south) - could improve its implementation of land reforms by 3.79 
points to catch up Soc Trang, an average firm in Hanoi can increase its LP by 38.66%. 
This is equivalent to an increase of VA of an average firm in Hanoi by VND 37,603, or 
1.34 times of the daily per capita GDP in 2005. The result is, perhaps, a good answer for 
the puzzle posed in Nguyen et al. (2004) 'why southern provinces grow much faster 
than those in the north'. However, it should be noted that the statistical reliability of 
'land' reported by PcGets is only 22.3%. That means this variable is significant in the 
full sample, but not in both sub-samples in the overlapping analysis. 
Other aspects of institutional reforms including 'dispute' and 'transaction cost' have 
insignificant effects on firm performance (specification 7 and 8), and hence are 
eliminated from the model by the multiple search path of PcGets. The insignificant 
effect of 'dispute' can be explained by no reform in this area. On the other hand, 
'transaction cost' measures the aggregate effect of diminishing time for firm entry, land 
acquisition and bureaucratic compliance. Albeit that entry cost has decreased 
significantly since the second phase reform, this is still more costly than in other 
countries (Youth Newspaper49 12th Oct 2006) and helps firms in the establishment stage 
49 Translated from Vietnamese 'Bao Thanh Nien' ngay 12/10/2006. 
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only. Furthermore, red tape and discretion of state officials remain in many areas, 
causing difficulties for the operation of firms. Government assistance in labour training 
has a positive impact on firm LP (column 19, Table 5.6). This positive effect indicates 
that central and local governments prescribe a correct policy for a persistent illness of 
unskilled workers in non-state firms. The findings imply that although all governance 
areas need to be improved, a good reform strategy would be to focus on good 
governance services, labour training and effective dispute resolution. 
To assess the economic significance of the effects of PC/06, we calculate the average of 
firm observed LP for each province and graph the mean observed LP on PC/06. We 
also carry out a simple simulation based on specification 3 in Table 5.6. As all 
coefficients in this specific model are significantly different from zero, no variable is 
excluded from the simulation. The predicted log(lp) is then transformed into levels. 
The mean of firm predicted LP is computed for each province and graphed on PC/06 as 
well. If the ranking of the mean of the observed and predicted LP on the PCI06 is 
different, the estimated coefficients are only statistically significant, not economically 
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significant. Figure 5.3 (page 164) presents the rankings of the mean observed and 
predicted LP of firms in each province. 
As shown in Figure 5.3, the pattern of the mean observed and predicted LP is not 
different. Overall, the average firm in provinces with higher PCI06 has higher LP. We 
also categorise the predicted LP of the average firm for each province into quartiles in 
ascending order of PCI06. The average of predicted LP of the lowest and highest 
quartile groups is computed. The ratio of these means is 1.18, indicating that PCI06 is 
both economically and statistically significant in explaining differences in firm 
performance. The findings imply that in the short term, provinces can promote the 
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sustainable development of the non-state sector by more effective implementation of 
central government reforms. 
5.6 Conclusion 
The transition period in Vietnam has witnessed much effort by the Vietnamese 
government in building institutions supporting markets. These institutional reforms, 
especially since the second phase in 2000, focus on the sustainable development of the 
non-state sector. The reforms have significantly improved the provision of regulatory 
information and, to some extent, market information. Land tenure and entry costs have 
been also improved. However, weaknesses remain in the judiciary system and 
administration reforms to reduce government officials' discretion. 
The prominent feature of the institutional reforms in Vietnam is the differences in the 
implementation of the central government's regulations and policies in different regions 
of the country. These differences are more pronounced between the north and the south 
and the causes for this institutional variation are history, geography and the complexity 
of laws in Vietnam. 
To examine the impact of institutional reforms on firm economic performance, we use 
firm level data in Vietnam in 2005 and the provincial competitiveness index in 2006 
(PCI06). The results indicate that good governance practices, reflected by PCI06, are 
both statistically and economically significant in explaining differences in firm 
economic performance among provinces. Based on the estimated model, we show that a 
one percentage point improvement in government practices could increase the value-
added of the sample mean firm by an amount equal to a nearly three-times increase in 
the Vietnamese daily per capita GDP. 
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The results indicate that an improvement of institutions in providing firms with market 
information, securing land tenure and labour training assistance, positively increases 
firm labour productivity. The implications are that central and local governments 
prescribe correct policies for non-state firms' persistent problems, including lack of 
market information, and land and skilled worker shortages. The insignificant impact of 
transaction costs and dispute resolution implies that attention should be paid to 
administrative reforms to reduce government officials' discretion and also the weakness 
of the judiciary system. 
Overall, the results show that governance is an important obstacle to the development of 
the non-state business sector and that institutions matter in terms of private firm 
economic performance in Vietnam. 
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5.7 Appendix 5.1 
List of variables 
Variables 
Log(/p) 
K*L ratio 
Firm age 
Micro 
Small 
Medium 
Large 
Cooperative 
Sole-
proprietorship 
Limited 
Shareholding 
EdusOl 
Edu99 
GDPP 
% of population 
North 
PCI06 
Information 1 
Information 2 
Land 
Dispute 
Transaction cost 
Labour training 
Explanation 
Log of labour productivity 
Capital/labour ratio 
Number of years of operation 
Dummy variable for micro firm 
Dummy variable for small firm 
Dummy variable for medium firm 
Dummy variable for large firm -
excluded from the model as a 
reference group 
Source 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
GSO firm survey in 2005 
Level 
Firm 
Firm 
Firm 
Firm 
Firm 
Firm 
Firm 
Dummy variable for cooperative GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
firm 
Dummy variable for sole- GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
proprietorship - excluded from the 
model as a base 
Dummy variable for limited GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
companies 
Dummy variable for shareholding GSO firm survey in 2005 Firm 
companies 
Proportion of students enrolled in 
professional high school education 
as a proportion of the provincial 
total population in 2001 
Percentage of graduates in the 
total population of each province 
Average per capita GDP during 
2001-04 
Proportion of population of each 
province over the total population 
Regional dummy variable 
Provincial competitiveness index, 
2006 
GSO, (2005) 'Socio- Province 
economic statistical data 
of 64 provinces and cities' 
book 
GSO, population census in Province 
1999 
GSO website (GDP and Province 
population) 
GSO website (population) Province 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 Province 
'Transparency and access to VNCI&VCCI, 2006 
information' index 
Province 
'Private sector development VNCI&VCCI, 2006 
services' index 
'Land access and security of VNCI&VCCI, 2006 
tenure index' 
'Legal institutions' index 
Weighted index of 'entry costs' 
and 'time costs of regulatory 
compliance' indices 
'Labour training index' 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 
VNCI&VCCI, 2006 
Province 
Province 
Province 
Province 
Province 
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5.8 Appendix 5.2 
Figures 
Figure 5.1 Proportion of sample firms using each kind of business services 
Technical assistance 
•Bought 
II Personnal source 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 
Percentage 
Source: Author's calculation based on the data set of CSEG & CIEM 
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Figure 5.2 
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Plots of institution indicators across J?~ovinces 
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Figure 5.3 Rankings of observed and predicted mean LP on PC/06 
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Tables 
Table 5.1 Distribution of contractors 
1996 {%} 2001{%} 
Non-state enterprise in same district/town 65.12 43.02 
Non-state enterprise outside district/town 11.63 25.58 
State enterprise in same district/town 8.14 13.95 
State enterprise outside district/town 6.98 11.63 
Foreign company 4.65 1.16 
Other 3.49 4.65 
Total 100.00 100.00 
Source: Author's calculation based on the data set ofMOLISA on SMEs 
Table 5.2 Consumption per capita 1995-2005 
VNDt million/Eerson 
Year Whole RRD North North North South Central South MRD 
nation East West Central Central Highlands East 
Coast Coast 
1995 1.66 1.37 0.72 0.63 0.87 1.70 0.67 4.22 1.54 
1996 1.97 1.66 0.99 0.77 1.02 1.95 1.02 4.90 1.75 
1997 2.15 1.76 1.08 0.71 1.14 2.20 1.16 5.22 2.00 
1998 2.43 1.98 1.23 0.82 1.24 2.44 1.34 5.99 2.22 
1999 2.59 2.17 1.19 0.85 1.32 2.62 1.58 6.25 2.39 
2000 2.84 2.53 1.27 0.90 1.47 2.59 1.79 6.70 2.66 
2001 3.12 2.74 1.72 1.01 1.59 3.07 1.85 7.14 2.86 
2002 3.52 3.21 1.95 1.18 1.73 3.24 2.10 8.04 3.23 
2003 4.13 3.75 2.25 1.24 1.97 3.96 2.31 9.44 3.79 
2004 4.86 4.44 2.74 1.54 2.35 4.54 2.77 10.95 4.47 
2005 5.78 5.31 3.18 2.01 2.75 5.31 3.38 12.94 5.36 
Source: GSO (www.gso.gov.vn) 
Note: t The currency of Vietnam. 
Based on differences in geography, history and culture, and politics, Vietnam is divided into 
8 ecological regions: RRD includes 11 provinces in the Red River area; North East contains 
11 highland and mountainous provinces north east of Hanoi; North West includes 4 
mountainous provinces north west of Hanoi. North Central Coast includes 6 north coast 
provinces while South Central Coast includes 6 south coast provinces. Central Highlands 
contains 4 highland provinces in the central south. The South East includes Ho Chi Minh 
City and other developed provinces in the south, while the MRD contains 12 provinces. 
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Table 5.3 Firm characteristics b~ ownershiI? kind and firm size 
Firm % of firms Avg firm Avg firm Avg fixed Avg value-
ownership established age(# size(# asset added 
& size since 2000 years) workers) (VND (VND 
distribution billion) billion) 
(%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Total 100.00 64.97 7.02 131.39 7054.76 8060.82 
(6.84) (229.37) (17599.19) (19816.66) 
Firm ownership 
• Cooperative 4.52 28.21 14.38 81.55 1661.33 3400.04 
(13.24) (153.24) (5611.86) (11581.84) 
• Sole 25.07 63.74 6.60 50.95 1846.67 2963.97 
proprietorshi (4.09) (107.89) (4256.89) (10299.78) 
p 
•Limited 55.18 69.25 5.67 142.54 7889.18 7926.12 
(3.33) (244.29) (18975.54) (18305.15) 
• Shareholding 15.23 62.36 10.45 237.89 14205.28 18322.59 
(12.39) (283.48) (24199.47) (31622.33) 
Firm size 
•Micro 11.52 71.36 5.71 6.01 459.06 547.70 
(4.29) (2.09) (557.45) (2755.08) 
• Small 42.04 71.07 6.15 24.25 1656.19 2468.61 
(5.73) (10.91) (3496.93) (9109.58) 
•Medium 34.11 60.61 7.77 128.72 7987.35 9631.12 
(7.71) (70.20) (13270.39) (19195.41) 
•Large 12.33 50.23 9.16 620.44 29038.84 29798.58 
(8.72) (346.29) (36912.01) (35251.00) 
Source: Author's calculation based on the countrywide firm survey 2004 (GSO) 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors 
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Table 5.4 Impact of history and culture on firm performance 
Dependent variable: log(lp) 
1: North only 2: North & PCI06 
Coeff t-values Coeff t-values 
Constant 
K*L ratio 
Firm age 
Micro 
Small 
Medium 
Cooperative 
Limited 
Shareholding 
EdusOl 
Edu99 
GDPP 
% of population 
North 
PCI06 
#of obst 
F test (Prob) 
R squared 
(1) 
2.822 
0.002 
0.009 
-0.114 
0.090 
0.135 
-0.445 
0.163 
0.486 
0.448 
0.003 
0.014 
-0.008 
-0.290 
1727 
18.98 
0.13 
(2) 
21.68 
10.8 
1.97 
-0.91 
0.91 
1.40 
-2.92 
2.11 
4.62 
1.51 
0.14 
1.61 
-0.41 
-3.58 
(3) 
2.836 
0.002 
0.009 
-0.114 
0.089 
0.135 
-0.444 
0.164 
0.486 
0.456 
0.002 
0.014 
-0.008 
-0.294 
-0.000 
1727 
17.62 
0.13 
(4) 
9.70 
10.8 
1.97 
-0.91 
0.91 
1.40 
-2.91 
2.09 
4.62 
1.38 
0.11 
1.59 
-0.41 
-2.79 
-0.05 
Note: 1 Number of observations. Large groups and sole-proprietorships 
are excluded as reference groups 
Table 5.5 Correlation between PCI05 and region 
Log(lp) 
PCI06 
North 
Log(lp) PCI06 North 
1.000 
0.083 
-0.066 
1.000 
-0.620 1.000 
Note: Figures in the Table are correlation coefficients 
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Table 5.6 Reliabili~ and coefficients of variables in the firm eerformance model 
General model Specific model - Dependent variable: log(labour productivity) 
3: PCI06 4: Information 1 5: Information 2 
Coe ff Std-err Reliable Coe ff Std-err Reliable Coe ff Std-err Reliable 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Constant 2.466*** 0.181 1.000 2.843*** 0.067 1.000 2.565*** 0.122 1.000 
K*Lratio 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 
Firm age 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.009** 0.004 1.000 
Micro -0.177** 0.080 1.000 -0.194** 0.079 1.000 -0.168** 0.079 0.700 
Small Exct Exct Exct 
Medium Exct Exct Exct 
Cooperative -0.602*** 0.130 1.000 -0.579*** 0.130 1.000 -0.615*** 0.130 1.000 
Limited 0.173** 0.063 1.000 0.222*** 0.062 1.000 0.202*** 0.061 1.000 
Shareholding 0.486*** 0.084 1.000 0.525*** 0.082 1.000 0.526*** 0.081 1.000 
EdusOl Exct Exct Exct 
Edu99 0.017** 0.007 0.592 Exct Exct 
GDPP 0.016*** 0.006 1.000 0.029*** 0.005 1.000 0.020*** 0.006 1.000 
% of population Exct Exct Exct 
PCI05 
PCI06 0.007** 0.003 0.530 
Information l Exc1 
Information 2 0.053*** 0.017 0.499 
Land 
Dispute 
Transaction cost 
Labour training 
Number of obs 1727 1727 1727 
# of outliers 52 51 52 
Chow (864:1) 0.9260 0.9029 0.8973 
Chow (1555:1) 0.6593 0.8827 0.6858 
Hetero test (Prob) 0.5948 0.8460 0.8852 
Note: t Exe means the variable is not relevant and excluded from the model by the algorithm simulation. 
'***'; '**' are significant at l % and 5%, respectively. 
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Table 5.6 ~continuedl 
General model Specific model - Dependent variable: log(labour productivity) 
6: Land 7: Dispute 8:Transaction cost 9: Labour training 
Coe ff Std-err Reliable Coe ff Std-err Reliable Coe ff Std-err Reliable Coe ff Std-err Reliable 
(IO) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) 
Constant 2.191*** 0.329 1.000 2.843*** 0.067 1.000 2.843*** 0.067 1.000 2.635*** 0.127 1.000 
K*Lratio 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 0.002*** 0.000 1.000 
Finn age 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.008** 0.004 1.000 0.009** 0.004 1.000 
Micro -0.209*** 0.079 1.000 -0.194** 0.079 1.000 -0.194** 0.079 1.000 -0.185** 0.080 1.000 
Small Exct Exct Exct Exct 
Medium Exct Exct Exct Exct 
Cooperative -0.581 *** 0.131 1.000 -0.579*** 0.130 1.000 -0.579*** 0.130 1.000 -0.586*** 0.130 1.000 
Limited 0.202** 0.064 1.000 0.222*** 0.062 1.000 0.222*** 0.062 1.000 0.212*** 0.062 1.000 
Shareholding 0.504*** 0.084 1.000 0.525*** 0.082 1.000 0.525*** 0.082 1.000 0.519*** 0.082 1.000 
EdusOl Exct Exct Exct Exct 
Edu99 0.027*** 0.010 0.700 Exct Exct Exct 
GDPP 0.027*** 0.006 1.000 0.029*** 0.005 1.000 0.029*** 0.005 1.000 0.024*** 0.006 1.000 
% of population Exct Exct Exct 
PCI05 
PCI06 
Information 1 
Information 2 
Land 0.102** 0.049 0.223 
Dispute Exct 
Transaction cost Exct 
Labour training 0.040** 0.019 0.471 
Number of obs 1727 1727 1727 1727 
# of outliers 52 51 51 51 
Chow (864:1) 0.9260 0.9029 0.9029 0.9266 
Chow (1555:1) 0.8860 0.8827 0.8827 0.8926 
Hetero test (Prob) 0.6263 0.8460 0.8460 0.7482 
Note: t Exe means the variable is not relevant and excluded from the model by the algorithm simulation. 
'***'; '**' are significant at 1%and5%, respectively. 
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CHAPTER6 
CONCLUSIONS 
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The purpose of the thesis is to explore the performance of non-state enterprises in 
Vietnam and the impacts of institutional reforms on their performance since the 'Doi 
moi' economic reforms. The reforms brought the non-state sector from an 'illegal' to 
'legal' status and introduced many institutional changes to create a 'level playing field' 
for all economic sectors and to promote the sustainable development of the non-state 
sector. 
An investigation into the historical development, general characteristics, performance 
and constraints facing non-state enterprises in Chapter 2 shows that the non-state sector 
in Vietnam has been characterised by operations at a small and medium scale, 
dominated by household enterprises. Although the non-state sector has been successful 
at creating jobs, especially for unskilled labour from rural areas, non-state firms' 
survival rates and contribution to the industrial outputs and GDP is moderate given the 
upsurge in the number of new firms. This may be because of constraints such as: few 
market opportunities, lack of market information and land, limited capital, and the 
shortage of skilled worker. In addition, despite efforts of the Vietnamese government in 
creating a favourable policy environment, non-state firms encounter a high level of 
discretion of government officials. Although there has been an increasing number of 
more advanced enterprises, including limited and shareholding companies, the non-state 
sector dominates labour-intensive areas with low capital investment. 
The performance of non-state enterprises is examined in Chapters 3 and 4 using the data 
set of non-state small and medium manufacturing enterprises from 1991, 1996 and 
2001. Chapter 3 uses the stochastic frontier method to estimate technical efficiency of 
non-state firms and evaluate factors influencing this efficiency level. The results show 
that the average level of efficiency of non-state small and medium manufacturing 
171 
industries was high, and increased during the period studied. Results also indicate a 
wide range in efficiency among firms. 
Based on the estimated frontier production function, production elasticities are 
calculated showing that non-state small and medium manufacturing firms in Vietnam 
still maintain low-cost labour advantages and, thus, have low added value and returns. 
Moreover, the insignificant impact of firm age indicates few or no gains from the 
'learning by doing' process, that may reflect low initial human capital endowments in 
non-state firms. 
A higher proportion of hard working family labour and better-educated workers and 
managers in metropolitan areas appears to be relative advantageous for firms during the 
transition period. The results indicate few benefits from government financial and non-
financial assistance and this support does not appear to be based on any identifiable 
performance criteria. 
The performance of non-state small and medium firms is further investigated in Chapter 
4. In this chapter, a new method called the 'error index decomposition method' is 
developed. The method introduces an error term into the decomposition equation to 
capture measurement biases and white noise that are generated by using the industry 
deflator instead of the observed price to resolve the dimensionality problem. Using the 
data set of non-state small and medium manufacturing firms in 1996 and 2001, the 
method allows a firm's value-added to be decomposed into the contribution of total 
factor productivity, firm size in terms of capital and labour, and prices of outputs and 
intermediate inputs. 
The results indicate that value-added increases with firm size and there is an increasing 
trend of total factor productivity with the use of machinery capital. The 
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decompositions show that total factor productivity is the most important factor 
contributing to a firm's value-added. A further decomposition of total factor 
productivity into capital and labour productivity shows that large firms use capital more 
efficiently than small enterprises, while labour productivity is somewhat similar among 
different firm sizes. This implies that the contribution of labour to value-added is 
mainly due to the higher absolute value of value-added as a result of a higher wage 
proportion, not necessarily to a higher value of a product. This fmding, again, is a 
warning of weak management skills, unskilled workers and weak competitiveness of 
non-state small and medium manufacturing enterprises in Vietnam 
The results in Chapter 4 also indicate the ineffectiveness of government assistance 
programs because the majority of assistance recipients are poor performers. This is not 
because government support programs target weak firms, but costly procedures and few 
benefits from government support encourage strong firms to rely on their own 
resources. 
The policy implications of the thesis are clear. Non-state enterprises in Vietnam need 
support from government to improve workers and managers' skills to enhance labour 
productivity, and, therefore, total factor productivity. They also need the government to 
disentangle their capital shortages to upgrading technology because the majority of 
firms have obtained a high level of technical efficiency given the current technology. 
Improving productivity is the only choice for Vietnamese non-state firms to escape a 
low cost-labour trap and to increase their competitiveness. Further, the development of 
high quality business development services that stimulate firms to use outsourcing 
services to release them from the burden of over-recruitment, and thus, increase the 
value of a product, should be considered in the non-state sector promotion program. 
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Constraints facing non-state enterprises in the 1990s have been somehow eased with the 
introduction of many policy and institutional changes favouring the development of the 
non-state sector since 2000. However, the implementation of these institutional reforms 
varies across provinces, depending on the local government attitude towards the non-
state sector. The impacts of institutional changes on firm performance are analysed in 
Chapter 5 using firm level data in Vietnam in 2005 and the provincial competitiveness 
index in 2006. The results indicate that good governance practices are both statistically 
and economically significant in explaining differences in firm economic performance 
among provinces. 
Institutional performance, in terms of providing market information and more secure 
land tenure, positively increase labour productivity. Nevertheless, administrative 
reforms to diminish transaction costs through simplifying administrative procedures and 
reducing local government officials' discretion do not appear to have any effect on firm 
performance. Few reforms in the judiciary system lead to insignificant impacts on a 
firm labour productivity. The positive effect of labour training assistance implies that 
central and local governments implement apparently correct policies for the persistent 
problem of unskilled workers in non-state firms. 
The findings imply that governance is an important obstacle to the development of the 
non-state business sector, and that a . wise strategy to promote the sustainable 
development of the non-state sector should focus on administrative reforms to reduce 
government officials' discretion. Weaknesses of the judiciary system need to be 
improved and other informal institutions should be developed to enhance cooperation 
among firms. In addition, labour training assistance and preferred loans that allow firms 
to upgrade their current obsolete technology promise the take-off of the non-state sector 
174 
in Vietnam. 
This thesis has limitations that offer possibilities for further work. Firstly, because of the 
nature of the data, we can not measure economic efficiency and decompose it into 
allocative and technical efficiencies. Technological progress and technical efficiency 
changes during the period studied also could not be decomposed. The availability by the 
end of 2007 of the follow-up survey of non-state small and medium firms in 2005 may 
enrich the panel data that allows analysis of changes of firm performance during the 
period 1996-2005. This also offers possibilities for extending the thesis using recent 
extensions of the stochastic frontier such as the meta-frontier analysis (Battese and Rao 
2002) and the random parameters model (Greene 2005). The meta-frontier function 
allows investigation of technical efficiency of firms in different groups that may not 
have the same technology without splitting up the data, while the random parameters 
model allows firm heterogeneity to be built into the stochastic frontier. 
Secondly, the effect of the privatisation program in Vietnam may be better depicted if 
data on SOEs are available. However, the non-state small and medium enterprise 
surveys of the Institute of Labour Science and Social Affairs did not collect information 
from SOEs, making the comparison of performance between state and non-state 
enterprises impossible. The data set from the General Statistics Office contains 
information of both types of ownership. Nevertheless, the provincial competitiveness 
index is intentionally calculated to evaluate impacts of the policy environment on the 
development of non-state firms, comparisons of the effects of institutional reforms on 
state and non-state enterprises are also impractical. Thus, the extension of data and 
further exploration will extend our understanding and help achieve effective policy 
outcomes. 
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